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Abstract 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to examine John Stuart Mill’s political thought from 
about 1827 to 1848 as an exercise in intellectual history. It focuses, first, on Mill’s view, 
formulated by the late 1830s, that contemporary society was ‘civilized’, and second, on 
his project of a science of society, which he aspired to develop in the late 1830s and 
early 1840s. 
By the late 1830s, Mill came to the view that his contemporary society was a 
‘commercial society or civilization’, dominated by the middle, commercial class. The 
first part of my thesis, constituted by Chapters 2-4, discusses the way in which Mill 
formed his notion of civilization, and what he meant by the term ‘civilization’. Mill paid 
attention to the implications of the rise of the middle class, and regarded such 
phenomena of contemporary society as the corruption of the commercial spirit and 
excessive social conformity as an inevitable consequence of the rise of the middle class. 
The second part of the thesis, constituted by Chapters 5-9, examines Mill’s 
projected science of society. In the late 1830s and early 1840s, Mill attempted to 
develop a new science of society whose subject-matter was the nature and prospects of 
commercial, civilized society. This aspiration culminated in A System of Logic, 
published in 1843. In examining Mill’s projected science, I pay particular attention to 
the fact that he conceived new sciences of history and of the formation of character, 
both of which were indispensable in his project, although he failed to give a complete 
account of these sciences. My thesis shows that the implications of his interest both in 
history and in the formation of character are more significant than Mill scholars have 
assumed. - 4 - 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1. Purpose of the Study 
i 
This thesis aims to examine John Stuart Mill’s intellectual activity from about 1827 
to 1848, namely between his recovery from his so-called ‘Mental Crisis’ and the 
publication of Principles of Political Economy. In his Autobiography, Mill said that 
there were three main periods in his mental progress; first, from his earliest memories 
(about 1809 when he began to learn Greek) to what he called ‘A Crisis in My Mental 
History’ in 1826-7;
1  second, from his Mental Crisis to about 1840; and third, from 1840 
to early in 1870 when he last worked on the Autobiography. Each of these periods has 
importance in its own right. However, as the literature on Mill has tended to emphasize 
his place in the history of ideas and the significance of his insights for the present time, 
the main interest of scholars has been in Mill’s later works, such as Considerations on 
Representative Government (1861), Utilitarianism (1861), The Subjection of Women 
(1869), and of course On Liberty (1859), written in the third phase. Recent so-called 
‘revisionist’ interpretations of Mill – the works of Alan Ryan, C. L. Ten, John Gray, and 
Fred Berger, to name but a few – have insisted that Mill’s writings contained a body of 
doctrine which was, though subtle and complex, not internally inconsistent, criticizing 
the ‘traditional’ view of Mill as an incoherent thinker.
2  They aim to reconstruct Mill’s 
thought in its most satisfactory form. In spite of their achievements as exercises in 
philosophy, their reconstructions have been achieved at the expense of giving 
consideration to what Mill really intended in the particular historical context in which 
his ideas were developed. Subsequently, these studies have often attributed to Mill 
views that he did not hold. 
As an exercise in intellectual history, this thesis focuses, first, on Mill’s idea of 
contemporary society as civilized, which had been formulated by the late 1830s, and 
                                                 
1  This phrase is the title of Chapter V of his Autobiography. As John Robson points out, Mill himself 
never used the phrase ‘Mental Crisis’ to refer to his depression in 1826-7. (Robson (1968) 21-49.) 
2  Ryan (1970); Ten (1980); Gray (1983); Berger (1984). For the traditional approach, see Cook (1998) 
36-64. For a comparison between traditional and revisionist interpretations of Mill, see Gray (1979), in 
which the interpretation of John Plamenatz is seen as a typical example of the traditional view. (ibid., 8.) - 10 - 
second, on his project of a science of society, which he aspired to develop in the late 
1830s and 1840s. Besides its significance in its own right, his intellectual activity at this 
period is of huge importance for the further understanding of Mill’s later works, for 
these works were the projects to which he deployed all the ideas he had developed by 
the mid-1840s. 
 
ii 
Throughout his life, Mill was a utilitarian reformer who aimed to better the 
condition of man and society and regarded the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
as the only true end of morality and politics. Having said that, I do not imply that the 
political theory on which his activism was grounded remained unchanged. Rather, his 
theoretical view on man and society altered drastically. Before his ‘Mental Crisis’, 
Benthamite politics provided Mill’s activism with its theoretical foundation. In this 
period, as he recalled in his Autobiography, ‘The Benthamic standard of “the greatest 
happiness” was that which I had always been taught to apply.’
3  Concerning the time 
when he first read Bentham’s Traités de Législation, he wrote: 
When I laid down the last volume of the Traité [sic] I had become a different being. 
The “principle of utility,” understood as Bentham understood it, and applied in the 
manner in which he applied it through these three volumes, fell exactly into its place 
as the keystone which held together the detached and fragmentary component parts 
of my knowledge and beliefs.
4 
From the Benthamite point of view, Mill thought that the rulers did not have any interest 
in promoting the happiness of people, but had a sinister interest in promoting their own 
happiness. They were willing to harm the people’s interest in order to advance their own. 
Therefore, it was impossible to secure the interest of the people under any form of 
government but representative democracy, where there could exist an identification of 
interests between the rulers and the ruled. In this period, as a committed advocate of 
representative democracy, Mill regarded James Mill’s essay on ‘Government’ as ‘a 
                                                 
3  JSM, Autobiography, CW, i, 67. 
4  Ibid., 69. - 11 - 
masterpiece of political wisdom’.
5  Political doctrines that were laid down in the works 
of James Mill, as well as in those of Bentham, dominated his journalism before his 
Mental Crisis; to use John Robson’s expression, his early writings were ‘made of 
Bentham’s opinions in James Mill’s tones’.
6 
In contrast, after his Mental Crisis, Mill attempted to ground his activism on an 
alternative view of man and society to what he viewed as a Benthamite one. At this time, 
he ceased to accept the doctrine of James Mill’s ‘Government’ as ‘a scientific theory’, 
and no longer thought that representative democracy was ‘an absolute principle’.
7  In 
pursuing an alternative, he came to hold what I call ‘political relativism’, a view that 
every question concerning political and social institutions was relative to time and place. 
In his Autobiography he wrote that, around 1829, he came to hold the following ideas: 
That all questions of political institutions are relative, not absolute, and that different 
stages of human progress not only will have, but ought to have, different 
institutions: That government is always either in the hands, or passing into the hands, 
of whatever is the strongest power in society, and that what this power is, does not 
depend on institutions, but institutions on it: That any general theory or philosophy 
of politics supposes a previous theory of human progress, and that this is the same 
thing with a philosophy of history.
8 
Although his view of representative democracy changed, Mill never abandoned the 
radical cause. He stated: ‘this change in the premises of my political philosophy did not 
alter my practical political creed as to the requirements of my own time and country. I 
was as much as ever a radical and democrat, for Europe, and especially for England.’
9 
He found no difficulty in grounding his claim for political reform on recently acquired 
ideas that society changed according to inevitable laws and that the suitability of the 
form of government depended on the condition of society.
10 
 
                                                 
5  Ibid., 107. 
6  Robson (1968) 7. 
7  JSM, Autobiography, CW, i, 177. 
8  Ibid., 169. 
9  Ibid. 
10  E.g. JSM, ‘Civilization’, CW, xviii, 126-7. For this argument, see Burrow (1988) 23-4. - 12 - 
iii 
By the time when his two massive works, A System of Logic (1843) and Principles 
of Political Economy (1848) were published, Mill had developed a theory of man and 
society, characterized by the relativism noted above. John Robson states that, ‘Mill’s 
mature and autonomous attitude towards moral and social phenomena was developed 
finally in the Logic, and from the time of its publication in 1843 no significant change 
of opinion affecting the total structure of his thoughts is to be found in his works.’
11 
Even though the style and content of his arguments in the 1850s onwards often differed 
in significant ways from those in the 1830s and 1840s, the view of man and society 
which he had developed by the mid-1840s formed the theoretical foundation for the 
works written in the 1850s and 1860s, including On Liberty and Considerations on 
Representative Government. 
Mill thought that intellectual improvement should always precede change in society. 
In particular, he placed emphasis on the refinement of the method of scientific reasoning. 
In the early 1830s, he stated: 
in whatever science there are systematic differences of opinion – which is as much 
as to say, in all the moral or mental sciences, and in Political Economy among the 
rest; in whatever science there exist, among those who have attended to the subject, 
what are commonly called differences of principle, as distinguished from differences 
of matter-of-fact or detail, – the cause will be found to be, a difference in their 
conceptions of the philosophic method of the science.
12 
Mill’s view of methodology as the arena where all intellectual issues could be settled is 
a clue to understanding why he devoted a great deal of time and effort to his work on 
logic, and therefore why the Logic – the most important product of his longstanding 
interest in methodology – had a crucial place in his thought. Some scholars, John 
Robson and Alan Ryan among others, have thought it necessary to take the Logic 
seriously in order to understand Mill’s political thought.
13  Nevertheless, no scholar has 
                                                 
11  Robson (1968) 117. 
12  JSM, ‘Definition’, CW, iv, 324. See also JSM to John Sterling, 20-22 October 1831, CW, xii, 78-9, in 
which he stated: ‘If there is any science which I am capable of promoting, I think it is the science of 
science itself, the science of investigation – of method.’ 
13  Robson (1968); Ryan (1974). - 13 - 
attempted fully to examine the Logic in light of his projected science of society. The aim 
of this thesis is, therefore, to interpret Mill in light of his project.   
Alan Ryan states that Mill’s Logic was ‘a reformer’s book’.
14  The Logic had a 
practical bias in that Mill intended it to rebut intuitionist philosophy, which, in his view, 
claimed that there were certain truths known by the mind whose source was not 
experience, and which he attributed to Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Whewell 
among others.
15  He saw that this philosophy led inevitably to conservatism in the 
political, social, and moral spheres, for it assumed that whatever existed must be true. 
Rebutting intuitionist philosophy was, therefore, to undermine the philosophical ground 
for anti-reform arguments. He was convinced that, in the Logic, he had achieved his 
intended aims, both theoretical and practical. In other words, he thought that he had 
resolved certain methodological problems, and then had rebutted intuitionism as the 
philosophical foundation of political conservatism. 
Prior to the Logic, in ‘Coleridge’ (1840), Mill contrasted the methods of the 
Benthamites and Coleridgians. He saw the Benthamites as the followers of the 
rationalist and deductive method of eighteenth-century empiricism, while Coleridgian 
arguments constituted ‘the reaction of the nineteenth century’ against it.
16  He identified 
the common error of the eighteenth-century empiricists as ‘mistaking the state of things 
with which they had always been familiar, for the universal and natural condition of 
mankind’.
17  In his view, as a follower of eighteenth-century thinkers, Bentham too was 
guilty of this error. According to Mill, Bentham neglected to gaze beyond his own mind 
to see how men actually were, and had knowledge only of his own mind which was too 
narrow to be relied on for generalization. Consequently, though ‘the great reformer of 
the moral and political branch of [philosophy]’,
18  Bentham developed an insufficient 
                                                 
14  Ryan (1974) 85. 
15  See JSM, Autobiography, CW, i, 231-3. For the practical bias which Mill’s argument always had, see 
Robson (1968) ix. 
16  JSM, Autobiography, CW, i, 169. 
17  JSM, ‘Coleridge’, CW, x, 132. Mill saw James Mill as ‘the last of the eighteenth century’. (JSM, 
Autobiography, CW, i, 213.) 
18  JSM, ‘Bentham’, CW, x, 86. - 14 - 
‘philosophy of universal human nature’,
19  and thereby his moral, political, and social 
theory, which was based on this philosophy, was characterized by ‘one-sidedness’.
20 
Mill concluded that the deductive approach which Bentham employed could accomplish 
nothing in politics and morals, as it did not take into account diversities in national 
character. 
Mill thought that an alternative to the eighteenth-century empiricist approach was 
provided by Coleridge and his followers, a group that Mill called ‘the 
Germano-Coleridgian school’.
21  In Mill’s view, the nineteenth-century approach to the 
study of man and society was inductive, while the eighteenth-century approach was 
deductive. To Mill’s mind, Coleridgians were the first to inquire into the inductive laws 
governing human society. They examined human behaviour in the varying contexts of 
time and place, and did not see the condition of society they knew as universal. 
Subsequently, they succeeded in developing a theory of man and society richer than that 
provided by eighteenth-century thinkers. Mill thought that, though the purely inductive 
approach was inappropriate, inductive insights should be incorporated into the 
deductive study of man and society. In other words, he aspired to combine Benthamite 
deductive and Coleridgian inductive approaches, which resulted in the complex and 
subtle formulation of the methodology of moral sciences in the Logic. His aspiration to 
combine the Benthamite and Coleridgian standpoints explains his desire to create 
sciences of history and of the formation of character as integral parts of his system of 
social science. 
 
iv 
The concept of civilization had a crucial place in Mill’s thought, especially in the 
1830s and 1840s. In his article ‘State of Society in America’ (1836), Mill regarded 
England (not Britain), France, Germany, and America as civilized. Each of these four 
nations showed, ‘either in its social condition, in its national character, or in both, some 
points of indisputable and pre-eminent superiority over all the others’, as well as ‘some 
                                                 
19  Ibid., 109 
20  JSM, ‘Coleridge’, CW, x, 112. 
21  JSM, ‘Coleridge’, CW, x, 138.   - 15 - 
deep-seated and grievous defects’.
22  Hence, these nations occupied a great deal of his 
interest. Among them, his enthusiasm for France and French thought is well known, and 
his attitude towards France has been given serious attention by previous scholars.
23  In 
contrast, his view of America as a civilized society remains relatively unexplored, 
despite the growing interest in Mill’s concept of civilization. Even where scholars show 
an interest in Mill’s views on the American experience, they discuss them in light of his 
attitude towards Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, which he highly 
praised. In so doing, their focus tends to be on such abstract political ideas as the 
tyranny of the majority and political participation, rather than on Mill’s views on 
America itself. Mill’s views on America are worth examining in relation to his concept 
of civilization. As D. P. Crook points out, the American experience was frequently 
referred to in Britain in the Age of Reform.
24  Hence, it seems appropriate to look at 
Mill’s interest in America in the context of the contemporary English political and social 
climate, as well as at Mill’s attitude towards Tocqueville.
25 
In examining Mill’s notion of civilization, I pay attention to the fact that he often 
referred with disapproval to the social condition and national character of England and 
the United States (particularly their commercial spirit).
26  Having said that, this does not 
mean that Mill thought that England and America were less civilized than such nations 
as France and Germany. Rather, he found more of the characteristics of civilization in 
England and America. This is a crucial point as it clarifies that he thought that the 
                                                 
22  JSM, ‘America’, CW, xviii, 94. 
23  See, for example, Mueller (1956); Pappé (1964); Filipiuk (1991); Varouxakis (2002b). 
24  Crook (1965). 
25  My attention to Mill’s view of America does not imply that the French experience did not have any 
impact on the development of his political thought. My argument is interested to complement the 
interpretations that have emphasized Mill’s connection with France. 
26  See, for example, JSM to Gustav d'Eichthal, 15 May 1829, CW, xii, 31-2; JSM, ‘The Spirit of the Age 
[1-6]’ (1831), CW, xxii, 227-34, 246-7, 258-9, 289-95, 312-16; JMS and Joseph Blanco White, ‘Guizot’s 
Lectures on European Civilization’ (1836), CW, xx, 367-93; JSM, Logic, CW, viii, 906. Moreover, Mill 
even expressed the view that Britain was in rapid decline in comparison with France. For this, see JSM to 
Alexis de Tocqueville, 30 December 1840, CW, xiii, 457-9; JSM to Auguste Comte, 26 March 1846, CW, 
xiii, 696-7. [Haac (1995) 364-5.]; JSM, ‘Prospects of France [1-7]’ (1830-1), CW, xxii, 128-40, 142-6, 
149-63, 184-9, 295-301. - 16 - 
process of civilization entailed vices. Therefore, what he pursued was ‘strengthening the 
weak side of Civilization by the support of a higher Cultivation’.
27  He was convinced 
that his projected science of society would make it possible to improve the condition of 
civilized society. 
 
v 
Some Victorian social theorists conceived the science of society as aiming to 
discover the ‘natural laws’ which governed the historical development of society, and on 
which all political activities more or less depended. They emphasized not the political, 
but the social, and this priority of the social over the political came to be closely bound 
up with two features: first, historicism, in other words, a belief in the existence of a 
pattern of historical development which could be understood in terms of ‘law’; second, 
a commitment to the methods of natural science as the model for the study of human 
behaviour.
28  ‘On this view’, according to Stefan Collini, ‘the relevant primary category 
was not moral philosophy but something increasingly referred to as “sociology”.’
29 
Mill’s projected science of society had characteristics of this Victorian social theory in 
important ways. In the Logic, Mill outlined a system of social science, which consisted 
of a ‘General Science of Society’ (Social Statics and Social Dynamics) and ‘Special 
Sociological Enquiries’ (political economy and political ethology). The systematic 
character of his project of a science of society becomes clear when examined in the 
context of his framework for social theorizing put forward in the Logic. 
My analysis of Mill’s projected science of society pays special attention to his 
interest in the science of history and that of the formation of character. His interest in, 
and aspiration to develop, both these sciences have been paid relatively little attention 
by scholars, particularly by political theorists, who put much weight on such works as 
On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government, and Utilitarianism. Mill’s 
hope for fully developing the science of history, whose objective was to discover the 
laws of social change, culminated in the mid-1840s. Even though Mill never published 
                                                 
27  JSM, ‘Civilization’ (1836), CW, xviii, 143. 
28  Mandelbaum (1971) 42. See also Collini (1980) 204. 
29  Collini (1980) 204. - 17 - 
any book whose exclusive subject-matter was history, in the mid-1840s he wrote a 
number of articles on history in the form of review articles on the works of French 
historians. When his formulation of a system of moral science, which he presented in 
Book VI of the Logic, is taken into consideration, it becomes clear that his notion of 
history occupied a more significant place in his thought than scholars assume. As far as 
Mill’s interest in the formation of character is concerned, in contrast to the scholarly 
consensus that Mill’s ethology does not need to be given serious attention because he 
failed to fully develop it, I give great importance to it in examining his political thought. 
In Mill scholarship, an underestimation of the significance of his aspiration to develop 
ethology often produces a misunderstanding of Mill’s argument. 
 
2. Structure of the Thesis 
In the mid-1830s, Mill came to hold a view that contemporary society was a 
‘commercial society’ or a ‘commercial civilization’, dominated by the middle, 
commercial class. The first part of the thesis, comprising Chapters 2-4, discusses, first, 
the intellectual context in which Mill formed his notion of ‘civilization’, and second, his 
notion of civilization itself. The second part, comprising Chapters 5-9, examines Mill’s 
projected science of society. In the late 1830s and early 1840s, he conceived a new 
system of the science of society for the purpose of inquiring into the nature and 
prospects of commercial or civilized society. This aspiration culminated in Book VI of 
the Logic, entitled ‘On the Logic of the Moral Sciences’.   
Chapter 2 deals with two formulations of the science of politics at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, both of which were similar to Mill’s argument in some important 
respects. The first was that put forward by Dugald Stewart. In the first part of this 
chapter, I examine Stewart’s view of commercial society. He thought that commercial 
society was distinct from any other society, in that it had achieved the wide diffusion of 
wealth and knowledge in society. He insisted that the new commercial society should be 
studied by a new science of society different from traditional politics. Political economy 
explained the strength of commercial society, and thereby gave scientific grounds to his 
belief in its superiority. In Stewart’s system of politics, therefore, political economy 
occupied a crucial place. 
In the second part of the chapter, I examine Saint Simon’s science of social - 18 - 
organization in the form of the philosophy of history, which attracted Mill. Saint Simon 
downgraded the form of government in the study of politics, claiming that it was 
necessary to examine the internal function and structure of the social body as a whole. 
Hence, in Saint Simon’s view, the state of society gained recognition as the 
subject-matter of scientific inquiry. Moreover, he was convinced that the science of 
social organization had a therapeutic function in promoting social stability.   
Chapter 3 deals with Mill’s views on America, which have vital significance for the 
understanding of his notion of civilization. The publication of Tocqueville’s Democracy 
in America in 1835 led Mill to pay attention to American society. Apart from the 
immediate circumstances that encouraged Mill to pay attention to America, it should be 
noted that America was a topic that many intellectuals and politicians at the time 
frequently referred to while discussing domestic issues, especially parliamentary reform. 
Hence, Mill’s views on America should be interpreted in the context of this intellectual 
climate, as well as in terms of his relationship with Tocqueville, whose argument was 
crucial to the formation of his views of America. 
Chapter 4 examines Mill’s notion of civilization in the late 1830s. He often 
mentioned that he had been influenced by French thinkers, such as Tocqueville and 
Guizot; various pieces of evidence support this claim. However, the view that 
contemporary society was a commercial civilization with a dominant commercial class 
was shared by most of Mill’s predecessors and contemporaries, including James Mill. 
Therefore, in the first part of this chapter, I point out the similarities between James 
Mill’s notions of the middle class and of civilization and those of J. S. Mill. 
In the late 1830s, Mill came to see contemporary society as a commercial 
civilization led by the commercial middle class, and attained a perspective from which 
he understood various phenomena in contemporary society. As the second part of the 
chapter shows, he sought to give a systematic and comprehensive explanation of the 
tendencies of civilized society, such as the corruption of the commercial spirit and the 
so-called ‘tyranny of the majority’, and to propose practicable solutions for them, such 
as the creation of social antagonism in order to counterbalance the dominant middle 
class. 
In Chapter 5, I inquire into Mill’s vision of social science, with reference to A 
System of Logic. The Logic has, from its publication, been an important subject of - 19 - 
research from a philosophical perspective. However, it is not my intention to point out 
whether his argument is philosophically convincing; my purpose is to explain what Mill 
himself meant and intended. Mill stated that every study of social phenomena should be 
grounded on psychology as the science of human nature. In other words, all the social 
sciences had to be deduced from the laws of psychology. In the Logic, he gave a 
detailed explanation of what kinds of deductive methods were to be applied to the study 
of social phenomena, pointing out why inductive methods of any kind were not feasible 
in such a study. 
In Mill’s projected science of society, history had a more crucial role than scholars 
have assumed. Hence, Chapter 6 is devoted to a discussion of Mill’s interest in 
historical knowledge and his aspiration to form a science of history whose objective was 
to discover the laws of social change. Even though he never published any works 
exclusively devoted to history, he wrote several historical essays in the form of review 
articles, especially in the mid-1840s. Without giving serious consideration to his views 
on history formed at this period, it is impossible to understand properly his thought, not 
only in the 1840s, but also from the 1850s onwards when many important works, 
including On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, were written. 
Chapters 7 and 8 are devoted to political ethology and political economy 
respectively, both of which constituted what Mill called ‘Special Sociological 
Enquiries’. The subject-matter of Chapter 7 is Mill’s aspiration to form a science of the 
formation of character, a science which he named ‘ethology’. In spite of the growing 
interest in Mill’s notion of human cultivation in recent scholarship, the significance of 
ethology, on which the practice of human cultivation was based, has tended to be 
ignored. The aim of Chapter 7 is, therefore, to examine his project of ethology.   
In the first section of the chapter, I give a brief account of two views about the 
formation of character – phrenology and Owenite environmentalism – which constituted 
Mill’s main target when he was conceiving his ethology. In the second section, I 
examine his interest in the formation of character in the 1830s which eventually led him 
to conceive ethology. Next, I discuss his project of ethology as outlined in the Logic. 
This section is followed by an examination of the practical dimension of ethology.   
In Chapter 8, I examine Mill’s notions on the nature of political economy and his 
formulation of its relationship with neighbouring sciences, such as the ‘General Science - 20 - 
of Society’ and political ethology. In the first part of this chapter, I examine the 
controversy over the method and scope of political economy in the 1820s and early 
1830s. The second part of the chapter discusses Mill’s views on the method and 
province of political economy as a science. Following David Ricardo, he stated that 
political economy was a deductive science with a narrow scope. In spite of his adoption 
of the Ricardian definition of the science of political economy, however, he regarded his 
own political economy as ‘a newer & better’ version, distinguished in several ways 
from the old political economy.
30  In the third part of this chapter, I examine what was 
‘newer & better’ about his version of political economy. 
The Irish famine in the mid-1840s, caused by the failure of the potato crop, called 
Mill’s attention to the agricultural and economic problems of Ireland. In Chapter 9, I 
examine Mill’s engagement in the so-called Irish land question at this period in light of 
contemporary discussion on Irish national character and the Irish question. He analyzed 
the condition of Ireland not only from a political and economic, but also an ethological 
point of view. This chapter shows that both his diagnosis of the Irish distress and his 
proposed remedy for it were firmly grounded on the theory of man and society which he 
had developed by the mid-1840s. 
Chapter 10 states the implications of this study for Mill scholarship. I discuss how 
this study of Mill’s projected science of society will lead to a revised understanding of 
his later works, in particular On Liberty and Considerations on Representative 
Government.   
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Chapter 2. The Science of Society in the Early Nineteenth Century 
 
1. Introduction 
J. S. Mill recognized that the dominance of ‘society’ over political forms was a 
distinguishing characteristic of nineteenth-century political thought. He believed that his 
projected science of society was distinct from an earlier political theory which he 
criticized as insufficient because it concentrated only on the form and machinery of 
government and omitted the examination of ‘society’. In A System of Logic, at the 
height of his confidence in the novelty of his project, Mill criticized ‘both … 
practitioners in politics and … philosophical speculators on forms of government, from 
Plato to Bentham’ for their narrowness of vision. ‘Students in politics’, he stated,   
attempted to study the pathology and therapeutics of the social body, before they 
laid the necessary foundation in its physiology; to cure disease without 
understanding the laws of health. And the result was such as it must always be when 
men even of great ability attempt to deal with the complex questions of a science 
before its simpler and more elementary propositions have been established.
1 
Despite his confidence in the novelty of his project, there had been a group of thinkers 
who had been concerned with ‘society’, and of whom Mill was by no means ignorant. 
These thinkers had been associated with the Scottish Enlightenment, and included 
David Hume, Adam Smith, and John Millar. 
With regard to the affinity between the views of the Scottish Enlightenment and 
those of J. S. Mill, Stefan Collini states that Mill’s understanding of the laws of social 
development was ‘slightly more determinist than Smith’s, and considerably more 
intellectualist than Millar’s’.
2  In fact, Mill’s standpoint was closer to that of Dugald 
Stewart than to that of Smith or Millar. In the first part of Chapter 1, therefore, I deal 
with the view of politics and history put forward by Stewart, who greatly inspired some 
members of the next generation of politicians and thinkers who would flourish in the 
first decades of the nineteenth century, including the founding members of the 
Edinburgh Review and James Mill. Stewart thought that the commercial society to 
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which he saw himself as belonging was superior both to any preceding societies, such as 
the feudal and agricultural, and to other contemporary societies, such as those of the 
Asian nations, which, to his mind, had not yet reached the stage of commercial 
civilization. Political economy explained the strength of commercial society, and 
thereby gave scientific grounds to his belief in its superiority. In Stewart’s system of 
politics, therefore, political economy occupied a crucial place. 
In Mill’s mind, the concern with ‘the social’ originated with post-Revolutionary 
French political theorists, such as Saint Simon, Auguste Comte, and François Guizot. In 
the second part of this chapter, I deal with Saint Simon, whose views were one of the 
important sources for Mill’s projected science of society.
3  Saint Simon downgraded the 
form of government in the study of politics. He saw it as merely one of several causal 
factors that constituted the state of a certain society. Government was not the definitive 
cause in determining the state of society; rather, the most suitable form of government 
was determined according to the condition of the society in which that government was 
located. He claimed it was necessary to examine the internal function and structure of 
the social body as a whole.   
As far as methodology was concerned, he held a naturalistic view that all moral and 
political problems could be solved by methods similar to those employed in the natural 
sciences, and thereby his science of social organization was expressed in physiological 
terms, grounded on the analogy between the social body and the human body. Having 
experienced the French Revolution, he was obsessed with the need to re-establish social 
order on a new, firm basis which would prevent the recurrence of such catastrophic 
turmoil. He was convinced that the science of social organization had a therapeutic 
function in promoting social stability. His science of social organization took the form 
of the philosophy of history, which Mill found attractive. 
 
2. Dugald Stewart on History and Politics 
i 
Eighteenth-century Europe witnessed the emergence of the notion of commercial 
society or civilization. There was a growing awareness that, in the age of commerce, the 
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power of a nation depended more on the arts and productivity of its people than on the 
valour of its armed forces on the field of battle. It was often remarked that European 
commercial society was sharply distinguished from any other form society. The 
Enlightenment philosophers, especially in Scotland, conceived a new science which 
investigated the nature, history, and prospects of commercial society. A picture of 
commercial society, and the division of labour as its distinctive element, can be found in 
the writings of such Scottish thinkers as David Hume, Adam Smith, and John Millar. 
They stated that commerce was the driving force behind the progress of society, and 
that the division of labour created complex social relations, thereby bringing about the 
refinement of manners and passions and general improvement in the arts and science. 
The study of society emerged as a discipline within moral philosophy particularly in 
the work of eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers, It was generally characterized by 
the following features.
4  First, the study of society was grounded on the study of human 
nature, in other words all social phenomena were interpreted in terms of the operations 
of the laws of human nature. Thus, the study of society was a study of man. The 
Enlightenment philosophers showed a huge interest in the social structure of any given 
people at any given point in time. For them, to inquire into a state of any remote and 
primitive society which was in contrast with their own society was nothing but to study 
human nature. Second, they regarded any social phenomenon as an ‘effect’ which had a 
‘cause’ to which it corresponded; the aim then was to clarify the causal relation in 
question. In other words, they assumed the existence of, and subsequently aimed to 
discover, the ‘natural laws’ which governed the historical development of society – laws 
which were applicable to all societies. Third, as far as methodology was concerned, they 
assumed that the same methods could be used for both the natural and the moral 
sciences. In particular, the Newtonian method was thought to be applicable to the study 
of man and society. The Newtonian method, as they understood it, consisted in the 
formulation of general laws through experimental methods.
5  However, there was a 
crucial difference between natural science and moral or human science; the latter 
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inevitably made experiment difficult. Hence, by ‘experimental’, they meant the 
inductive method, and not the conducting of actual experiments. Moreover, the 
inductive method, as they conceived it, did not mean the mere collection of observable 
facts, but induction from observation so as to discover ‘the constant and universal 
principles of human nature’.
6 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, Dugald Stewart, who can be taken to be a 
representative figure of the final generation of the Scottish Enlightenment, was 
committed to the Enlightenment project of a study of man and society. He attempted to 
renovate politics by adjusting Smith’s views, his Wealth of Nations in particular, to the 
new circumstances of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period. As professor of moral 
philosophy, he attracted a number of men who afterwards distinguished themselves, 
including the founders of the Edinburgh Review and James Mill.   
 
ii 
Stewart’s position on the development of society was characterized by his view that 
intellectual factors were decisive in social change. He stated that the diffusion of 
knowledge throughout society brought about a drastic change in the condition of 
society.
7  It encouraged changes of relationship between people, and thereby change in 
social and political institutions. Among historical events which contributed to the 
progress of society, such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the discovery of the 
New Continent, the invention of printing was particularly important.
8  According to 
Stewart, it contributed to the improvement of the condition of society in two ways: first, 
‘in securing and accelerating the progress of knowledge’; and second, ‘in facilitating the 
diffusion and dissemination of knowledge among the lower orders’.
9  He paid attention 
to the importance of material factors, but did so from the point of view that these 
constituted a necessary condition for the diffusion of knowledge. He stated: 
Without this auxiliary circumstance [i.e. the broad diffusion of wealth through 
society], the art of printing must have been a barren invention; for before men read, 
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they must have felt the desire of knowledge, and this desire is never strong, till a 
certain degree of independence and of affluence is obtained.
10 
Accordingly, the improvement of society by the broad diffusion of knowledge could be 
achieved only in commercial society where material needs were met to a certain degree. 
Commercial society was distinguished from preceding societies by this fact,.
11 
Stewart was distinguished from such Scottish thinkers as Hume, Smith, and Millar 
by his optimistic view of the possibility of the intellectual and moral progress of 
mankind, from which his strong belief in the rightness of public opinion and education 
as a means of forming that opinion arose.
12  Stewart stated, for example, that the 
division of labour in intellectual activities had had a huge significance in the progress 
and spread of knowledge.
13  Understanding history in terms of the progress and 
diffusion of knowledge, Stewart tended to depict history as the unilinear development of 
the intellectual ability of mankind. In addition, he expressed a strong belief in the use of 
legislation, grounded on acquired knowledge, to achieve desirable development, and 
therefore left little room for the operation of unintended consequences in the future 
development of society. Hence, his argument showed teleological and determinist 
tendencies, and gave an important role to the legislator in encouraging the progress of 
society.
14 
 
iii 
Stewart insisted that the new commercial society should be studied by a new science 
of society different from the traditional politics which focused almost exclusively on the 
advantages and disadvantages of forms of government. He stated that ‘little assistance is 
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to be derived from the speculations of ancient philosophers’ in analysing commercial 
society. This was because   
the greater part of [them], in their political inquiries, confined their attention to a 
comparison of the different forms of government, and to an examination of the 
provisions they made for perpetuating their own existence, and for extending the 
glory of the state. It was reserved for modern times to investigate those universal 
principles of justice and of expediency, which ought, under every form of 
government, to regulate the social order; and of which the object is, to make as 
equitable a distribution as possible, among all the different members of a community, 
of the advantages arising from the political union.
15 
As part of moral philosophy, a new science of society had been developed by Scottish 
philosophers, such as Hume and Smith, in the eighteenth century. Stewart attempted to 
adjust Smith’s argument to the new circumstances at the turn of the nineteenth century. 
The new science of society, as they conceived it, did not only aim to give a concrete 
account for each historical event, but also aimed to discover abstract principles which 
were not only applicable to the past, but also useful in predicting the future. Stewart 
wrote:   
The ultimate object of philosophical inquiry is the same which every man of plain 
understanding proposes to himself, when he remarks the events which fall under his 
observation, with a view to the future regulation of his conduct. The more 
knowledge of this kind we acquire, the better can we accommodate our plans to the 
established order of things.
16 
Stewart’s formulation of a science of society revealed his interest in the potential of 
political economy as the basis for the new science. In his view, theories of government 
and of legislation constituted political science. While the theory of government dealt 
with the advantages and disadvantages of each form of government, the theory of 
legislation was designed to inquire into ‘those universal principles of justice and 
expediency, which ought, under every form of government, to regulate the social 
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order’.
17  In Stewart’s terminology, this theory of legislation was identified with 
political economy whose subject-matter was ‘the happiness and improvement of 
Political Society’.
18  The theory of legislation, as conceived by Stewart, embraced 
jurisprudence but excluded a comparative study of the forms of government.
19   
Furthermore, Stewart wrote on the relation between theories of government and 
legislation. Stewart claimed that the promotion of the happiness of people in a society 
depended immediately on social and economic arrangements, and not political 
arrangements. In other words, civil liberty was more important than political liberty for 
the happiness of the people. Nevertheless, it seemed reasonable on the surface to deal 
with the theory of government prior to political economy, since the existence of 
government was an indispensable prerequisite for the stability of society. However, it 
was not theoretically appropriate. On the one hand, the study of political economy did 
not necessarily presuppose knowledge of forms of government, because the general 
principles of political economy could be applied to many nations under different forms 
of government. On the other hand, the theory and comparative study of forms of 
government presupposed a knowledge of political economy.
20  The fact that different 
European nations had reached the stage of commercial civilization under a diversity of 
forms of government suggested that commercial society could flourish under different 
political arrangements. 
Stewart’s prioritization of political economy over the theory of government had 
practical as well as theoretical dimensions. He claimed that political economy did not 
have a radical, but a moderate practical implication, and was not, therefore, dangerous 
to the existing social order. Political economy, as he conceived it, whose main objective 
was to achieve the expediency and rightness of laws – the improvement of legislation – 
was not primarily concerned with questions of the form of government and the rights 
and liberties of the people. Thus, political economy was separated from the democratic 
trends of political and social speculation which had been apparent since the French 
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Revolution.
21 
Another significant point is that Stewart emphasized the importance of applying 
general principles to politics, and, therefore, thought that the aim of science was to 
discover general laws using a deductive approach. According to Stewart, philosophy 
could correct the narrowness of political empiricism, while history could provide no 
reliable theories. As a guide, knowledge of the past was inferior to ‘the sagacity of our 
conjectures with respect to the future’, especially in commercial society which was 
unlike any preceding society.
22  Stewart stated:   
there are plainly two sets of political reasoners; one of which consider the actual 
institutions of mankind as the only safe foundation for our conclusions, and think 
every plan of legislation chimerical, which is not copied from one which has already 
been realized; while the other apprehend that, in many cases, we may reason safely 
a priori from the known principles of human nature combined with the particular 
circumstances of the times.
23   
He claimed that politics should employ the latter method, because it was difficult, 
almost impossible, either to conduct experiments in human affairs or to draw reliable 
causal inferences from history. Having said that, he did not ignore the role of experience 
in political theorizing. He insisted that political theorizing must be grounded on the 
observation of societies that had existed or were then in existence. 
Nothing, indeed, can be more absurd than to contrast, as is commonly done, 
experience with theory, as if they stood in opposition to each other. Without theory 
… experience is a blind and useless guide; while, on the other hand, a legitimate 
theory … necessarily presupposes a knowledge of connected and well ascertained 
facts, more comprehensive by far than any mere empiric is likely to possess.
24 
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The objective of politics thus understood was not to explain each phenomenon, but to 
discover general laws from an examination of phenomena. Stewart’s view was that the 
general principles, which were independent of spatial and temporal particularities, could 
offer useful knowledge in terms of the future development of society. 
Stewart’s preference for abstract, general principles and geometrical reasoning in 
politics might be associated with his knowledge of mathematics. His father Matthew, 
professor of mathematics at the University of Edinburgh, instructed him in mathematics. 
In 1772 Stewart substituted for his ailing father in the mathematics class at the 
University. He was convinced that moral, as well as physical, science could obtain the 
certainty of mathematics. He stated: ‘it appears that it might be possible, by devising a 
set of arbitrary definitions, to form a science which, although conversant about moral, 
political, or physical ideas, should yet be as certain as geometry.’
25 
Significantly, Stewart gave little importance to the role of historical study in politics. 
His attitude was underscored by his conviction that history was nothing but the 
historian’s own theoretical construction.
26  He stated that, ‘By far the greater part of 
what is called matter of fact in politics, is nothing else than theory; and very frequently, 
in this science, when we think we are opposing experience to speculation, we are only 
opposing one theory to another’.
27  Stewart’s teleological view of history, reinforced by 
his belief in the possibility of artificial improvement in terms of legislation and 
education, was distinct from Smith and Millar who were more sceptical about the 
possibility of the improvement of mankind. Hence, Stewart simplified the four-stage 
theory of social development, elaborated by such thinkers as Smith and Millar, into a 
dichotomy of barbarous and civilized societies.
28 
 
iv 
As a student at the University of Edinburgh, James Mill was greatly influenced by 
Stewart. There are several crucial affinities between the views of Stewart and James 
Mill. They agreed that the study of society should employ a method which involved 
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deduction from the laws of human nature. They also agreed that intellectual or moral 
factors played a decisive role in the development of society. As will be seen below, 
these ideas similarly characterized J. S. Mill’s projected science of society.
29  James 
Mill followed Stewart in downplaying historical knowledge in politics. In his essay on 
‘Government’, he developed an argument on parliamentary reform without any 
reference to history, which was reminiscent of Stewart’s view that historical knowledge 
was of little importance in politics and it was even mischievous to depend on it.
30  In 
addition, James Mill followed Stewart in his dichotomy of barbarous and civilized 
societies. It is well-known that James Mill intended his History of British India (1817) 
to be a continuation of the works of the Scottish philosophical historians, particularly 
John Millar.
31  James Mill certainly employed the language of Scottish philosophical 
history, but it is doubtful that his practice of it was, as Duncan Forbes argues, a 
straightforward adoption of the Scottish tradition in which he had been educated.
32  J. H. 
Burns argues: 
The faults [of History of British India] are rather those of an imperfectly realized 
conception of philosophical history in which the object is indeed to relate social 
phenomena to ‘the law of human nature,’ but in which it is recognized that such 
phenomena, and the development of society, can be understood only by way of ‘a 
joint view of all the great circumstances taken together.
33   
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More recently, Knud Haakonssen and Jennifer Pitts have emphasized the gulf which 
separated much Scottish philosophical history and the more simplistic theory of 
progress put forward by James Mill.
34  Haakonssen argues that what made ‘[James] 
Mill’s History of British India such an arid rationalist exercise when compared with, for 
example, the works of Smith and Millar’ were first, his inattentiveness to unintended 
consequences, and second, his tendency to attribute all change to the intervention of 
individuals and subsequently the lack of any ‘theoretical conception of social and 
institutional change’.
35  In a similar vein, Pitts argues that James Mill, unlike the 
Scottish historians who preceded him, failed to pay sufficient attention to the 
differences between non-European nations, and saw them all as essentially ‘rude’ or 
‘barbarous’.
36  Pitts goes on to remark: ‘To a great extent … [J. S. Mill] shared his 
father’s judgements of Indian society, about the usefulness of making a dichotomous 
distinction between civilized and barbarous peoples, and about the proper relationship 
between India and its British rulers.’
37  Though her argument is suggestive, she does not 
discuss who influenced James Mill as far as this dichotomous distinction was concerned. 
James Mill’s argument was novel in comparison with Smith and Millar, but the 
distinction he employed was common among the contributors to the Edinburgh Review 
in its pioneer years. Crucially, most of them, including James Mill, had been taught by 
Stewart.
38   
It is the concept of progress, grounded on this distinction between barbarous and 
civilized, that characterized both James Mill’s and J. S. Mill’s outlooks,
39  and, 
therefore, in this regard, William Thomas’ claim that ‘[James Mill] adapts utilitarian 
ideas to support an argument that is insular, morally intolerant, and implicitly 
authoritarian’ is misconceived.
40  It is not utilitarianism but his idea of progress, which 
seems to be associated more with Stewart’s dichotomy between barbarous and civilized 
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societies than Scottish philosophical history as represented by Smith and Millar, that led 
to James Mill’s authoritarian view on barbarous nations, particularly India.
41 
 
3. Saint Simon and the Origin of Social Science 
i 
Saint Simon attempted to create a new science of society, ‘the science of social 
organization’ as he called it. His science of society, according to Robert Wokler, was an 
attempt to combine, in physiological terms, the insight of four thinkers, namely the 
anatomy of Félix Vicq d’Azyr, the physiology of Marie François Xavier Bichat, the 
psychology of Pierre Jean George Cabanis, and the philosophy of history of 
Condorcet.
42  On the basis of the physiology of the human body, Saint Simon conceived 
the positive science of social organization, a science which aimed to inquire into the 
internal function and structure of the social body. To his mind, there was a close and 
necessary connection between every aspect of social existence, such as the moral, 
intellectual, religious, legal, economic, and political. A crucial change in one aspect 
brought about inevitable, corresponding changes in the others. In the social body, 
political form was merely one factor among several in determining social condition. 
This belief led him to question the possibility of a political solution to social disorder. 
He insisted that existing theories of politics should be replaced by the study of social 
organization which examined a number of factors. The fundamental factor in 
determining the state of society was an ideological one. If there was ideological 
uniformity, society could be stabilized; if not, it became unstable. In light of history, 
society developed through a progressive spiral of stable epochs alternating with unstable 
ones. 
Saint Simon stated that humanity as a collective entity had grown from generation to 
generation, according to invariable laws, including the ‘law of the perfectibility of the 
human species’.
43  Society progressed from the stage of savagery towards that of 
perfection. In this progress, society had passed through two alternative modes of social 
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existence, which he named the ‘organic and critical epochs’. The organic epoch was 
characterized by ‘unity and harmony in all spheres of human activity’. Power was 
possessed by ‘the truly superior’.
44  In contrast, the critical epoch was distinguished by 
‘anarchy, confusion, and disorder in all directions’.
45  In this epoch, faith in the dogma 
which was the source of order in the preceding organic epoch was lost; the legitimacy of 
all power was doubted.
46  Even though he preferred the organic epoch, Saint Simon 
believed that neither could be avoided; in order to enter the next organic epoch, society 
had to pass through a critical epoch. 
In European history, the first organic epoch was that of Ancient polytheism, lasting 
until Socrates appeared in Greece and Augustus in Rome. This epoch was followed by 
the first critical epoch in which classical philosophers undermined polytheism. The 
second organic epoch was from the preaching of the Gospels to the Reformation. After 
the Reformation, European society had entered the second critical epoch. Saint Simon 
and his followers thought that this critical epoch would be replaced by a new organic 
period in which they would take a leading role in providing a new morality. Even 
though each critical epoch was unfavourable, they regarded it as an advance on the 
previous organic epoch, because the law of continual progress was operating even in the 
critical epoch.
47  In a well-organized society, moral and intellectual progress could be 
rapidly achieved, thus rendering the existing institutions insufficient and new ones 
necessary. Thus, society would remain unstable until new institutions were established, 
but this unstable state was superior to the preceding stable state.
48 
Saint Simon’s interpretation of the Middle Ages was significant in that it clearly 
reflected his relativism.
49  To his mind, each organic epoch was characterized by a 
dominant class whose talent and ideology made its members the rulers of society at that 
particular stage of the moral development of society. He stated: ‘Absolutely speaking, 
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there is nothing good, nothing bad. Everything is relative – that is the only absolute; 
everything is relative, above all to the time, in so far as social institutions are 
concerned.’ In general, Enlightenment philosophers, including Condorcet from whom 
Saint Simon learnt about the philosophy of history, tended to see the Middle Ages as a 
church-ridden and superstitious age, and as representing a retrograde step in the 
development of human mind, and, therefore, welcomed its being superseded by their 
own enlightened age. In contrast, Saint Simon appreciated medieval culture in its own 
right from the viewpoint of historical relativism. He thought that the Middle Ages were 
a necessary step in the progress of society; it was ‘the veritable cradle of our modern 
civilization’. Catholicism provided a creed and a vision of the world as the basis for 
social organization.
50  Even though the theocratic or feudal political system which 
originated in this period should now be extinguished, he claimed:   
it was impossible to establish a better political system at that time, because, on the 
one hand, all the knowledge that men had was yet superficial and vague, general 
metaphysics provided the only principles that could serve as guides to our medieval 
forebears, and therefore general metaphysicians had to direct the scientific affairs of 
society. On the other hand, the only means by which a great people might increase 
in prosperity in those barbarous times being conquest, soldiers had to be put in 
charge of directing the national affairs of the several states. Thus, the fundamental 
basis of the old political system was, on the one hand, a state of ignorance …; and 
on the other hand, an absence of skill in the arts and craft which … left [people] 
with no other means of adding to their wealth than to seize the raw materials held by 
other people.
51 
By ‘progress’, Saint Simon specifically meant the ‘progress of moral conception’; 
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political and institutional progress was seen as a derivative of moral progress, or ‘the 
realization, that is the putting into practice of this conception’.
52  While moral progress 
was continual, the progress of political and social institutions was not continual. In the 
organic epoch, institutions could fully reflect the advance in moral conceptions and 
society was, therefore, stable, grounded on the new moral concept. Well-organized 
society in this epoch could provide a shelter under which moral progress could proceed 
rapidly. Ironically, it was this moral progress that made the existing institutions obsolete, 
whereupon society entered a critical epoch where there was no harmony between the 
moral and institutional conditions of society, as well as no agreement over what was the 
new, proper moral concept. Once a new moral concept was articulated in the critical 
epoch, society would again stabilize. 
Saint Simon stressed the importance of the elite class who possessed the talents and 
outlook appropriate to the needs of society at its particular stage of development. In the 
critical epoch, where the existing elite ossified, a new class was expected to emerge, a 
class which would later displace the existing elite. As it emerged, the rising class 
contributed to the formation of the new moral concept and corresponding institutions 
appropriate to the coming organic epoch, even though its taking over from the old elite 
could not be done without a prolonged struggle. In his own age, this rising class was 
what Saint Simon called the ‘industrial’ class, and he regarded himself as its theoretical 
advocate. Saint Simon thought that the industrial class was more valuable than other 
classes such as aristocracy or clergy. Hence, he hoped for the reorganization of society, 
led by the industrial chiefs as the ‘temporal power’, replacing the aristocrats, and by the 
men of science as the ‘spiritual power’, replacing the church of the medieval age.   
 
ii 
Saint Simon never used the expression ‘social science’ to refer to his own science of 
society, but his views are often regarded as one of the origins of the ‘social science’ 
which philosophers of the nineteenth century were eager to create. According to 
historians of social science, the French term ‘science sociale’ emerged first in the later 
eighteenth century, and its English equivalent, ‘social science’, appeared in the early 
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nineteenth century.
53  Some members of the Bentham circle were among the earliest to 
employ the expression ‘social science’. The earliest use of the expression in English in 
published writings, according to Robert Wokler, appeared in 1824 in William 
Thompson’s Inquiry into the Principles of the Distribution of Wealth most conductive to 
Human Happiness.
54  Even though not in published writings, Bentham himself used the 
expression in a private letter as early as 1821.
55  J. S. Mill also used the expression in a 
private letter to Gustav d’Eichtal, dated 8 October 1829,
56  and then in a published 
article ‘Definition of Political Economy’ in 1836. His use of the expression was perhaps 
a consequence of his acquaintance with the views of French philosophers, Saint Simon 
and his former disciple Auguste Comte among others. Just after his Mental Crisis, Mill 
was particularly interested in the Saint Simonian science of society in the form of the 
philosophy of history. Significantly, Mill’s interest in history, which coloured his 
project of a science of society, was initially excited by the French historians, such as 
Saint Simon, Comte, and Guizot, not the Scottish tradition of philosophical history, of 
which he was by no means ignorant, thanks to his early education by James Mill.
57 
Around 1830 Mill was eager to absorb Saint Simonian ideas, particularly on the 
development of society. In his Autobiography, Mill recalled that: ‘The writers by whom, 
more than by any others, a new mode of political thinking was brought home to me, 
were those of the St. Simonian school in France. In 1829 and 1830 I became acquainted 
with some of their writings’.
58  During this period, Mill formed a very close friendship 
with a Saint Simonian, Gustav d’Eichthal, who stayed in Britain from April to 
December 1828 and met young English intellectuals including Mill.
59  Impressed by 
Mill, d’Eichthal attempted to recruit him for the Saint Simonian cause and gave him 
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copies of the Saint Simonian journal Le Producteur and a copy of Auguste Comte’s 
Système de Politique Positive.
60  Even though Mill never converted to Saint 
Simonianism,
61  his articles in the early 1830s, particularly ‘The Spirit of the Age’ in 
1831, revealed his acceptance of some Saint Simonian ideas, such as the cycle of 
organic and critical epochs, and the role of the elite class in promoting social health. 
In ‘The Spirit of the Age’, Mill attempted to develop the Saint Simonian idea that 
‘the only wholesome state of the human mind’ was ‘a state in which the body of the 
people, i.e. the uninstructed, shall entertain the same feelings of deference & submission 
to the authority of the instructed, in morals and politics’.
62  He claimed the necessity of 
political and social reform which would give power to the new elites, instead of the 
existing aristocrats. Having defined his contemporary age as ‘an age of transition’ in 
which ‘Mankind have outgrown old institutions and old doctrines, and have not yet 
acquired new ones [which were fit for them]’, Mill pointed out that this anarchical state 
was a consequence of the disagreements among the intellectual elites of his day.
63 
According to Mill, in a transitional state of society, ‘there are no established doctrines’, 
and ‘the world of opinion is a mere chaos’.
64  This state would continue until ‘a moral 
and social revolution … has replaced worldly power and moral influence in the hands of 
the most competent’.
65  As Alan Ryan states, ‘“The Spirit of the Age” is not the “real 
Mill”; appropriately, it is a transitional Mill that it reveals.’
66  Nevertheless, some of the 
Saint Simonian ideas Mill absorbed and illustrated in this series of articles, especially 
those regarding history, were incorporated into his project of the science of society that 
culminated in A System of Logic. 
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4. Concluding Note 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, there were attempts to create a new science 
which inquired into the nature, history, and prospects of civilized society. Both Dugald 
Stewart and Saint Simon thought that the drastic change of European society, brought 
about by commercialization and democratization, had made the existing science of 
politics outdated. In the face of the social and political turmoil caused by the French 
Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, they intended that their new science of society 
would contribute to the stabilization and development of European civilization. Their 
project inspired political theorists of the next generation, including J. S. Mill. 
While Europe was in turmoil, a newly founded nation, the United States of America, 
was rapidly developing. Some European observers saw that she had reached the same 
stage of civilization as European nations; she posed a threat to, as well as excited the 
envy of, the European. J. S. Mill depicted the situation as follows:   
The progress of political dissatisfaction, and the comparisons made between the 
fruits of a popular constitution on one side of the Atlantic, and of a mixed 
government with a preponderating aristocratic element on the other, had made the 
working of American institutions a party question. For many years, every book of 
travels in America had been a party pamphlet, or had at least fallen among partisans, 
and been pressed into the service of one party or of the other.
67 
Mill himself regarded America as a civilized society in its most advanced form, and 
examined the characteristics of her society as symptoms of civilization. In the next 
chapter, I examine Mill’s view of American society in light of the early 
nineteenth-century British controversy over America. 
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Chapter 3. J. S. Mill and the American Experience 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to an examination of the views of America held by J. S. Mill 
and his contemporaries. Observation on the American experience contributed to Mill’s 
understanding of the nature of contemporary civilized society. The publication of Alexis 
de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America in 1835 led Mill to pay attention to America 
and the relationship between government and society in general. Observations on 
America, especially through the eyes of Tocqueville, occupied a crucial place in the 
development of Mill’s political thought. Whatever the immediate causes that 
encouraged Mill to pay attention to America, it should be noted that her democratic 
form of government and its relation to the climate, habits, and manners of her society 
were frequently referred to in debates about various domestic issues, especially 
parliamentary reform, in Britain. Hence Mill’s view of America should be examined in 
the context of this intellectual climate, together with his relationship with Tocqueville. 
In this chapter, I first show how America had been discussed in early 
nineteenth-century Britain: the conservative, critical view of the Tories; the 
middle-of-the road view represented by the Whigs; and the favourable view of Jeremy 
Bentham and his circle. Second, I examine how Mill interpreted Tocqueville’s account 
of American society. He thought that Tocqueville’s account was full of insight and 
accepted most of his theses, though not completely. Third, I discuss Mill’s view of 
America. He saw the existence of the middle class as the most important characteristic 
of American society. This was where America and Britain possessed a common feature. 
In light of the contemporary British controversy over America, Mill’s views on America 
can be seen to follow the typical strategy of Philosophic Radicalism. In other words, he 
wished to provide a counter-argument to the anti-reformers who referred to America as 
an example showing how democracy had adverse effects on society.   
 
2. The Tory View of America 
Generally speaking, in the early nineteenth century, the Tories argued against 
domestic reform. Their conservatism coloured articles relating to America in the   - 40 - 
Quarterly Review, the most important organ of conservative opinion at that time.
1  Their 
views of America were generally critical, as they feared that the introduction of 
democratic or popular government into Britain would destroy the established order of 
British society and thereby infringe their class interests. They eagerly attempted to 
expose the faults of America, and in turn advocated the existing British system.
2 
With regard to political reform, the Tories denied the applicability of the American 
system to Britain, emphasizing the differences between American and British social 
conditions. In the debates on the first Reform Bill, Robert Peel stated that, while Britain 
attempted to introduce foreign electoral systems, ‘In France, in Spain, in Portugal, in 
Belgium, the utmost efforts have been exhausted to establish a form of government like 
ours – to adjust the nice balance between the conflicting elements of royal, aristocratical, 
and popular power – to secure the inestimable blessings of limited monarchy and 
temperate freedom.’ Even though America might have succeeded in introducing popular 
government, it did not mean that it would be safe to make the British government more 
popular than it was. He went on to claim: ‘the circumstances of the two countries are so 
totally different, that no inference could be drawn from the success of such a form of 
government in the United States, in favour of the application of its principles to this 
country.’
3  In his view, the suitability of government for a society depended on its 
circumstances, and, accordingly, that American governmental devices, such as the 
secret ballot and universal suffrage, could not be effectively introduced into Britain. 
Several Tory-biased books on America were published in the late 1820s and early 
1830s. These included Basil Hall’s Travels in North America in the Years 1827 and 
1828 (1829), Frances Trollope’s Domestic Manners of the Americans (1832), and 
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Thomas Hamilton’s Men and Manners in America (1833). Thanks in part to their 
cutting style and entertaining content, these works created a furore and helped to 
disseminate conservative views not only in Britain but also on the Continent.
4 
Subsequently, they became points of reference for those attempting to give an account 
of America. This may be the reason why Mill’s article on America of 1836 was 
published in the form of a critical review of these Tory works. 
Among Tory writers, Thomas Hamilton offered one of the most important 
arguments against popular government.
5  He stated that, although it was the fashion ‘to 
call the United States the land of liberty and equality’,
6  the Americans did not actually 
believe in the idea that all men were equal, an idea from which they derived the 
philosophical justification for their political and social institutions. Furthermore, 
Hamilton stated that the importance of landed property had been overlooked in America, 
because property in the form of land was, thanks to the vast expanse of the West, 
available to everyone for the moment. But such resources would be exhausted in the 
future, and then America’s circumstances would become similar to those of Britain, 
where the majority of the people were without property of any kind, and then there 
would be ‘the great struggle between property and numbers; on the one side hunger, 
rapacity, and physical power; reason, justice, and helplessness on the other’.
7  If Britain, 
following the American experience, abandoned her own established institutions and 
introduced popular government based on a fallible philosophy, she would become 
corrupt like America.
8 
Hamilton’s attack was directed against American governmental devices such as 
representation and the presidency: ‘The institutions of the United States afford the 
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purest specimen the world has yet seen, of a representative government; of an executive, 
where duties are those of mere passive agency; of a legislature, which serves but as the 
vocal organ of the sole and real dictator, the people.’
9  The policies of each President 
were inevitably directed towards his re-election, and were in accord with the passions or 
prejudices of the numerical majority of the people.
10 
A characteristic of Hamilton’s work was that he pointed out the similarities between 
America and Britain. He paid considerable attention to the similarities between their 
commercial circumstances. He asserted that what had been called equality in America 
was seen even in Britain: ‘On the whole, the difference is not striking, I should imagine, 
between the social habits of the people of New York, and those prevalent in our 
first-rate mercantile cities. In both, the faculties are exerted in the same pursuits; in both, 
the dominant aristocracy is that of wealth; and in both, there is the same grasping at 
unsubstantial and unacknowledged distinctions.’
11  In order to understand Mill’s 
argument on America in its historical context, it is important to note Hamilton’s focus 
on the affinities between the two nations. Such a perspective had been given little 
emphasis by preceding writers, while philosophical writers after Hamilton, including 
Tocqueville and Mill, laid great stress on the similarities between American and 
European society. 
 
3. The Whig View of America 
It is not seriously doubted that those generally called the Whigs, though ‘Whig’ was 
an elusive term in the early nineteenth century, took a crucial role in bringing about 
domestic reforms in Britain during the Age of Reform. As Joseph Hamburger points out, 
the Whigs occupied an ambiguous position in that they were essentially a party of 
aristocrats, yet claimed to be reformers and advocates of the people’s interest. They 
were often accused of founding their policies on no principle or of holding incompatible 
principles, and thereby of not defining their position with regard to the central issue of 
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aristocracy versus democracy.
12  James Mill’s condemnation of the Whigs’ 
middle-of-the road position was severe: 
In their speeches and writings, therefore, we commonly find them playing at seesaw. 
If a portion of the discourse has been employed in recommending the interests of the 
people, another must be employed in recommending the interests of the aristocracy. 
Having spoken a while on the one side, they must speak a while on the other. 
Having written a few pages on the one side, they must write as many on the other. It 
matters not how much the one set of principles are really at variance with the other, 
provided the discordance is not very visible, or not likely to be clearly seen by the 
party on whom it is wished that the delusion should pass.
13 
Compared with the Tories, the Whigs often offered a more favourable view of 
America, criticizing misinterpretations by Tory writers.
14  Of importance was the fact 
that the Whig approval of the American government was grounded on the theory of 
balance and check, in terms of which the British constitution could also be justified. 
Hence, the Whig view of America was not necessarily associated with a criticism of 
Britain. Even though they advocated constitutional reform in Britain, their strategy was 
a gradualist one; they did not wish for a dramatic change in the British constitution 
which would lead to republican or popular institutions, and never supported any reform 
that might change the established order of the nation. Accordingly, their allusions to 
American experience were not in terms of a good example which Britain should follow, 
but an inspiration for the limited and moderate reform which they wished to achieve. As 
D. P. Crook points out, ‘Praise of American democracy per se was … outside the true 
Whig tradition’.
15  They were prepared to be critical of America, if the American 
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example was not useful for their cause. 
In his review of Jeremy Bentham’s Plan of Parliamentary Reform in the Form of a 
Catechism (1817) in the Edinburgh Review of 1818, James Mackintosh criticized 
Bentham’s proposals, which amply reflected American democracy. Mackintosh doubted 
that, ‘all interests will be best protected, where the representatives are chosen by all 
men’.
16  He insisted that universal suffrage and secret ballot were of no use in securing 
the interests of all classes. Mackintosh stated that Bentham’s use of the American 
experience did not support his radical proposal. In Mackintosh’s view, universal 
suffrage did not exist in America because of the existence of slavery. Moreover, thanks 
to the existence of the vast frontier, a majority of the people possessed property, and the 
greater part of the people ‘are either landholders, or just about to be so’. Even if it were 
admitted that universal suffrage was established in America, it could not be introduced 
into Europe, as there were crucial differences between America and Europe where 
‘crowded cities and unequal fortunes’ existed.
17 
 
4. Jeremy Bentham, the Westminster Review, and America 
i 
Despite his life-long hostility to the natural rights doctrine, which gave the 
philosophical foundation to the American Declaration of Independence and the Bill of 
Rights, as well as to the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, 
Bentham greatly approved of the United States in his later years.
18  He came to be 
interested in America in two ways.
19  First, he regarded America as potentially a vast 
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ground for experiments in codification. Bentham wanted the United States to 
emancipate herself from the yoke of the common law by the introduction of a complete 
and rationalized utilitarian code of law, what he termed the ‘pannomion’. He thought 
that under a democratic form of government, rulers might be so placed that they only 
had motives to promote the general interest, unlike under a monarch, where they tended 
to promote their own sinister interests. This seems to be the reason why he believed that 
his ideal system of code might be introduced in America.   
Second, Bentham paid full attention to many of the constitutional features of the 
United States, and approved of her democratic form of government. Among his 
contemporaries, he was one of the most doctrinaire in his approval of the American 
representative system. For Bentham, it was not direct democracy, but well-arranged 
representative democracy, which had been seen only in America, that was the only form 
of government which could deliver the greatest happiness of the greatest number in 
terms of the identification of interests between the ruler and the ruled. D. P. Crook 
writes that America could provide support for Bentham’s constitutional theory, even 
though he might not have derived most of his democratic ideas from the experience of 
America.
20  Bentham’s admiration for American government developed alongside his 
radical critique of the British constitution. 
Bentham’s Plan of Parliamentary Reform contained a number of favourable 
references to the United States as a good example of ‘pure representative democracy’, 
often being contrasted with vices in the British constitution. He found positive aspects 
of ‘pure democracy’ in the United States, not merely of ‘democratic ascendancy in a 
mixt government’. Nowhere else did there exist ‘so regular, so well-regulated a 
government’ as in the United States.
21  In addition, his Radicalism not Dangerous 
(1820) had a section entitled ‘Defence from Experience in the Case of the United 
States’. Bentham stated that, though ‘the features or elements of radicalism, secrecy, 
universality, equality, annuality of suffrage’ were virtually realized in some states of the 
United States, subversion of the rights of property, which the opponents of democracy 
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feared, had never come about, and ‘nowhere in the Union have any of those of 
symptoms of misrule at any times shown themselves’.
22 
Bentham’s praise of the United States was based on a utilitarian perspective. He 
thought that America successfully introduced constitutional devices which enabled her 
to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The American government 
was, he believed, superior to that of Britain in that it pursued only the general interest, 
and never served the separate and sinister interest of the few. 
 
ii 
Bentham’s view of America influenced the tone of his fellow utilitarians’ arguments. 
The Westminster Review, Bentham’s newly-founded periodical intended to form the 
political organ of the Philosophic Radicals, often published articles which discussed 
America. In his article in the first number of the Review, Peregrine Bingham, one of the 
most important contributors in the first few years of the Review, posed the following 
question: ‘if it [a great mass of happiness in America] be enjoyed, how far this good 
effect is ascribable to the nature of the government, how far to other causes?’ His 
answer was that almost all good phenomena in America were attributable to her 
governmental system, particularly representative government, and bad phenomena, such 
as slavery, to peculiarities of American society.
23  This mode of argument became a 
typical strategy which most Westminster Reviewers followed. Most articles on America 
in the Review contained more or less favourable accounts of the current condition of 
American society, and were, either explicitly or implicitly, combined with a critique of 
the state of Britain. The Westminster Reviewers compared various aspects of Britain 
with those of America: expensive government with cheap government; the existence of 
the Anglican Church with the absence of such an established church; the lack of a free 
press with the existence of it; economic stagnation with rapid economic growth; and 
limited education with universal education. 
As far as America was concerned, another important contributor to the Westminster 
Review was John Neal, an American writer and critic, and a propagandist of 
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utilitarianism in America. He met Bentham and other members of the utilitarian circle 
during his visit to England in 1824, and Bentham invited him to stay at his house in 
Queen’s Square Place.
24  Neal’s Westminster Review article on America formed a good 
example of the positive tone of the Review. As for slavery in the south of the United 
States, for instance, he was optimistic about the future, even though he condemned the 
current situation: ‘if they [i.e. the proposals he had in mind] were adopted forthwith … 
and acted upon throughout, slavery would be no more, in the whole United States of 
North America, within fifty years from today’.
25 
Thus, even though the Westminster Reviewers criticized American tariff policy and 
the legal system, as well as slavery, they were in general sympathetic and optimistic. 
They insisted that no matter how unsatisfactory her current condition, America was 
improving, and would continue to improve. This, they believed, was due to her popular 
government. 
 
iii 
The Philosophic Radicals’ praise of America was closely associated with a critique 
of the state of Britain. In his commentary on the Quarterly Review in the second volume 
of the Westminster Review in 1824, James Mill wrote: ‘Whoever speaks against the 
Americans, is to receive implicit credit [from the Quarterly Review], and no questions 
asked. Whoever says any thing in their favour, is to be told that he or she is a liar, and a 
knave, and a fool; agreeably to the most approved rules of the aristocratical logic.’
26  It 
was, to his mind, a result of the Quarterly Review’s usual mode of praising ‘the 
blessings of the British Constitution’.
27  Even when the Westminster Reviewers found 
favourable views on America in rival periodicals, they saw them as hypocritical.   
J. S. Mill, for example, dismissed the Edinburgh Review’s favourable comments on 
America as follows: 
an article on America, in the thirty-first volume, contains an unusual proportion of 
democratic sentiments. The same observation applies to another article on the same 
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subject, in the thirty-third volume, where a charge which had been brought against 
the Review of illiberality towards America, seems to have extorted from it sundry 
expressions in favour of popular governments, exceeding perhaps, in boldness, any 
which had yet appeared in its pages.
28 
Alexander Brady states that ‘they [i.e. the Philosophic Radicals] looked to America to 
demonstrate the virtues of democracy, and abundant praise of the United States became 
their orthodox practice’.
29  They praised the United States as they believed that the 
principle of utility was applied more assiduously in the United States than in Britain. 
Furthermore, they thought that the experience of America could offer grounds for 
attacking the existing British constitution and supporting its reform. As one 
Westminster Reviewer asserted, the worth of the institutions which had been introduced 
into America but not yet into Britain, such as representative democracy, a free press, 
and religious liberty, had ‘demonstrated practical results in the multiplied advantages of 
the many’, and could not be ‘destroyed by the railing of the interested few’.
30 
Given this intellectual milieu, it is unsurprising that Mill came to be interested in 
America. Like his fellow radicals, he had an interest in America as the only nation 
where democracy was realized in practice, and recognized that it had a crucial 
significance for all European thinkers and politicians who argued, whether for or against, 
democracy. It was this intellectual climate that led Mill to attempt to rebut 
anti-democratic or anti-parliamentary reform arguments, using the example of America. 
This is not to deny the importance of Tocqueville in the development of Mill’s 
political thought. The deepening of his understanding of American society, and the 
subsequent crucial developments in his political thought, were stimulated by the 
appearance of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. Most of Mill’s ideas on America 
had found antecedents in the periodical literature (including the Westminster Review) 
and books published before Democracy in America. Hence, it is not true that Mill 
derived his knowledge about America exclusively from Tocqueville’s study. 
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Nevertheless, Mill thought that the works which had appeared before Tocqueville were 
not only fragmentary and superficial but also party-biased, and thereby lacked any 
philosophical perspective with which the relevant phenomena could be systematically 
understood. 
By discussing America, Mill, like his contemporaries, attempted to offer a practical 
argument within the political context of his age. At the same time, however, he aspired 
to develop an analytical, value-free argument without relation to the context. For the 
Mill of this period, Tocqueville was a philosopher who offered a deeper, broader, and 
more impartial account of phenomena in America than any writer before him. As will 
be seen, what Mill gained from Tocqueville was above all a perspective from which he 
was able to interpret America comprehensively and impartially. 
 
5. Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America 
i 
In an article entitled ‘Rationale of Representation’, written in July 1835, 
immediately after the publication of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, Mill insisted 
on the need to apply perspectives to the study of politics which were different from 
those put forward in Samuel Bailey’s The Rationale of Political Representation, which 
Mill saw as a good example of Benthamite reasoning on the subject. Mill stated that 
Bailey dealt only with ‘the advantages of a representative government, and the 
principles on which it must be constructed in order to realise those advantages’.
31  He 
insisted that these formed only one branch of the philosophy of government. Hence, he 
thought that the Benthamite theory of government was not so much wrong as 
insufficient. He wrote: 
The philosophy of government, a most extensive and complicated science, would           
comprise a complete view of the influences of political institutions; not only their 
direct, but what are in general so little attended to, their indirect and remote 
influences: how they affect the national character, and all the social relations of a 
people; and reciprocally, how the state of society, and of the human mind, aids, 
counteracts, or modifies the effects of a form of government, and promotes or 
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impairs its stability.
32 
He claimed that to acquire scientific knowledge of polity and society, the distinction 
needed to be made between the influence of political institutions and that of social 
circumstances, and consideration given to their mutual influences.
33 
The need to distinguish between government and society as a source of causation 
had often been insisted upon, albeit from a strategic point of view, by other Westminster 
Reviewers in the controversy over America. In this sense, Mill’s perspective was by no 
means unique. Nevertheless, Mill thought that such a perspective was lacking in 
Benthamite politics, and insisted that it should be introduced into the study of politics. 
Additionally, he emphasized the view that politics should deal with the mutual and 
comprehensive influences between polity and society. Tocqueville’s Democracy in 
America, in Mill’s view, had done so. The fact that Mill referred, in the footnote given 
to the passage cited above, to Tocqueville’s work as the most important recent 
contribution to the study of politics, indicates the huge impact which Tocqueville had 
on Mill.
34 
In the early nineteenth century, the concept of democracy had many connotations, 
such as the rise of a social and political system led by the middle class; the diffusion of 
political liberty and suffrage with a representative institution; and an anarchic political 
condition. Tocqueville’s use of the term contained two main meanings: first, democratic 
government; and second, equality of condition in society.
35  In addition, he used the 
term ‘democracy’ to indicate the psychological tendencies which led to equalization, 
and which such equality in turn naturally encouraged. His broadened definition of the 
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term ‘democracy’ gave his ideas greater significance,
36  and it was this which, as I will 
demonstrate later, inspired Mill. 
Tocqueville regarded democratization as a universal and inevitable process not only 
in America but also in the rest of the world. He called this gradual equalization the 
‘great democratic revolution’.
37  He accounted for the equalization of conditions, a 
process in which aristocracy gave way to democracy in the West, focusing on the 
development of commerce and manufacture, the subdivision of land, the diffusion of 
knowledge, the diffusion of moveable property, and social mobility. What especially 
attracted Tocqueville was the fact that in America ‘the middle classes can govern a 
nation.’
38   
 
ii 
Tocqueville stated that the factors which made democracy in America work well 
included such constitutional features as federalism, communalism, and a well organized 
judicial power. The federal system enabled each state both to maintain its uniqueness 
and to enjoy benefits provided by the federal government, such as security against 
foreign invasion and economic freedom.
39  The separation of powers between the 
executive and legislative, and the balance of powers between the Senate and the House 
of Representatives within the legislative body, were sufficiently secured by the 
presidential system and the bicameral legislature respectively.
40  Additionally, in terms 
of judicial review, judicial power was given huge authority and, therefore, was able to 
correct any popular excesses.
41  The jury system was also crucial in that it taught people 
the notion of equity in a practical way, and encouraged them to take responsibility for 
their acts. It encouraged people to combat the ‘selfishness which is like rust in 
society’.
42  Under the municipal system, citizens were encouraged to exercise public 
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rights and perform public duties in their everyday life. As a result, the corruption 
engendered by sinister interest could be prevented.
43 
Mill was interested in Tocqueville’s analysis of the devices which made American 
democracy work well. This was because Mill regarded America as the most unsuitable 
nation for democracy, as I shall show below. He regarded the municipal system as 
particularly important.
44  In Tocqueville’s view, local self-government in America 
played an intermediate role between the governing and the governed, a role which had 
been played by the aristocrat and the privileged class under the ancien régime in France. 
Tocqueville thought, therefore, that democracy enabled ordinary people to cultivate 
their virtue in terms of political participation.
45 
Mill agreed with Tocqueville that national character could be cultivated under a 
democratic government. The argument that the system of government had beneficial 
effects on the state of society and national character was significant, for the good 
educational effects of democracy could provide effective counterevidence against those 
who opposed democracy on the grounds of the poor intellectual capacity of people.
46 
He also shared Tocqueville’s view that the evils of democracy should be rectified by 
democracy itself.
47  However, while Tocqueville had sympathy for the aristocracy, Mill 
insisted that they needed to be reformed in order to function under a democracy. Mill 
thought that the aristocracy had to be defeated in order to achieve constitutional reform 
in Britain. Subsequently, Mill did not totally concur with Tocqueville’s favourable 
opinion of the American legal profession, which he thought played an aristocratic role 
in terms of their professional knowledge and conservative tendency. Mill stated: ‘the 
minds of lawyers were …, both in England and America, almost universally perverted 
by the barbarous system of technicalities – the opprobrium of human reason – which 
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their youth is passed in committing to memory, and their manhood in administering’.
48 
 
iii 
Tocqueville identified unskilful legislation and the abuse of power by the majority 
over the minority as the vices of democracy. He stated that democracy not only tended 
to fail to choose men of merit because of the lack of the intellectual ability of people, 
but also had neither the desire nor the disposition to do so. He argued that, in their 
political careers ‘it would be difficult [for the men of distinction] to remain completely 
themselves or to make any progress without cheapening themselves’.
49  Both 
Tocqueville and Mill thought that this tendency was not unique to America, but 
common to civilized nations. Furthermore, Mill found a unique circumstance at work 
which promoted it in America. He wrote that, ‘America needs very little government’, 
as ‘She has no wars, no neighbours, no complicated international relations; no old 
society with its thousand abuses to reform; no half-fed and untaught millions crying for 
food and guidance’. Accordingly, ‘The current affairs which her Government has to 
transact can seldom demand much more than average capacity.’
50   
As far as the tyranny of the majority was concerned, Mill praised Tocqueville’s 
argument as a proper analysis of American society, even though he doubted whether it 
could be applied to European nations, including Britain. In Mill’s view, the reason why 
the risk of the tyranny of the majority was greater in America than in Britain was that 
there was no leisured class in America. While Tocqueville argued that democratic 
government in general was apt to depend heavily on public opinion, and so its policy 
was much more hasty and short-sighted than that of an aristocracy,
51  Mill denied that 
legislative and administrative instability was an essential feature of democracy. In so 
doing, Mill distinguished between the concept of delegation, under which the person 
elected had to follow the instructions of his electors to vote in certain ways, and that of 
                                                 
48  Tocqueville (1994) 263-70; JSM, ‘Tocqueville [1]’, CW, xviii, 85. 
49  Tocqueville (1994) 197-9. 
50  JSM, ‘Tocqueville [2]’, CW, xviii, 175. See also his comment: ‘the United States of America are a 
standing proof that under democratic ascendancy a country may be very well governed with a very small 
portion of talent.’ (JSM, ‘The British Constitution’ (19 May [?] 1826), CW, xxvi, 381-2.) 
51  Tocqueville (1994) 202, 249 (legislative), 207-8 (administrative).   - 54 - 
representation, under which he was not so bound: 
The idea of a rational democracy is, not that the people themselves govern, but that 
they have security for good government. … Provided good intentions can be secured, 
the best government … must be the government of the wisest, and these must 
always be a few. The people ought to be the masters, but they are masters who must 
employ servants more skilful than themselves.
52 
By the end of the 1820s, Mill had come to place emphasis on the role of elites in society. 
It had led him to alter his attitude towards one element of the radical reform programme, 
namely the so-called pledge doctrine, a demand that the elected representative be bound 
by particular pledges made to those electing him to act in certain ways.
53  Mill not only 
ceased to think that the pledge was a necessary element of radical reform, but also came 
positively to oppose it.
54 
Mill did not deny the need for constitutional checks on the exercise of power. 
However, while many radicals argued that the pledge was vital in checking and limiting 
the power of governors, as any governing minority was apt to abuse power in support of 
their own sinister interest, Mill thought that the majority could neither recognise their 
true interest nor were capable of checking power by means of the pledge.
55  In 1832 he 
stated that, ‘The true idea of popular representation is not that the people govern in their 
own persons, but that they choose their governors’, and, therefore, ‘The sovereignty of 
the people is essentially a delegated sovereignty. Government must be performed by the 
few, for the benefit of the many.’
56   
Joseph Hamburger states that ‘in 1835 [J. S. Mill] reverted to the orthodox Radical 
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position that justified pledges as a means of achieving a degree of popular control of a 
representative’,
57  and refers to Mill’s essay ‘Rationale of Representation’, published in 
July 1835, as a new attempt to reconcile popular representation and government by the 
wisest few. Mill, however, made the same attempt as early as 1832. What Mill insisted 
on, both in 1832 and 1835, was that the pledge was undesirable under an ideal popular 
representation, despite being useful in the current situation.
58  He did not cease to argue 
against the pledge in principle in 1835. In ‘Rationale of Representation’, he stated that a 
condition essential to good government was that ‘political questions be not decided by 
an appeal, either direct or indirect, to the judgement or will of an uninstructed mass, 
whether of gentlemen or of clowns; but by the deliberately-formed opinions of a 
comparatively few, specially educated for the task’.
59 
 
iv 
Mill thought that Tocqueville’s account was full of insight and accepted most of his 
theses. Nevertheless, Mill thought that Tocqueville could not sufficiently distinguish 
between those factors which had to be attributed to the peculiarity of American society 
on the one hand, and those which were inherent in democracy and, therefore, applicable 
to other democratic nations on the other. It was this confusion which caused Mill’s 
disquiet, for he had been emphasizing the importance of the distinction between the 
influences attributable to political institutions and those attributable to social 
peculiarities. Nevertheless, Mill’s high estimation of Democracy in America arose from 
the mode of argument which allowed Tocqueville to investigate both political and social 
affairs comprehensively in terms of a single concept, namely democracy. His later 
                                                 
57  Hamburger (1965) 98. 
58  In ‘Tocqueville [1]’, Mill stated: ‘such a government, though better than most aristocracies, is not the 
kind of democracy which wise men desire’. (JSM, ‘Tocqueville [1]’, CW, xviii, 73.) 
59  JSM, ‘Rationale of Representation’, CW, xviii, 23. In his article on Tocqueville’s Democracy in 
America, Roebuck rebutted Mill’s emphasis on delegation. See Roebuck (1835) i, 20th pamphlet, 1-4. It 
should be noted, however, that, even though the pledge might be popular among radicals and their 
supporters, not all the Philosophic Radicals gave it such great importance as Roebuck. For instance, 
Francis Burdett, like J. S. Mill, explicitly opposed the pledge, and James Mill had less interest in it and 
gave priority to other programs, such as the extension of suffrage and secret ballot. See Thomas (1979) 
142, 215-6.   - 56 - 
criticism of Tocqueville focused not on the comprehensiveness of the concept, but on 
the lack of a causal foundation for it. In Mill’s view, it was not ‘democracy’, but 
‘civilization’, which could be scientifically grounded. 
 
6. J. S. Mill’s Analysis of American Society 
i 
Scholars have tended to pay little attention to the fact that Mill thought America was 
the nation where the tendencies of civilization were revealed in their most advanced 
form. Mill’s notion of civilized society reflected his view of American society. His 
article on America, entitled ‘State of Society in America’, published in January 1836, is 
significant in that it formed part of a process in which he rejected Tocqueville’s concept 
of democracy and came to adopt that of ‘civilization’ as the key to understanding the 
state of society. As far as ‘State of Society in America’ is concerned, it is the 
perspective from which he examined the cause of phenomena, rather than his comments 
on the particular features of American society, which is important.   
Mill noted that ‘the government is only one of a dozen causes which have made 
America what she is’,
60  and that ‘nearly all which has been complained of as bad in 
America, and a great part of what is good, are accounted for independently of 
democracy’.
61  Through the analysis of American society, he intended to clarify the 
mutual relations between political institutions and the state of society in which they 
existed. He grounded his analysis on the idea that phenomena should be distinguished 
into those which were associated with political institutions on the one hand, and those 
whose causes were social circumstances, and not political institutions, on the other. He 
stated: 
Democracy may be studied in America – but studied it must be; its effects are not 
apparent on the mere surface of the facts; a greater power of discriminating 
essentials from non-essentials than travellers or politicians usually possess, is 
required for deducing from the phenomena of American society inferences of any 
kind with respect to democracy. The facts themselves must first be sifted, more 
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carefully than they ever are by any but a most highly-qualified observer. Next, we 
have to strike off all such of the facts as, from the laws of human nature, democracy 
can have nothing to do with, and all those which are sufficiently accounted for by 
other causes. The residuum alone can, by even a plausible conjecture, be traced 
home to democracy.
62 
From this perspective, what he did in this essay was to connect the development of the 
middle class with phenomena which could not be attributed to democracy. The 
phenomena which he saw as the result of peculiar factors of American society, and 
thereby which existed independently of democracy, included the equality of wealth, the 
lack of a leisured class (except in the southern states of America where slavery existed), 
high wages, a high rate of literacy, and a tendency to imitate, especially in literature. 
The last element is of particular interest. Mill stated: 
to all intents except government, the people of America are provincials. Politically, 
the United States are a great and independent nation, but in all matters social or 
literary, they are a province of the British empire. … The characteristic of 
provincialism, in society and literature, is imitation: provincials dare not be 
themselves; they dare do nothing for which they have not, or think they have not, a 
warrant from the metropolis.
63 
In Mill’s opinion, as far as social and cultural factors were concerned, America was a 
mere province of Britain, and the disposition of the Americans to imitate reflected their 
provincial character. This view led him to the following conclusion: 
Subtract from the British empire London and Edinburgh, and all or nearly all who 
are born to independence; leave at the summit of this frustum of the social pyramid 
the merchants of Liverpool, the manufacturers of Manchester, the bar of London 
spread over the whole of England, and physicians, attorneys, and dissenting clergy; 
then raise the working classes to the enjoyment of ample wages – give them 
universally the habit of reading, and an active interest in public affairs; and you will 
have a society constituted almost identically with that of the United States, and the 
only standard with which this last can either be likened or contrasted. The present 
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government of France has been called la monarchie des épiciers; America is a 
republic peopled with a provincial middle class.
64 
Focusing on the existence of the middle class, Mill thus established a perspective in 
terms of which he could compare England and America. According to Mill, because of 
its aristocratic form of government and the existence of a huge inequality in wealth, the 
England of his age could not be regarded as a democratic state in either of Tocqueville’s 
conceptions of democracy. Nevertheless, England was similar to America in certain 
vital respects. In contrast, even though Lower Canada was moving towards an 
equalization of conditions, which Tocqueville regarded as a movement towards the 
democratization of society, the features found in America could not be seen there. The 
fact that certain features of the democratic state of America could not be found in 
Canada – a democratic nation in its social aspects in Tocqueville’s sense of the term – 
but could be found in England – a non-democratic nation in any sense of the term – 
meant that these features were not attributable to democracy.
65  To Mill’s mind, the 
cause to which these features should be attributed was the existence of the commercial, 
middle class. Thus, Mill developed his concept of civilization in the latter half of the 
1830s, in which he examined the implications of the existence of the commercial, 
middle class. 
 
ii 
Apart from his analysis of America as a civilized nation, it is worth examining 
Mill’s view of American democracy put forward in ‘State of Society in America’. His 
analysis followed in some degree the typical strategy of Philosophic Radicalism. 
Among those writers looking at America in order to investigate democracy, the Tory 
writers, in Mill’s view, had been mistaken in arguing ‘as if the experiment of 
democracy had been tried in America under circumstances wholly favourable’, in spite 
of their correct understanding that ‘tranquillity and prosperity, in a country placed in the 
peculiar physical circumstances of America, proves little for the safety of democratic 
institutions among the crowded population, the innumerable complications and causes 
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of dissatisfaction, which exist in older countries’.
66  The Tories claimed almost all the 
bad effects could be explained in terms of democracy, and almost all the good effects in 
terms of other causes. In their view, the success of American democracy was due to the 
specific circumstances of American society, and not to democratic government. 
Mill pointed out that that ‘America is, in many important points, nearly the most 
unfavourable field in which democracy could have been tried’. He went on to say: 
In everything which concerns the influences of democracy on intellect and social 
life, its virtues could nowhere be put upon a harder trial than in America; for no 
civilized country is placed in circumstances tending more to produce mediocrity in 
the one, or dullness and inelegance in the other. Everything in the position of 
America tends to foster the spirit of trade, the passion of money-getting, and that 
almost alone.
67 
The practical implication of this argument is clear. If undesirable phenomena in 
America were ascribed to democracy, the example of America would be unfavourable 
to the pro-democratic argument. Mill, however, thought that much of the American 
experience, especially its negative features, should be seen as the effect of the 
connection of democracy with the specific social conditions of America, in particular 
the lack of a leisured class, the class which he regarded as a counterbalance against the 
harmful effects of democracy. 
As far as the lack of a counterbalance was concerned, Mill was optimistic in that he 
thought that the further accumulation of wealth might lead to the formation of such a 
class. Additionally, he argued that improvement in American society had taken place in 
many areas under democratic government. What he intended to offer here was a 
pro-democratic argument, namely that a democratic form of government could produce 
beneficial effects on society. His argument proceeded as follows. Democracy, with 
well-arranged institutional devices, was functioning well and had positive effects on 
society in America, which in itself was a most unfavourable nation for democracy. If so, 
the democratic form of government could be introduced into Britain as well, which, to 
his mind, was more suitable to democracy than America. Having pointed out the 
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similarities between America and Britain caused by the existence of the middle class, he 
could thus develop a counter-argument against those who denied the possibility of 
introducing democratic government into Britain on the grounds of the differences in 
condition of the two nations. 
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Chapter 4. J. S. Mill and the Notion of Civilization 
 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to clarify J. S. Mill’s notion of civilized society. As many 
scholars point out, his essay ‘Civilization’, which appeared in the London and 
Westminster Review of April 1836, constituted the earliest formulation of the project 
which was fully developed in his mature works, such as On Liberty and Considerations 
on Representative Government.
1  In ‘Civilization’ and other articles written around 
1840, including ‘Bentham’ (1838) and the two reviews of Tocqueville’s Democracy in 
America (1835 and 1840 respectively), Mill saw contemporary society as ‘civilized’, 
and discussed what he approved and disapproved of in such a civilized society. At the 
same time, he often expressed an aspiration to offer a system of social science in terms 
of which civilized society could properly be understood. His speculation in this period, 
therefore, was characterized by his aspiration to create a science for inquiring into the 
nature and prospect of civilized society, a science that he called a ‘Science of Society’. 
In the first part of this chapter, I consider James Mill’s idea of the middle class, 
which he saw as ‘a creature of civilization’.
2  James Mill viewed the middle class in the 
same positive way as contemporary Whig thinkers, including Thomas Babington 
Macaulay who attacked his essay on ‘Government’. They based their view on the 
arguments of the philosophical historians of eighteenth-century Scotland, who 
illustrated that the growth of commerce and the corresponding diffusion of wealth 
among society had brought about an increasing demand for liberty and power on the 
part of the middle class.
3  J. S. Mill developed his notion of civilization in this 
intellectual milieu.
4 
In the second part of this chapter, I examine Mill’s notion of civilization, developed 
in the late 1830s. In this period, Mill came to understand the various phenomena of 
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contemporary civilized society through his concept of ‘civilization’. He sought to give a 
systematic and comprehensive account of the features of civilized society, such as 
corruption and the so-called ‘tyranny of the majority’.   
 
2. James Mill’s Notion of the Middle Class 
i 
J. S. Mill thought that civilization was contemporaneous with the growth of the 
middle class. Though there was little agreement in defining who comprised the middle 
class,
5  such a view was shared by most thinkers in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. They argued that the development of commerce and liberty 
brought out the development of the middle class. In the early nineteenth century, the 
Edinburgh Reviewers, amongst others, often expressed a favourable view of the middle 
class. Francis Jeffrey, for example, expected the middle class to correct the bad 
consequences of the division of labour, though he could not help thinking that they also 
inevitably had negative influences over society.
6 
The Whig thinkers generally expressed a favourable view of the middle class, but 
they feared that it would have excessive power. As I will demonstrate below, J. S. Mill, 
much inspired by Tocqueville, expressed the same concern. Having said that, it does not 
mean that their opinions had common ground. The Whigs based their view on the 
traditional constitutional argument about the balance of powers, while Mill’s opinion 
was that social progress would not have been achieved without social antagonism. 
In order to clarify the characteristics of J. S. Mill’s notions of civilization and the 
middle class, it is helpful to compare it with James Mill’s. Apart from the dichotomy 
between the ‘ruling-few’ and the ‘subject-many’, James Mill often divided society into 
three classes: the aristocratic or higher class; the middle class; and the lower or 
labouring class. He placed great importance on the middle class. Despite their 
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disagreement about the proper method of political science and what degree of political 
reform was desirable, James Mill and the Edinburgh Reviewers, including Macaulay, 
agreed that the middle class was an intrinsic element of civilization. Their view had a 
common source, namely the philosophical historians of eighteenth-century Scotland, 
such as Hume, Smith, Stewart, and Millar, who had shown that the growth of commerce 
and the corresponding diffusion of wealth among society brought about an increasing 
demand for liberty and power on the part of the middle class.
7 
 
ii 
In an advanced society, James Mill stated, in order to retain their superiority over 
the poor, wealthy rulers exerted a malevolent influence on society by associating 
elegance not with beautiful, but with costly things. As a consequence, ‘cost’ and 
‘elegance’ came to be synonymous terms, and subsequently ‘the very thought of 
seeking for elegance … is extinguished in the breasts of those among whom it is of 
most importance that the taste of real elegance should be diffused’.
8  Moreover, to 
wealthy rulers, ‘it appears far more eligible to pay court to a monarch, and, by holding 
his favour, to retain the monopoly of honour and power, than to contend with the whole 
body of the people in the acquisition and display of those higher qualities’.
9  James Mill 
went on to write that, ‘if the habits and feelings of the upper ranks, and of the owners of 
wealth in general, have, in modern times, an undeniable bias to the side of arbitrary 
government, we can only look for a counterbalancing power in the character of the other 
classes of society’. He hoped for ‘a counterbalancing power’ against ‘an undeniable bias 
to the side of arbitrary government’.
10  He expected the middle class – ‘a creature of 
civilization’
11– to be the counterbalancing power, a power which played several 
important roles in society: to control the government with, or instead of, the higher or 
aristocratic class on the one hand; and to instruct the lower class on the other. ‘The 
middle class’, James Mill stated,   
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had no existence in the rude state of society; and it increases as the benefits of 
civilization increase. It has always been our faith and trust, that in this class, and the 
circumstances connected with it, a power is really provided sufficient to prevent the 
passive or active principle of despotism in the other classes from finally 
consummating their deplorable consequences, and rendering civilization its own 
destroyer.
12 
James Mill admitted that, in the current situation, the rich ‘have the power of setting 
the fashion, and their example forms the general taste’, and thereby the middle class had 
undesirable tendencies under their influence.
13  The rich regarded wealth as honourable 
or virtuous, and successfully imposed such a standard of virtue on the people. In his 
view, ‘Nothing is more remarkable in human nature, than the intense desire which we 
feel of the favourable regards of mankind’, and the reason why the desire for wealth 
was unbounded was because it enabled those who possessed it to ‘procure over the 
favourable regards of society’.
14  However, James Mill was firmly convinced that such 
undesirable tendencies among the middle class could be corrected, for the association of 
honour or virtue with wealth was, though strong, not intrinsic. This association was 
initially caused by the political arrangements in which the rich abused their power to 
promote their own sinister interest.   
James Mill conceived two remedies for such an undesirable condition in the middle 
class: first, an education system by which the negative influence of the aristocracy was 
reduced; second, political and social reform in order to disassociate wealth from the 
idea of virtue. As for the former, James Mill wrote: 
We may conceive that certain trains might, by the skilful employment of the early 
years, be rendered so habitual as to be uncontrollable by any habits which the 
subsequent period of life could induce, and that those trains might be the decisive 
ones, on which intelligent and moral conduct depends. The influence of a vicious 
and ignorant society would in this case be greatly reduced ….
15   
As far as social and political reform was concerned, James Mill aimed to remove the 
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immoral influence of wealth. The ballot, for example, would contribute to this aim. If 
the ballot enabled the constituents to ‘give their suffrages only to those whom they 
regarded as best endowed with the qualities which fit men for the duties of legislation, 
the men of property would exert themselves to attain and to display those qualities’.
16 
While James Mill was critical of the association of wealth and political power and 
condemned the current inequality of wealth, he did not desire an equality of wealth in 
society. He wrote: ‘Reformers are far from thinking evil of inequalities of fortune; on 
the contrary, they esteem them a necessary consequence of things which are so good, 
that society itself, and all the happiness of human beings, depend upon them’. He 
justified the inequality of wealth on the grounds that man had to have a certain degree 
of fortune in order to be independent and to cultivate his own mental and intellectual 
faculties. Furthermore, he claimed that only such a man was fitted for the business of 
government. Thus he stated that ‘the business of government is properly the business of 
the rich’.
17   
In James Mill’s opinion, however, the wealthy men of his time suffered from the 
‘corruptive operation’ of a large fortune which was accumulated thanks in large 
measure to an artificial social and political arrangement.
18  In favour of inequality of 
fortune resulting from ‘the natural laws of accumulation’, James Mill condemned 
extreme inequality on the grounds that it was ‘the result of unnatural restraint put upon 
the natural laws of distribution’.
19  He stated that ‘artificially-made, unnatural 
inequalities’ brought in enormous fortunes for a small number, and ‘the operation of 
large fortunes tends to the corruption of taste, in everything to which the word elegance 
is with propriety applied’.
20   
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According to James Mill, the large fortune limited the intellectual ability of its 
owner: ‘intellectual powers are offspring of labour. But an hereditary Aristocracy is 
deprived of the strongest motive to labour. The great part of them will, therefore, be 
defective in those mental powers’.
21  Unlike those possessing a huge wealth, ‘Men of 
independent, but few enormous incomes, sufficiently numerous to form a class and a 
public, are obliged to seek distinction among themselves by qualities which recommend 
them to the respect and affection of their follows.’
22  James Mill believed that men of a 
moderate fortune, unlike the existing ruling class,
23  could be satisfied with moderate 
fortune and, therefore, could be free from the corruptive operation of excessive fortune. 
He thought that, once wealth was disassociated from virtue by means of education and 
political reform, the middle class would be satisfied with moderate wealth.
24 
James Mill’s analysis of the middle class was concerned with its moral and 
intellectual status rather than its economic condition, though good economic 
circumstances were necessary for mental and intellectual cultivation.
25  Unlike J. S. Mill, 
who generally used the expressions the ‘middle class’ and the ‘commercial class’ 
interchangeably, James Mill included in the middle class intellectual professionals, 
whom J. S. Mill excluded from his definition of the middle class.
26  Furthermore, James 
Mill’s image of the middle class as the embodiment of civilization was closely 
associated with his use of the term ‘progress’, by which he initially meant the 
development of intellectual and moral qualities.
27 
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3. J. S. Mill’s Notion of the Middle Class and Civilization 
i 
Though both James and J. S. Mill emphasized an indissoluble connection between 
the middle class and civilization, there was a crucial difference between them. While 
James Mill tended to ascribe the vices of civilized society to the existence of aristocracy, 
J. S. Mill believed that the vices were the inevitable consequences of civilization, and, 
subsequently, was highly critical of the middle class. In order to understand the 
difference between the two Mills, it is necessary to clarify what they each actually 
meant by the expression ‘middle class’.   
While James Mill’s use of the term ‘middle class’ embraced intellectual elites, as 
well as men of moderate fortune, J. S. Mill’s notion of the middle class was almost 
entirely associated with their economic condition, and thereby he often identified the 
middle class with the commercial class.
28  Those to whom J. S. Mill referred as the 
middle class included the manufacturing and mercantile classes, except ‘the protected 
trades’ and ‘the very rich manufacturers and merchants of all denominations’, and the 
propertied class of the towns, the bulk of which were the ten-pound electors.
29 
In spite of this hope, however, what characterized J. S. Mill’s notion of the middle 
class was a sceptical attitude towards them and thereby commercial society itself. He 
doubted that the people, those in the middle class in particular, were capable of acting 
according to their own interests: in other words, he did not think that the people could 
recognize the importance of cultivating their own moral and intellectual abilities at the 
expense of quick economic profits. Subsequently, he came to doubt that the middle 
class could take a leading role in the progress of society. To his mind, the fact that the 
middle class had been gradually growing in social, economic, and political power did 
not mean that they had been improving their moral and intellectual abilities. In June 
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1834 he expressed concern over the middle class: ‘The middle classes of this country 
[i.e. England] … are repeating the very same series of errors by which almost all 
governing bodies have been ruined.’
30 
This was in contrast to his earlier insistence that the ruling few intended to leave the 
people ignorant in order to promote their own sinister interest, and, therefore, believed 
that the people were capable of understanding their own true interest once the influence 
of the ruling few was removed. His view of current British society in the mid-1820s was 
almost the same as that of James Mill’s.
31  As for the ability of the people, James Mill 
claimed that, though it might be true that a majority of the people would make a bad 
choice due to lack of information – this was the very reason why representative 
government was superior to other forms of government. According to James Mill,   
The people may have a want of information for one thing, and no want of it for 
another. … The highest degree of knowledge is required to perceive on each 
occasion what is best to be adopted as a measure of government. But it requires no 
knowledge beyond that of a people in any tolerable state of civilization to know who 
are the men among them in best esteem for worth and understanding.
32   
Moreover, in James Mill’s view, the reason why people remained ignorant was because 
‘so much has been done to make them ignorant; so little done to make them 
instructed’.
33  Hence, education would reduce the risk of making a wrong choice.   
Such a claim was accepted fully by J. S. Mill before his Mental Crisis of 1826-7. 
Before the Crisis, Mill was eager to rebut the traditional case for the British constitution 
in terms of the notion of balance of powers. In his view, it was a poor argument as the 
members of the House of Commons were ‘the real governors’ and they acted in 
subservience to the sinister interest of a narrow oligarchy.
34  He also attempted to rebut 
                                                 
30  JSM, ‘Notes on the Newspapers [4]’ (June 1834), CW, vi, 218. 
31  For J. S. Mill’s views at that time, see, for example, JSM, ‘Parliamentary Reform’ (read at the Mutual 
Improvement Society in August 1824), CW, xxvi, 261-85; JSM, ‘Law of Libel and Liberty of the Press’ 
(April 1825), CW, xxi, 1-34; JSM, ‘The British Constitution’ (read at the London Debating Society in 19 
May [?] 1826), CW, xxvi, 358-85. 
32  James Mill (1825: ER on reform’) 222-3. See also James Mill (1820; Government) 504. 
33  James Mill (1825: ER on reform) 227. 
34  JSM, ‘Parliamentary Reform’, CW, xxvi, 264; JSM, ‘The British Constitution’, ibid., 359, 377. See 
   - 69 - 
the class representation theory, according to which the House of Commons was seen to 
represent the interest of all components of society. He claimed that, while it was merely 
the separate and sinister interest of each class that was represented there, it was the 
general interest that should be represented in the House of Commons. Those particular 
interests opposing the general interest did not need to be represented.
35  Good 
government could not be secured without making it dependent on those having no 
sinister interest, and the only persons who had no sinister interest were the people. As 
for the ability of people, he followed James Mill in insisting that not every person 
should always be required to have any special abilities because ordinary people could be 
guided by the wisest person among them, and that ‘if they [i.e. people] are ignorant, it is 
precisely because that discussion, which alone can remove ignorance, has been withheld 
from them’.
36 
Another important feature of Mill’s view before the Crisis was his exclusive 
reliance on the principle of self-interest. He stated: ‘There is a principle in man, far 
more constant and far more universal than his love for his fellows – I mean his love for 
himself.’
37  It was unacceptable to state that, as those pursuing their own interest were 
ill-educated, what was needed was to educate them to be benevolent. If the people could 
be perfectly benevolent, government would not have been needed. If ‘they [i.e. the 
people] love themselves better than they love the community of which they are 
members’, what should be done was to ‘let things be so arranged that the interest of 
every individual shall exactly accord with the interest of the whole’ and to ‘let every 
individual be so educated, as to know his own interest’.
38   
In contrast, around 1830, Mill came to be sceptical about the middle or commercial 
class. He came to doubt whether they were capable of understanding their own interest 
in the long run, namely their interest in their own intellectual and moral improvement in 
preference to immediate economic benefits.
39  Further, he extended his criticism to 
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commercial society itself, where the commercial, middle class was flourishing.
40  With 
regard to this point, he came to be highly critical of previous political thinkers, who, he 
believed, underestimated the need to improve human ability. He wrote to Gustav 
d’Eichthal that French philosophers like Auguste Comte   
deduce politics like mathematics from a set of axioms & definitions, forgetting that 
in mathematics there is no danger of partial views: a proposition is either true or it is 
not, & if it is true, we may safely apply it to every case which the proposition 
comprehends in its terms: but in politics & the social science, this is so far from 
being the case, that error seldom arises from our assuming premises which are not 
true, but generally from our overlooking other truths which limit, & modify the 
effect of the former.
41   
Comte, to Mill’s mind, failed to recognize that ‘Government exists for all purposes 
whatever that are for man’s good: and the highest & most important of these purposes is 
the improvement of man himself as a moral and intelligent being, which is an end not 
included in M. Comte’s category at all.’
42  Apparently, this criticism reflected Mill’s 
discontent with Bentham (more accurately, what he saw as Benthamite politics), in that 
one of his criticisms of Benthamite politics was that it dealt only with the problem of 
political machinery, overlooking the importance of moral improvement by means of 
political institutions.
43 
 
ii 
While examining Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, Mill came to pay 
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a great deal of attention to ‘the vastness of all that is implied in the words, growth of a 
middle class’.
44  In so doing, he employed the concept of civilization, a concept which 
was common among early nineteenth-century European thinkers. In April 1836, the 
year following his review of Democracy in America, Mill published an essay entitled 
‘Civilization’ in the London and Westminster Review. This essay was unusual in that, 
unlike most of his periodical articles, it had been published neither in the form of a 
literary review nor in the form of a report on parliamentary debates. The purpose of the 
essay was to discuss the current condition of society rather than to trace its historical 
development.
45  It had two aspects: theoretical and practical. In other words, it 
combined abstract ideas with the politics of his time. As far as the theoretical aspect was 
concerned, Mill attempted to explain various phenomena of contemporary civilized 
society from the point of view of the growth of the middle class. Having shown the 
theoretical characteristics of civilization, he examined contemporary phenomena, such 
as the corruption of the commercial, middle class and the tyranny of the majority, from 
a practical standpoint. 
At the outset of ‘Civilization’, Mill defined the term civilization, not as synonymous 
with improvement in the broader sense of the term, but as indicating a narrower 
meaning: ‘that kind of improvement only, which distinguishes a wealthy and populous 
nation from savages or barbarism’. ‘The present era is’, in his view, ‘pre-eminently the 
era of civilization, in the narrow sense.’
46  The features of civilization in this sense of 
the term, according to him, included the following: dense population; dwelling in fixed 
habitations in towns and villages; highly developed agriculture, commerce, and 
manufactures; co-operation in large bodies for common purposes; the enjoyment of the 
pleasures of social intercourse; and the establishment of social arrangements for 
protecting persons and their property.
47  In addition to these, in the European nations, 
including Great Britain, which were at a higher stage of civilization, a remarkable trend 
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could be found, a trend that saw power passing ‘more and more from individuals, and 
small knots of individuals, to masses’, whereby ‘the importance of the masses becomes 
constantly greater, that of individuals less’.
48  As for the causes of all the phenomena of 
civilized society, he stated: ‘There are two elements of importance and influence among 
mankind: the one is, property; the other, powers and acquirements of mind.’
49  Along 
with the broader diffusion of wealth and knowledge, the development of the ability of 
people to co-operate with others strengthened the influence of the masses.
50  In his view, 
‘There is not a more accurate test of the progress of civilization than the progress of the 
power of co-operation.’
51 
The progress of civilization brought about a substantial transfer of power from the 
few to the masses. The masses thus became more influential, in all spheres, including 
the political. In the political sphere, democratization of government was its 
consequence.
52  Mill insisted: 
The triumph of democracy, or, in other words, of the government of public opinion, 
does not depend upon the opinion of any individual or set of individuals that it ought 
to triumph, but upon the natural laws of the progress of wealth, upon the diffusion of 
reading, and the increase of the facilities of human intercourse. … The distribution 
of constitutional power cannot long continue very different from that of real power, 
without a convulsion. Nor, if the institutions which impede the progress of 
democracy could be by any miracle preserved, could even they do more than render 
that progress a little slower. Were the Constitution of Great Britain to remain 
henceforth unaltered, we are not the less under the dominion, becoming every day 
more irresistible, of public opinion.
53 
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makes a very questionable addition to the general happiness; and is even, if the same wealth would 
otherwise have been employed in raising other persons from a state of poverty, a positive evil’. (JSM, 
‘The Quarterly Review on the Political Economists’ (30 January 1831), CW, xxii, 249.) 
51  JSM, ‘Civilization’, CW, xviii, 122. 
52  Unlike Tocqueville, Mill used the term democracy only to indicate a democratic government. 
53  JSM, ‘Civilization’, CW, xviii, 126-7. Mill used here the term ‘natural’ in the sense that it is 
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Mill’s concept of civilization was comprehensive in that all phenomena could be 
explained in terms of it, and, therefore, it was capable of explaining democratization. 
Mill thought, accordingly, that Tocqueville misunderstood the cause of contemporary 
phenomena; in his opinion, equalization of conditions, which Tocqueville called 
‘democracy’ and which he identified as the cause of contemporary phenomena, was 
merely one of the symptoms of civilization, and not the cause of it.
54 
 
iii 
Having shown the features of civilization, Mill attempted to explain, in light of his 
concept of civilization, phenomena which he had discussed in such early articles as 
‘The Spirit of the Age’. In the mid-1830s, he came to regard phenomena which he 
found in contemporary society as inherent in civilized society. As he recalled in his 
Autobiography, the essay ‘Civilization’ was not only an attempt to offer a theoretical 
view of civilization, but also an attempt ‘into which I threw many of my new opinions, 
and criticised rather emphatically the mental and moral tendencies of the time’.
55  In 
‘Civilization’ and subsequent writings , such as ‘Bentham’, ‘Tocqueville [2]’, and 
‘Coleridge’, he discussed not only the positive aspects of civilization, such as the 
diffusion of property, knowledge, and the power of co-operation, but also the negative 
ones, such as the diminishing of the influence of individuals. His critical view of 
civilized society implied that such negative elements were inevitably involved in the 
process of civilization, and, therefore, it was of huge practical importance for him to 
consider how these evils could be cured. While taking it for granted that vices were 
                                                                                                                                      
understandable and predictable in terms of scientific inquiry. This expression did not imply that it was 
invariable. 
54  Mill stated that ‘this growing equality is only one of the features of progressive civilization; one of the 
incidental effects of the progress of industry and wealth: a most important effect, and one which as our 
authors [i.e. Tocqueville] shows, re-acts in a hundred ways upon the other effects, but not therefore to be 
confounded with the cause’. (JSM, ‘Tocqueville [2]’, CW, xviii, 192.) 
55  JSM, Autobiography, CW, i, 211. This caused Bain’s discontent with the essay: ‘I never felt quite 
satisfied with the article on Civilization. The definition given at the outset seems inadequate; and the 
remainder of the article is one of his many attacks on the vicious tendencies of the time …. To my mind, 
these topics should have been detached from any theory of Civilization, or any attempt to extol the past at 
the cost of the present.’ (Bain (1882b) 48.)   - 74 - 
inevitably involved in the process of civilization, he was convinced that artificial 
measures could cure them. He asserted: 
human affairs are not entirely governed by mechanical laws, nor men’s characters 
wholly and irrevocably formed by their situation in life. Economical and social 
changes, though among the greatest, are not the only forces which shape the course 
of our species; ideas are not always the mere signs and effects of social 
circumstances, they are themselves a power in history.
56 
He was convinced that artificial improvement was not only necessary but also possible, 
and he expected the intellectual elites to play a key role in the improvement of mankind. 
Furthermore, he thought that solutions to these problems had to be sought without 
relinquishing the benefits of civilization: measures should be taken which strengthened 
‘the weak side of Civilization by the support of a higher cultivation’.
57 
 
iv 
In ‘Civilization’, Mill took up two particular topics from a practical point of view: 
the corruption of the commercial spirit and the tyranny of the majority, both of which he 
associated with the progress of civilization. In this section, I examine these topics.   
As early as 1828, Mill had come to be highly critical of the commercial spirit in 
general, and that of the English in particular. He wrote to Gustav d’Eichthal, who 
praised the English middle class:
58 
this superiority [‘of the English to the French in all those qualities by which a nation 
is enabled to turn its productive and commercial resources’] is closely connected 
with the very worst point in our national character, the disposition to sacrifice every 
thing to accumulation, & that exclusive & engrossing selfishness which 
accompanies it. … I fear that the commercial spirit, amidst all its good effects, is 
almost sure to bring with it wherever it prevails, a certain amount of this evil; 
because that which necessarily occupies every man’s time & thoughts for the greater 
                                                 
56  JSM, ‘Tocqueville [2]’, CW, xviii, 197-8. 
57  JSM, ‘Civilization’, CW, xviii, 143. 
58  In his letter of 1828 to Comte, d’Eichthal wrote: ‘As for the industrial aspect [of England], you can 
imagine I felt only one thing, admiration.’ (Gustav d’Eichthal to Auguste Comte, 17 October 1828, 
D’Eichthal (1977) 7.)   - 75 - 
part of his life, naturally acquires an ascendancy over his mind disproportionate to 
its real importance ….
59 
In ‘Civilization’, Mill examined the implications of the commercial spirit from the 
viewpoint of the concept of civilization. In his view, in the process of civilization, every 
individual learnt to cooperate and to help each other, and came more and more to 
depend on the social arrangements which were gradually being improved with the 
progress of society. This tendency decreased the necessity for self-dependence. The 
negative features of the middle class reflected this tendency. The decrease of 
self-dependence, or the increase of dependence on the social system, removed 
inducements that called forth energy. No inducements remained but the desire for 
wealth. This was why people in a civilized society tended to concentrate their energies 
on money-getting. The middle class devoted their energy to the pursuit of wealth, while 
the energy of the aristocrat, whose desire for wealth was already sufficiently satisfied, 
was nearly extinct. This tendency to money worship encouraged moral corruption – 
getting money was like ‘quackery’. Moreover, the intellectual sphere was inevitably 
involved in this commercialization of society. Literature was apt to pander to the masses 
to make sales, and subsequently became ‘more and more a mere reflection of the current 
sentiments’. Quality was sacrificed for quantity, serious thought for immediate comfort. 
As a result, the influence of the leading individuals over society was diminished.
60 
Mill’s views on the corruption of the commercial spirit makes it clear that his 
identification of civilized society with commercial society never implied terminological 
confusion. In ‘Tocqueville [2]’, he stated: 
M. de Tocqueville … has, at least apparently, confounded the effects of Democracy 
with the effects of Civilization. He has bound up in one abstract idea the whole of 
the tendencies of modern commercial society, and given them one name – 
Democracy; thereby letting it be supposed that he ascribes to equality of conditions, 
several of the effects naturally arising from the mere progress of national prosperity, 
in the form in which that progress manifests itself in modern times.
61 
                                                 
59  JSM to d'Eichthal, 15 May 1829, CW, xii, 31-2. See also JSM to Gustav d’Eichthal, 8 October 1829, 
CW, xii, 34-8. 
60  JSM, ‘Civilization’, CW, xviii, 129-135. 
61  JSM, ‘Tocqueville [2]’, CW, xviii, 191-2. See also ibid., 196, where he stated: ‘The defects which M. 
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In regard to this point, H. O. Pappé points out: ‘Tocqueville thought that equality as 
such was the source of the commercial and industrial spirit with all its consequences, 
promising as well as threatening. Mill attributed the evil consequences to aspects of the 
commercial as such, not to the idea of equality.’
62  Tocqueville and Mill shared a fear of 
the excessive tendency towards social conformity in democratic society, which would 
cause social stagnation. There was, however, a crucial difference between them. On the 
one hand, Tocqueville thought that the tendency towards equalization freed individuals 
from the yoke of social custom and tradition, but, at the same time, it induced in them a 
sense of isolation, which led them to feel impotent and to follow public opinion. On the 
other hand, Mill, who associated the tyranny of majority with the moral corruption of 
the commercial class, thought that the prejudices of the commercial class tended to 
repress individuality. Accordingly, in his opinion, both the problems of the tyranny of 
majority and the corruption of the commercial spirit should be understood together in 
terms of the progress of civilization. 
 
v 
Scholars have examined the notion of the tyranny of the majority in the thought of 
Mill, either through On Liberty, or in light of his relationship with Tocqueville. Mill’s 
understanding of this phenomenon deepened gradually from ‘Tocqueville [1]’ (1835), 
through ‘Civilization’ (1836) and ‘Bentham’ (1838), to ‘Tocqueville [2]’ (1840). In 
such earlier essays as ‘Tocqueville [1]’ and ‘State of Society in America’, the problem 
of majority rule was seen as peculiar to American society. At this stage, Mill even 
concluded that Britain was more fit for democracy than America, because Britain, 
unlike America, had an aristocratic class which he expected would buffer the excessive 
influence of the majority.
63  It was in the essay on ‘Bentham’ that Mill first explicitly 
expressed his anxiety about the tyranny of the majority. In ‘Bentham’, he questioned 
whether it was ‘the proper condition of man, in all ages and nations, to be under the 
                                                                                                                                      
de Tocqueville points out in the American, and which we see in the modern English mind, are the 
ordinary ones of a commercial class.’ 
62  Pappé (1964) 230. 
63  See pp. 58-60 above. Mill stated: ‘America is … nearly the most unfavourable field in which 
democracy could have been tried.’ (JSM, ‘America’, CW, xviii, 107.)   - 77 - 
despotism of Public Opinion’.
64  He went on to say that, though the majority should be 
sovereign, a remedy which prevented the numerical majority from swallowing up 
everyone else had to be considered. Where the exercise of power by the majority was 
excessive, ‘the rights of the individual human being’ would be ‘in extreme peril’. 
Mill pointed to three social groups who would counterbalance the commercial, 
middle class – the agricultural class, the leisured class, and the learned class – and take 
crucial roles in correcting its influence.
65  The agricultural class was first referred to in 
‘Tocqueville [2]’ in 1840, while the others had already been mentioned in ‘Civilization’ 
in 1836 and before. According to Mill, the evils of civilization were first, the power of 
the masses was the only substantial power, and second, each individual would become 
deprived of moral vigour. His proposed solutions for these problems were to form a 
combination of individuals whose influence was declining, and to create educational, 
political, and social institutions by which individual character could be developed.
66   
In the case of the former, concerning the learned class, he favoured co-operative 
organizations, with the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in mind. He 
thought that isolated individuals, those of intelligence in particular, should enjoy the 
advantages of civilization, namely ‘the spirit of co-operation’.
67 With regard to the 
second remedy, in ‘Civilization’ he examined the problem of the ‘relaxation’ of the 
leisured aristocracy. In this period, he repeatedly criticized existing educational 
institutions, the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge in particular, which had been 
strongly associated with the existing establishment of church and state.
68  In order to 
improve the character of the aristocratic class, Mill hoped that an end would be put ‘to 
every kind of unearned distinction’, letting ‘the only road open to honour and 
ascendancy be that of personal qualities’.
69 
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Subsequently, in ‘Tocqueville [2]’, Mill began to show an interest in the agricultural 
class. Mill thought that the agricultural class had not been corrupted by the commercial 
spirit. Generally, they were willing to accept the guidance of the intellectuals, and had 
local attachments to place and occupation. The disposition of the agricultural class was 
opposite to that of commercial class. Their disposition was, according to Mill, 
composed of ‘moderate wishes, tranquil tastes, cultivation of the excitements and 
enjoyments near at hand, and compatible with their existing position’.
70  He insisted that 
artificial devices should be introduced to maintain this disposition. This included 
economic and social reform, such as the reform of the system of rack-renting and 
tenancy at will along with the repeal of the Corn Laws, and educational improvements 
so that knowledge could be diffused and their minds trained.
71 
Importantly, in ‘Bentham’ and ‘Tocqueville [2]’, Mill attempted to connect the idea 
of the necessity of counterbalancing powers against the middle class with a view that 
organized social antagonism was needed for the development of society. He feared the 
tyranny of the majority because it would stunt social development, rather than because 
it would lead to the oppression of the minority by the majority. He believed that, ‘The 
unlikeness of one man to another is not only a principle of improvement, but would 
seem almost to be the only principle’.
72  He stated: 
All countries which have long continued progressive, or been durably great, have 
been so because there has been an organized opposition to the ruling power, of 
whatever kind that power was: plebeians to patricians, clergy to kings, freethinkers 
to clergy, kings to barons, commons to king and aristocracy. … Wherever some 
such quarrel has not been going on – wherever it has been terminated by the 
                                                                                                                                      
Aristocracy) 301-2. It should also be noted here that J. S. Mill later abandoned his hope for the leisured 
class. On 13 April 1847, Mill wrote to John Austin: ‘I have even ceased to think that a leisured class, in 
the ordinary sense of the term, is an essential constituent of the best form of society.’ (JSM to John Austin, 
13 April, 1847, CW, xiii, 713.) 
70  Mill claimed that the reason why the agricultural spirit was not seen in America was that the 
agricultural class there was ‘to all intents and purposes a commercial class’. (JSM, ‘Tocqueville [2]’, CW, 
xviii, 198.) 
71  Ibid., 199. In ‘Coleridge’, Mill referred to Coleridge’s argument that the landed property represented 
‘[t]he interest of permanence, or the Conservative interest’ in society. (JSM, ‘Coleridge’, CW, x, 152-3.) 
72  JSM, ‘Tocqueville [2]’, CW, xviii, 197.   - 79 - 
complete victory of one of the contending principles, and no new contest has taken 
the place of the old – society has either been hardened into Chinese stationariness, 
or fallen into dissolution.
73 
In his view, ‘The evil is not in the preponderance of a democratic class, but of any 
class.’
74  However, he also argued that it was a natural tendency of civilization that the 
importance of the masses became gradually greater, and the tendency towards social 
conformity gradually became stronger. Hence, social antagonism, he claimed, should 
artificially be created in order to encourage social development. 
Around 1830, especially in ‘The Spirit of the Age’, Mill accepted Saint Simonian 
ideas of the necessity of social conformity by the instruction of intellectuals in order to 
achieve social stability. However, in the mid-1830s, he came to the view that such 
stability meant that society was at a deadlock, and conformity constituted a disturbing 
factor in social development. Subsequently, he came to see that diversity in society was 
necessary for its development. Even though Mill continued to believe in the importance 
of instructed elites, his tone had changed. While he used to think that their role was to 
bring about an agreement of opinion for social stability,
75  he now insisted that the elites 
should form one of the counteracting powers against the majority in order to maintain 
the social diversity that was a necessary condition for social development and 
civilization. 
 
4. Concluding Note 
In the late 1830s, Mill came to see contemporary society as a commercial 
civilization led by the commercial middle class. In light of his notion of civilization, he 
attempted to give a systematic and comprehensive explanation of its tendencies, such as 
                                                 
73  JSM, ‘Bentham’, CW, x, 108. For his reference to China as an example of a nation being at a standstill 
due to the lack of social antagonism, see also ‘Tocqueville [2]’, CW, xviii, 188-9. Mill probably took the 
idea of Chinese stagnation from his reading of Guizot, as Tocqueville did also. (Varouxakis (1999) 
296-305.) For Mill’s argument on China, see Levin (2004) 94-120. 
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75  As far as such a view was concerned, John Austin’s influence on Mill was vital, as well as that of the 
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utilitarian basis. For the influence of Austin on Mill, see Friedman (1968).   - 80 - 
the corruption of commercial spirit and the so-called ‘tyranny of the majority’, and to 
propose practicable solutions for them, such as the creation of social antagonism in 
order to counterbalance the dominant middle class. 
While fostering a better understanding of characteristics of commercial society, in 
1837 Mill resumed writing a work on logic, which he had commenced in the early 
1830s, but had had to suspend it in 1832 due to problems regarding the theory of 
induction. He thought that the progress of methodological argument – the science of 
science as he called it – could encourage the improvement of science in general and 
then the improvement of man and society.
76  He had been confident about contributing 
to the renovation of methodology since the mid-1820s. In the next chapter, I shall 
examine Mill’s projected science of society, formulated in the Logic – the most 
important result of his longstanding interest in methodology. 
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Chapter 5. J. S. Mill’s Projected Science of Society 
 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to expound Mill’s ambitious system of moral science, with 
reference mainly to A System of Logic. Since as early as around 1826, writing a book on 
logic had been one of Mill’s most important self-appointed tasks. In his Autobiography, 
Mill recalled that he first ‘formed the project of writing a book on Logic’ during the 
study meeting, which he held with his friends twice a week at George Grote’s house, 
where topics relating to logic were discussed, drawing on the works of such thinkers as 
Henry Aldrich, Richard Whately, and Thomas Hobbes.
1  In ‘the early part of 1830’ he 
actually began to ‘put on paper the ideas on Logic’, which eventually resulted in the 
publication of the Logic in 1843.
2  However, due to difficult problems regarding 
induction, he interrupted his writing on logic between 1832 and 1837.
3  Significantly, 
during this interruption, much of his intellectual effort was devoted to the examination 
of contemporary society, which contributed to broadening and deepening his 
understanding of contemporary commercial society. The fruits of this work can be 
found in such essays as ‘De Tocqueville on Democracy in America’ (1835 and 1840), 
‘Civilization’ (1836), ‘Bentham’ (1838), and ‘Coleridge’ (1840), as well as in the Logic, 
where his system of moral science was formulated. 
He set down the discovery of what he called ‘universal law’, or simply ‘law’, as the 
chief objective of every scientific study. The term ‘law’ referred to the invariable 
uniformities in the relationships between phenomena: ‘It is the custom of philosophers, 
wherever they can trace regularity of any kind, to call the general proposition which 
expresses the nature of that regularity, a law’.
4  Hence, the point of his work on logic 
was to clarify the scientific method by which such laws could reasonably be 
determined. 
The ultimate task of the scientist of society, in Mill’s opinion, was to explain 
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scientifically the empirical uniformities of social phenomena by showing their 
connection to the psychological laws of human nature, which operated in conjunction 
with given social conditions. He emphasized the point that social science should be 
grounded on the knowledge of human nature; in other words, every social science 
should be deduced from the science of human nature.
5  Even though this idea was not 
unique, in that it had been put forward by earlier thinkers, including Dugald Stewart and 
James Mill,
6  Mill went further by giving a detailed explanation of what sorts of 
deductive method were to be applied for the study of various social phenomena, and 
pointing out why an inductive method was not feasible when investigating social 
phenomena. 
In the first part of this chapter, I examine Mill’s essays in the 1830s, among others 
‘Definition of Political Economy’, in which he presented the earliest formulation of his 
system of moral science. One of the characteristics of his thought at this period was 
what I call political relativism. Mill came to emphasize the way in which the state of 
society affected, or rather restricted, the form of government which it was feasible for a 
given community to adopt. His system of moral science reflected this political 
relativism. The second part of this chapter focuses exclusively on the Logic, where I 
explain why Mill concluded that experimental, inductive methods were not sufficient 
when studying social phenomena. This is followed by an examination of his detailed 
discussion of deductive methods. Finally, I expound his system of moral science as 
developed in the Logic. In so doing, I will investigate the role of ethology as the 
‘axiomata media’ of moral science. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5  To refer to the study of social phenomena, Mill employed several different terms. Even within a single 
work, the Logic, such terms were used as ‘the study of the phenomena of Society’ (ibid., viii, 875.), ‘the 
study of Politics’ (ibid.), ‘political or social science’ (ibid.), ‘the philosophy of society’ (ibid., 876.), 
‘Social Science’ (ibid., 877, 895.), and ‘Sociology’ (ibid., 895.). In addition, he had previously used such 
terms as ‘speculative politics’, ‘the natural history of society’, and ‘the science of social economy’. (JSM, 
‘Definition’, CW, iv, 320-1.) See also note 17 of this chapter. 
6  Fontana (1985) 81-105.   - 83 - 
2. J. S. Mill’s Formulation of a System of Moral Science in the 1830s 
i 
By 1830 at the latest, Mill came to hold two relativist viewpoints: the first was that 
different societies were at different stages of development; the second was that societies 
might vary even when they were at the same stage. Moreover, he came to believe that 
relativism of this kind had a huge importance in the study of politics. In other words, he 
focused in the notion of ‘society’, and subsequently thought that the value of political 
institutions depended on the state of society in which they were established. 
In ‘Miss Martineau’s Summary of Political Economy’, which he published in the 
Monthly Repository in May 1834, Mill criticized political economists for regarding a 
class society which consisted of landlords, capitalists, and labourers, as universal. He 
emphasized the importance of applying a relativist perspective to the study of political 
economy: 
They revolve in their eternal circle of landlords, capitalists, and labourers, until they 
seem to think of the distinction of society into those three classes, as if it were one 
of God’s ordinances, not man’s, and as little under human control as the division of 
day and night. Scarcely any one of them seems to have proposed to himself as a 
subject of inquiry, what changes the relations of those classes to one another are 
likely to undergo in the progress of society; to what extent the distinction itself 
admits of being beneficially modified, and if it does not even, in a certain sense, 
tend gradually to disappear.
7 
At the same time, he often expressed the view that political problems were relative, and 
attempted to ground this view on solid scientific foundations. This attempt took the 
form of a criticism of what he regarded as Benthamite politics on the one hand, and the 
form of an interest in historical knowledge on the other. In September 1840 he claimed: 
                                                 
7  JSM, ‘Miss Martineau’s Summary of Political Economy’, CW, iv, 226-7. In regard to this statement, of 
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‘whoever knows these two principles, possesses more of the science of politics than was 
known even to eminent thinkers fifty years ago’. The principles in question were as 
follows: first, ‘the successive changes which take place in human affairs are no more 
left to chance in the moral than in the physical world, but that the progress of society, 
social, moral, and political, together with the whole train of events which compose the 
history of the human race, are as much the effect of certain fixed laws as the motions of 
the planets or the rotation of the seasons’; and second, ‘the changes in political 
institutions are the effects of previous changes in the condition of society and of the 
human mind’.
8 
It should be noted, as Frederick Rosen points out,
9  that Mill’s relativism never 
meant that he abandoned a psychological theory based on the universal laws of human 
nature, even though, ‘The more highly the science of ethology is cultivated, and the 
better the diversities of national character are understood, the smaller, probably, will the 
number of propositions become, which it will be considered safe to build on as 
universal principles of human nature’.
10  What he meant was that the way causal laws 
determining man’s character and behaviour actually operated was complex and 
depended on a given condition of society, itself the result of historical events. In his 
system, ethology would be the bridge between the universal laws of human nature and 
social phenomena actually observed, as I shall show. 
     
ii 
Even though his interest in logic can be traced back to the mid-1820s, it was in the 
early 1830s that Mill came to emphasize the importance of methodological argument in 
general, and to the moral sciences in particular. In so doing, his political relativism was 
reflected in his formulation of a system of moral science, of the relation between 
sciences, and of the methodologies applied to them.   
In ‘Definition of Political Economy’ which, though first published in 1836, was 
written in the early 1830s,
11 Mill gave a general account of the whole system of moral 
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9  Rosen (2007) 133. 
10  JSM, Logic, CW, viii, 906. 
11  For the process of writing ‘Definition of Political Economy’, see John Robson, ‘Editor’s Note’, CW, iv, 
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science – a comprehensive system within which political economy was placed.
12  In his 
view, moral science, whose subject-matter was ‘Man … considered as a being having a 
moral or mental nature’, consisted of three categories. The first category, which formed 
a part of ‘pure mental philosophy’, dealt with ‘what belongs to man as an individual 
man, and would belong to him if no human being existed besides himself’. This study 
clarified ‘all the laws of the mere intellect, and those of the purely self-regarding 
desires’. The second, which constituted another part of pure mental philosophy, and on 
which ‘morals, or ethics, are founded’, discussed those laws of human nature regarding 
the feelings called forth in relation to others, such as ‘the affections, the conscience, or 
feeling of duty, and the love of approbation’.
13 
The third category was conceived as ‘certain principles of human nature which are 
peculiarly connected with the ideas and feelings generated in man by living in a state of 
society’.
14  Mill stated: 
It shows by what principles of his nature man is induced to enter into a state of 
society; how this change in his position acts upon his interests and feelings, and 
through them upon his conduct; how the association tends progressively to become 
closer, and the co-operation extends itself to more and more purposes; what those 
purposes are, and what the varieties of means most generally adopted for furthering 
them; what are the various relations which establish themselves among men as the 
ordinary consequence of the social union; what those which are different in different 
states of society;
15  and what are the effects of each upon the conduct and character 
of man.
16 
This science was comprehensive in that it was to embrace ‘every part of man’s nature, 
                                                                                                                                      
309. For Mill’s argument on the definition and method of political economy, see Chapter 8 below. 
12  Besides the expression ‘moral science’, Mill employed such phrases as ‘psychological science’ or 
‘mental science’ for this branch of science. (JSM, ‘Definition’, CW, iv, 316, 324.) 
13  Ibid., 319. 
14  Ibid., 320. 
15  When this essay was republished in 1844 as part of Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political 
Economy, the following sentence was inserted at this point: ‘in what historical order those states tend to 
succeed one another’. This insertion, as J. H. Burns points out, reflects his strong interest in the theory of 
social change at that period. (Burns (1976) 7.) 
16  JSM, ‘Definition’, CW, iv, 320.   - 86 - 
in so far as influencing the conduct or condition of man in society’; it was to be ‘the 
scientific foundation of practical politics, or the art of government, of which the art of 
legislation is a part’.
17 
On the one hand, political economy was conceived as dealing with only one kind of 
motive, the desire for wealth and aversion to labour; it was intended to show what 
would happen as a consequence of the pursuit of wealth in a given state of society.
18 
Mill stated that political economy dealt with the desire for wealth ‘as if it were the sole 
end’,
19  even though no political economist ‘was ever so absurd as to suppose that 
mankind are really thus constituted’.
20  On the other hand, the subject-matter of politics 
was the state of society. In order to examine such a complex phenomenon as society in 
which man was often moved by many motives, it was useless to focus on only one set 
of motives, as political economy did. Moreover, the conclusions of political economy, 
which presupposed a certain state of society, were subject to the conclusions of politics, 
which discussed the nature and condition of that society. 
As far as the methodology of such sciences as political economy and politics was 
concerned, Mill presented two types of reasoning: what he termed the method of 
‘practical men’ and the method of ‘theorists’. The method of practical men, which he 
also called ‘the method à posteriori’, was an operation of induction, while the method 
of the theorist, also called ‘the method à priori’, did not mean merely an operation of 
deduction, but meant the mixed operation of induction and deduction.
21  To Mill’s mind, 
the true method of moral science was that of the theorist. However, due to such 
difficulties inevitably involved in the subject-matter of moral science as the complexity 
of the premises of reasoning and the impossibility of experiment, one could never be 
assured that all the operative causes had been identified. In order to eliminate these 
problems, Mill proposed an à posteriori process to verify the accuracy of the temporary 
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conclusions reached by deductive reasoning.
22 
Compared with the Logic, the argument in ‘Definition of Political Economy’ left 
some ambiguities. The most important difference was that, while in ‘Definition of 
Political Economy’ Mill did not propose the existence of more than one method à priori, 
in the Logic he recognized the existence of two kinds of method à priori – the 
geometrical method and the physical method. This recognition enabled him to 
distinguish James Mill’s method (the geometrical) from his own (the physical). In 
‘Definition of Political Economy’, he did not, therefore, distinguish, from a 
methodological perspective, between a comprehensive study of society, which he 
thought employed the inverse deductive method, and such separate studies of social 
phenomena as political economy and political ethology, which used the direct deductive 
method. Despite such ambiguities, this essay was of huge importance in that he 
attempted to formulate the relationship between the branches of moral science, and to 
argue that all studies of social phenomenon should employ the deductive approach, 
employing what he called ‘the principle of the Composition of Forces’.
23 
 
3. J. S. Mill’s Formulation of a System of Moral Science in the Logic 
i 
Mill wrote that every phenomenon existed in two relations to every other; either in 
that of simultaneity or in that of succession. He stated: ‘Of all truths relating to 
phenomena, the most valuable to us are those which relate to the order of their 
succession.’ This was because the law of simultaneity was a derivative law of the law of 
succession.
24  Of uniformities of succession, only one had been found capable of being 
regarded as rigorously universal, namely ‘the Law of Causation’, a law which, in the 
simplest terms, stipulated ‘every fact which has a beginning has a cause’.
25  The 
ultimate objective of every scientific inquiry, therefore, was to ascertain the universal 
law of causation, or simply universal causation.   
According to Mill, cause was the ‘unconditional invariable antecedent’ of every 
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phenomenon. Cause should not only be ‘invariable’ in the sense that the antecedent had 
always been followed by the consequent, but also ‘unconditional’ in the sense of being 
independent from any other antecedents. For instance, day was always followed by 
night, but this did not mean that day was the cause of night, for the alternation of day 
and night was caused by earth’s rotation.
26  Significantly, Mill was interested only in 
what he called ‘physical causes’, and subsequently he saw causation as a relation 
between observable phenomena.
27  This means that he did not intend to investigate 
‘metaphysical’ causes, which were non-physical phenomena in themselves, and about 
which man could have no knowledge, even when they were supposed to exist ‘behind’ 
physical phenomena. Therefore, ‘The only notion of a cause … is such a notion as can 
be gained from experience.’
28 
As an empiricist, Mill attempted to develop an inductive method which could be 
applied to both natural and moral science, and then claimed that the law of universal 
causation was the foundation of any logic of induction. In other words, he believed that 
the notion of universal causation found in the natural world could also be applied to 
human actions. At the same time, he was vitally concerned with human freedom, and 
eager to develop an argument that showed that the law of universal causation was 
compatible with the notion of the freedom of human will. He developed this point in 
Chapter II of Book VI of the Logic, entitled ‘Of Liberty and Necessity’, which he 
thought to be ‘the best chapter’ in the Logic.
29 
Mill stated that there were two main theories of the causation of human actions: the 
theory of free will and that of necessity.
30  The former theory, however, was improper in 
that it conflicted with the law of causation – effect always had antecedent causes. In 
favour of the doctrine of necessity, he introduced a distinction between the doctrine of 
necessity properly understood and that misconceived, namely ‘fatalism’.
31  The term 
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‘necessary’ properly understood merely meant, according to Mill, the uniformity of 
sequence, and, therefore, ‘Applied to the will, it only means that the given cause will be 
followed by the effect, subject to all possibilities of counteraction by other causes.’
32 
But, in common use, it often wrongly implied ‘the operation of those causes exclusively, 
which are supposed too powerful to be counteracted at all’. As the following statement 
clarifies, Mill understood the doctrine of necessity to refer to the ‘capability of being 
predicted’,
33  and not of inevitable compulsion. 
Correctly conceived, the doctrine called Philosophical Necessity is simply this: that, 
given the motives which are present to an individual’s mind, and given likewise the 
character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act may be 
unerringly inferred: that if we knew the person thoroughly, and knew all the 
inducements which are acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as much 
certainty as we can predict any physical event.
34 
Mill subsequently claimed that human moral freedom could be compatible with ‘the 
doctrine that our volitions and actions are invariable consequents of our antecedent 
states of mind’.
35  This doctrine only meant that, once his character and circumstances 
were known, a man’s action could be predicted. It did not mean that the man’s actions 
were compelled by his character and circumstances. Man could resist certain motives, 
even though his wish to resist needed its own antecedent. Mill thought that fatalism, 
which denied such a possibility, was represented by Owenism. Though correct in 
endorsing that ‘whatever is about to happen, will be the infallible result of the causes 
which produce it’, Owenism was wrong in further claiming that ‘character is formed for 
him, and not by him; therefore his wishing that it had been formed differently is of no 
use; he has no power to alter it’.
36  According to Mill, however, ‘He has, to a certain 
extent, a power to alter his character.’
37  In opposition to fatalism, Mill denied that the 
doctrine of necessity implied that our actions were inevitably compelled in any way. 
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‘The causes, therefore, on which action depends, are never uncontrollable’,
38  and it was 
controllable even by the man himself. Subsequently, Mill stated that moral freedom did 
not consist in the ability to act against our volition, which was not an unconditional 
cause, but was a consequent of an antecedent. It consisted in a man’s creating his own 
volition, or, at least, in wishing to create his own volition, by forming his own character 
in a particular way.
39  The Owenite, on the contrary, failed to recognize that ‘his own 
desire to mould it in a particular way, is one of those circumstances [contributing to the 
formation of his own character], and by no means one of the least influential’.
40  Mill’s 
purpose here was to insist on the importance of man’s ability to form volitions, and 
thereby, mould his own character. Mill did not attempt to point out the manner in which 
such volitions were produced, in other words to point out the unconditional and ultimate 
causes of volitions. He thus regarded moral freedom as a belief in the possibility of the 
self-formation of character. He thought that moral freedom thus understood did not 
contradict the doctrine of necessity. This doctrine, if properly conceived, merely meant 
that man’s actions were always caused by a certain antecedent state of mind, and Mill 
was prepared to admit that the desire for moral freedom had its antecedent cause.
41 
 
ii 
According to Mill, induction was a logical process to ascertain the laws of 
causation;
42  inductive reasoning was conducted by either observations or experiments, 
or both. One inductive operation was ‘simple enumeration’, an operation that relied 
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only on observation.
43  To Mill’s mind, simple enumeration was incapable of 
ascertaining causation, for the conclusion derived from this operation only meant that 
any contrary instances had not yet been observed, and did not mean that such 
counterexamples would never be discovered in the future. Accordingly, Mill claimed 
that, in conducting inductive reasoning in order to ascertain causation, experiment was 
required, along with observation. This claim encouraged him to examine experimental 
methods in detail. 
In Chapter VIII of Book III of the Logic, entitled ‘Of the Four Methods of 
Experimental Inquiry’, Mill examined four experimental methods: the methods of 
agreement; of difference; of residues; and of concomitant variation.
44  He stated that he 
took them from John Herschel, who had been inspired by Francis Bacon. Mill 
formulated the method of agreement thus: ‘If two or more instances of the phenomenon 
under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which 
alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon.’
45  The 
method of difference was thus expressed: ‘If an instance in which the phenomenon 
under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every 
circumstance save one in common, that one occurring only in the former; the 
circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a 
necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon.’
46  Mill expressed the method of 
residues thus: ‘Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous 
inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is 
the effect of the remaining antecedents.’
47  The method of concomitant variation was 
formulated as follows: ‘Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another 
phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that 
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phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation.’
48  These were, 
according to Mill, ‘the only possible modes of experimental inquiry’,
49  and, therefore, 
if these could not be applied to the study of social phenomena, the causal laws of social 
phenomena could not be ascertained through an inductive, experimental method.   
In Mill’s view, the methods of agreement, of residues, and of concomitant variation 
were inconclusive. These could affirm only the existence of some causal connection 
between phenomena, and could not clarify the law of connection. What the method of 
agreement could show was merely that ‘there is a “uniformity” between an antecedent 
and consequent, that they are invariably connected’,
50  and, this method could not, 
therefore, specify which was the cause and which was the effect. In others words, it 
could not show that the antecedent was the cause of the consequent. The method of 
residues could lead to the conclusion that one or more consequents were the effect of 
one of a set of antecedents, but could not clarify that a particular antecedent was the 
cause of a particular consequent.
51  Through the method of concomitant variations, it 
was possible to show that there was a casual relation between the antecedent and the 
consequent, but impossible to decide whether the antecedent was the cause of the 
consequent or whether both of them had another cause.
52  Accordingly, Mill claimed 
that only the method of difference could specify casual laws. He saw this method as ‘the 
most perfect of the methods of experimental inquiry’.
53  In employing this method, it 
was necessary not only to produce the consequent in terms of producing the antecedent, 
but also to exclude the consequent by excluding the antecedent. Otherwise, neither 
could be ascertained.
54 
A further advantage of the method of difference was that it could treat not only the 
cases in which a single cause acted alone to produce an effect, but also those cases 
where there was a ‘plurality of causes’, cases in which there might be several different 
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antecedents that produced the same effects.
55  None of the other three methods could 
effectively solve the difficulties caused by a plurality of causes. There was, however, a 
particular case in which all the methods of experimental inquiry, including that of 
difference, were not applicable. This case Mill termed the ‘intermixture of effects’.
56 
The intermixture of effects referred to cases in which multiple causes interfered with 
each other to produce a single effect. What Mill termed the ‘composition of causes’ was 
one common type of such an intermixture.
57  In such a case, it was impossible to find 
the two examples that the method of difference needed, namely two examples which 
shared all antecedent circumstances and differed only in the feature in question. All the 
possible causes of this particular feature would be included within other features which 
the antecedents in both examples shared. In order to examine a case involving the 
intermixture of effects, an alternative method was required. This was what Mill termed 
the deductive or à priori method. The most significant kinds of phenomena in which the 
intermixture of effects occurred were social phenomena. Accordingly, in the study of 
social phenomena, only the deductive method was applicable. Mill concluded that the 
experimental method could not be used in the study of social phenomena, due to the 
impossibility of experimentation.
58  Not only that, even empirical laws could not be 
ascertained by this method, as I shall show. 
It should be noted here that the notion that social phenomena could not be 
investigated through experimental methods did not mean that it was impossible to 
dissolve a certain social phenomenon into the elements which composed it, and then to 
ascertain the cause of each element through induction. Social phenomena could be 
investigated by deduction from propositions which had been ascertained by induction. 
This idea was related to Mill’s distinction between what he called ‘chemical 
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combination’ and ‘mechanical composition’. 
On the one hand, chemical combination was a process where two or more 
substances combined to form another, which took on properties which differed from the 
properties of its constituent elements to such an extent that they could not have been 
predicted from the properties of its elements. In this case, ‘most of the uniformities to 
which the causes conformed when separate, cease altogether when they are conjoined’. 
An example of chemical combination was the production of water from the combination 
of hydrogen and oxygen: ‘Not a trace of the properties of hydrogen or of oxygen is 
observable in those of their compound, water.’
59  On the other hand, mechanical 
composition was defined as ‘the principle which is exemplified in all cases in which the 
joint effect of several causes is identical with the sum of their separate effects’;
60  in 
other words, it was a mode ‘of the mutual interference of laws of nature, in which, even 
when the concurrent causes annihilate each other’s effects, each exerts its full efficacy 
according to its own law, its law as a separate agent’.
61  The difference, therefore, 
between them was, according to Mill, the difference ‘between the case in which the 
joint effect of causes is the sum of their separate effects, and the case in which it is 
heterogeneous to them; between laws which work together without alteration, and laws 
which, when called upon to work together, cease and give place to others’.
62 
In order to understand a social phenomenon which is the result of the mechanical 
composition of causes, Mill stated that the phenomenon should be dissolved into the 
elements of which it was composed, and then the causal law of each element ascertained. 
Accordingly, he thought that it was possible to ascertain a scientific law by deduction, 
in the narrow sense of the term, from premises which had been ascertained by induction. 
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As I shall demonstrate below, these operations – direct induction and deduction in its 
narrow sense – comprised, along with verification as the third process, deduction in the 
broad sense of the term, or what Mill called the ‘deductive method’. 
 
iii 
At the outset of Chapter X of Book VI of the Logic, Mill attempted to define ‘a state 
of society’,
63  which was the subject-matter of scientific inquiry: 
What is called a state of society, is the simultaneous state of all the greater social 
facts or phenomena. Such are, the degree of knowledge, and of intellectual and 
moral culture, existing in the community, and in every class of it; the state of 
industry, of wealth and its distribution; the habitual occupations of the community; 
their division into classes, and the relations of those classes to one another; the 
common beliefs which they entertain on all the subjects most important to mankind, 
and the degree of assurance with which those beliefs are held; their tastes, and the 
character and degree of their æsthetic development; their form of government, and 
the more important of their laws and customs. The condition of all these things, and 
of many more which will spontaneously suggest themselves, constitute the state of 
society or the state of civilization at any given time.
64 
What he called the state of society were the conditions ‘not of one or few organs or 
functions, but of the whole organism’,
65  and 
There is no social phenomenon which is not more or less influenced by every other 
part of the condition of the same society, and therefore by every cause which is 
influencing any other of the contemporaneous social phenomena. There is, in short, 
what physiologists term a consensus, similar to that existing among the various 
organs and functions of the physical frame of man and the more perfect animals.
66   
The existence of a given state of society was ‘a necessary consequence of the influence 
exercised by every one of those phenomena over every other. It is a fact implied in the 
                                                 
63  Mill used ‘the state of society’ and ‘the state of civilization’ interchangeably. 
64  JSM, Logic, CW, viii, 911-2. 
65  ibid., 912. 
66  Ibid., 899.   - 96 - 
consensus of the various parts of the social body’.
67  Of importance was the fact that he 
regarded the form of government as an element constituting the state of society; in other 
words, he thought that the form of government would inevitably be influenced by other 
social phenomenon. This view was similar to that of Saint Simon, and reflected his 
relativist attitude towards political institutions.
68 
Having defined ‘a state of society’, Mill formulated a system of social science 
which examined the various aspects of society. In Mill’s view, the science of society 
consisted of two major categories: the ‘General Science of Society’ and ‘Special 
Sociological Enquiries’. He conceived the General Science of Society as a study which 
‘inquires into the laws of succession and coexistence of the great facts constituting the 
state of society and civilization at any time’.
69  Two sciences constituted the General 
Science of Society: Social Statics and Social Dynamics. The former was ‘the theory of 
the mutual actions and reactions of contemporaneous social phenomena’,
70  while the 
latter aimed ‘to observe and explain the sequences of social conditions’.
71  According to 
Mill, the law of coexistence should be seen as a derivative law of the law of succession, 
because ‘the proximate cause of every state of society is the state of society 
immediately preceding it’.
72  Special Sociological Enquiries, which included political 
economy and political ethology, dealt with one class of actions in a given condition of 
society. In this field of study, the question was ‘what effect will follow from a given 
cause, a certain general condition of social circumstances being presupposed’; the 
conclusions of Special Sociological Enquiries, therefore, ‘must be limited and 
controlled’ by those of the General Science of Society, whose subject was the states of 
societies themselves.
73   
Mill insisted that all social scientific studies should be based on the science of 
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human nature. In other words, every law of social phenomena had to be deduced from 
the laws of human nature. Unless it connected with the law of human nature, a law of 
social phenomena was merely an empirical law, not a scientific law. In Mill’s opinion, 
associationist psychology was expected to take a role of the science of human nature, as 
I shall demonstrate below. 
As far as methodology was concerned, in Mill’s view, the deductive method should 
be employed in the study of social phenomena, as stated above. He conceived two kinds 
of deductive method, methods termed respectively the geometrical method and the 
physical method. Of these two, only the latter was appropriate for the study of social 
phenomena.   
By the geometrical method, which he also termed the ‘abstract method’, Mill meant 
a method that was grounded on the assumption that ‘each of them [i.e. social 
phenomena] results always from only one force, one single property of human nature’.
74 
Remarkable examples of this method, according to Mill, were Hobbes’s politics 
grounded on the single motive of self-preservation, and what Mill famously called ‘the 
interest-philosophy of the Bentham school’, which he thought grounded the theory of 
government only on the single comprehensive, but ambiguous, premise that ‘men’s 
actions are always determined by their interest’.
75  In Mill’s view, this method was 
crucially deficient, in that there was in practice no phenomena ‘which does not depend 
on a conjunction of very many causes’.
76  Therefore, a different kind of deductive 
method was required. This was what Mill called the ‘physical method’, ‘the concrete 
deductive method’, or the ‘method à priori’. Mill stated:   
The Social Science … is a deductive science; not, indeed, after the model of 
geometry, but after that of the higher complex physical sciences. It infers the law of 
each effect from the laws of causation on which that effect depends; not, however, 
from the law merely of one cause, as in the geometrical method; but by considering 
all the causes which conjunctly influence the effect, and compounding their laws 
with one another. Its method, in short, is the Concrete Deductive Method ….
77 
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Physical method was associated with what Mill called ‘the principle of the Composition 
of Forces’, which appeared typically in dynamics, and which regarded a phenomenon as 
the sum of separate effects.
78  Under this method, it could hardly be assumed that all the 
operative causes had been identified, due to the complexity of social phenomena and the 
impossibility of experiment. It was necessary, therefore, to verify its conclusions. Mill 
wrote: 
This remedy consists in the process which, under the name of Verification, we have 
characterized as the third essential constituent part of the Deductive Method; that of 
collating the conclusions of the ratiocination either with the concrete phenomena 
themselves, or, when such are obtainable, with their empirical laws. The ground of 
confidence in any concrete deductive science is not the à priori reasoning, but the 
consilience between its results and those of observation à posteriori.
79 
It should once again be noted here that Mill thought it impossible to verify empirical 
conclusions ascertained by simple enumerative induction. In the study of social 
phenomena, no empirical law could be ascertained by simple enumerative induction. 
Accordingly, another kind of inductive generalization had to be employed. This was 
what Mill termed ‘approximate generalization’. Where no empirical law could be 
ascertained even by approximate generalization, Mill proposed an alternative mode of 
verification, which he termed ‘indirect verification’, by which the law was verified by 
‘concrete phenomena’, and not by empirical law.
80 
Mill argued that it was a deductive method of this sort – the physical or concrete 
deductive method – that should be employed in every study of social phenomena. The 
method itself was divided into two branches: first, the ‘Direct Deductive Method’; 
second, the ‘Inverse Deductive Method’. The direct deductive method consisted of three 
logical steps: first, direct induction to ascertain premises; second, deduction (in its 
narrow sense) to deduce conclusions from the ascertained premises; and third, 
verification of the conclusions in terms either of empirical laws or of concrete facts. 
This method could be employed only in Special Sociological Enquiries, and not in the 
                                                 
78  See pp. 93-5 above. 
79  Ibid., 896-7. 
80  Ibid., 909.   - 99 - 
General Science of Society. This was because the social phenomena in question in 
Special Sociological Enquiries were ‘in the main dependent, immediately and in the 
first resort, on different kinds of causes; and therefore not only may with advantage, but 
must, be studied apart: just as in the natural body we study separately the physiology 
and pathology of each of the principal organs and tissues, though every one is acted 
upon by the condition of all the others’.
81 
In Mill’s view, the direct deductive method could not be used in the General Science 
of Society, for the state of society – the subject-matter of the General Science of Society 
– was a condition of the whole organism, in which many causes influenced each other. 
Moreover, he wrote: 
So long a series of actions and reactions between Circumstances and Man, each 
successive term being composed of an ever greater number and variety of parts, 
could not possibly be calculated from the elementary laws which produce it, by 
merely human faculties. The mere length of the series would be a sufficient obstacle, 
since a slight error in any one of the terms would augment in rapid progression at 
every subsequent step.
82   
A different kind of concrete deductive method had to be employed in the General 
Science of Society. This was what Mill called the ‘Inverse Deductive Method’ or the 
‘Historical Method’. In this method, unlike in the direct deductive method, investigation 
began by determining the empirical laws of social phenomena, and proceeded by 
showing that it was likely to result from the known laws of human nature. 
Given Mill’s detailed formulation of the methodologies employed in the moral 
sciences, a crucial question arises here: while insisting that deducing the laws of social 
phenomena from the laws of human nature would be impossible under the direct 
deductive method, why did Mill think that social phenomena could be linked with the 
laws of human nature in the inverse deductive method. The answer is this: while Mill 
had a direct connection in mind when discussing the direct deductive method, in the 
inverse deductive method he proposed an indirect connection between these laws, by 
means of what he called the ‘axiomata media’ or the ‘middle principle’. Axiomata 
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media was a set of laws that were distinguished ‘on the one hand from the empirical 
laws resulting from simple observation, and on the other from the highest 
generalizations’.
83  To Mill’s mind, the most general laws were ‘too general, and 
include too few circumstances, to give sufficient indication of what happens in 
individual cases, where the circumstances are almost always immensely numerous’, and 
it was impossible thereby to deduce directly the lower empirical laws from it.
84  Mill 
was convinced that the indirect connection between the highest and lowest 
generalizations by means of axiomata media could be as scientifically accurate as a 
direct connection. 
 
4. Psychology in J. S. Mill’s System of Moral Science 
i 
Mill used the term ‘human nature’ in two different, though related, ways: on some 
occasions, he referred to it as abstract and universal; on others, as empirical and 
historical, and, thereby alterable. Universal human nature was the subject-matter of 
psychology, while empirical human nature, or more exactly the way in which empirical 
human nature was formed in particular circumstances, was the subject-matter of the 
science of the formation of character, ethology.
85 
The subject-matter of psychology was the laws of the mind, namely the laws of 
succession and coexistence of mental states whose cause was other mental states.
86 
Psychology, Mill claimed, was an empirical science in that all knowledge of human 
actions should be ascertained in terms of experience – external observation and 
introspection. Psychological laws were formed by generalizations from such experience, 
and no further rationalization was required as far as these laws were concerned. In this 
sense, psychological laws were ultimate laws. 
Psychological laws always operated in conjunction with the circumstances in which 
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man was placed. The diversity of circumstances resulted in the diversity of human 
nature actually observed. The way in which empirical human nature, which Mill often 
called ‘character’, was formed, or the way in which universal psychological laws were 
affected by the circumstances in which they operated, was the subject-matter of 
ethology. 
Even though Mill believed in the existence of universal elements in human nature 
and hoped to identify them, his interest lay rather in the empirical elements of human 
character.
87  Mill stated: 
The more highly the science of ethology is cultivated, and the better the diversities 
of national character are understood, the smaller, probably, will the number of 
propositions become, which it will be considered safe to build on as universal 
principles of human nature.
88 
This view was a consequence of his gradual realization of the significance of diversity 
of human character. Furthermore, this realization was associated with Mill’s 
disapproval of certain elements of human nature which he thought should be changed 
for the better. There were, in human nature, inherent propensities which were often 
contrary to the progress of society; the natural traits of human character were not always 
superior to artificial ones.
89  Although Mill recognized negative elements in human 
nature, he did not think that man was by nature incapable of growing. In order to 
achieve the improvement of mankind, it was necessary both to suppress bad 
propensities in human nature and to cultivate good ones. Though he regarded some 
innate propensities as necessary engines for the progress of man and society, he saw the 
process of civilization as a process of redressing the negative elements of human nature. 
He stated:   
Civilization in every one of its aspects is a struggle against the animal instincts. 
Over some even of the strongest of them, it has shown itself capable of acquiring 
abundant control. It has artificialized large portions of mankind to such an extent, 
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that of many of their most natural inclinations they have scarcely a vestige or a 
remembrance left.
90 
As John Robson states, Mill saw human nature as ‘both the efficient cause and final end 
of improvement’.
91  Ethology was a science that showed both the original and the 
desirable condition of human nature, while psychological analysis based on 
associationism revealed human nature as an inherent efficient cause. 
 
ii 
Mill insisted that every scientific law of social phenomena had to be grounded on 
the laws of human nature. In his view, associationist psychology and its derivative 
science, ethology, formed the science of human nature.
92  In this respect, Karl Popper 
accuses Mill of committing what he calls ‘psychologism’, by which he means ‘the 
plausible doctrine that all laws of social life must be ultimately reducible to the 
psychological laws of “human nature”’.
93  Though Mill placed great emphasis on 
psychology as the scientific foundation for the study of social phenomena, he never 
insisted that social phenomena could be understood in terms only of psychological laws. 
In short, Mill did not commit ‘psychologism’ in Popper’s definition of the term. 
Popper’s accusation seems to be based on a misunderstanding of Mill’s methodology 
and projected science of ethology. To clarify this, it is necessary to understand how Mill 
used such terms as ‘deduction’, ‘explanation’, and ‘empirical law’.
94 
Mill wrote that the term ‘deduction’ had two meanings: first, ‘discovery’, a process 
in which unknown laws were derived from known laws; and second, ‘explanation’, a 
process in which known laws were derived from other known laws.
95  As far as Mill’s 
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vision of the study of social phenomena was concerned, the latter process, explanation, 
is worthy of examination here. According to Mill, the term ‘explanation’ had two 
meanings: one was to point out the cause or causes of a certain fact, namely to ascertain 
the law or laws of causation which produced a phenomenon; and the other was to 
resolve a law into other laws, or to resolve several laws into one law.
96 
There were three modes of explanation. The first was to regard a certain 
phenomenon as a complex effect and ‘resolve [the effect] into the laws of separate 
causes, together with the fact of their coexistence’. An example of this mode was the 
law of the motion of a planet being resolved into the law of tangential force and the law 
of the centripetal force.
97  The second mode was to point out an intermediate link 
between what was once thought cause and effect. For example, the act of touching a 
certain object was followed by the sensation of touch. However, touching the object was 
not a direct cause of the sensation, just a remote cause, namely the cause of the cause. 
The direct effect of touching the object was a change in the state of a nerve, which was 
the direct cause of the sensation.
98  In these two modes, a law was resolved into two or 
more laws. In addition to these two modes, there was a third mode in which several 
laws were resolved into one law. This was a mode of explanation in which less general 
laws were resolved into a more general law by subsumption, namely ‘gathering up of 
several laws into one more general law which includes them all’. An example was 
where the law of gravity on the earth and the law of centripetal force of a planet were 
explained in terms of the law of universal gravitation.
99 
The next topic to be examined here is Mill’s formulation of the relationship between 
a ‘derivative law’ and an ‘ultimate law’. According to Mill, a derivative law was a law 
that could be resolved into a higher law or a set of higher laws. In other words, the 
derivative law was a law which could be deduced from a higher law or laws. On the 
contrary, an ultimate law could not be resolved into any other. In short, the derivative 
law could be explained by a higher law, while an ultimate law could not be explained. A 
derivative law was derived either from ultimate laws or other higher derivative laws. It 
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is worth emphasizing here that Mill’s claim that a certain derivative law could be 
resolved into other higher laws, either ultimate or higher derivative, does not mean that 
the derivative law depended only on other higher laws. The derivative law might depend 
both on other higher laws and on the ‘collocation’ of these laws, which was irreducible 
into any individual laws.
100 
An ultimate law could be ascertained only by induction, as it did not have a law or 
laws from which it could be derived, while a derivative law was always ascertained by 
deduction from other higher laws. It was impossible to ascertain a derivative law by 
induction. What could be ascertained by induction was an ‘empirical law’, which was a 
derivative law whose higher laws were still unknown. A question here is: what kind of 
induction did Mill have in mind in order to ascertain an empirical law. Mill thought, as I 
have shown, that not only scientific, but also empirical, laws could not be ascertained by 
simple enumerative induction.
101  In order to discover empirical laws, there was a 
superior mode of generalization. This was what he termed ‘approximate generalization’. 
Mill thought that simple enumerative induction was insufficient in order to ascertain 
the empirical laws of social phenomena. A general proposition attained by induction of 
this sort did not mean that a phenomenon that had never been noticed would never 
occur in the future. In Mill’s opinion, ‘A phenomenon has never been noticed; this only 
proves that the conditions of that phenomenon have not yet occurred in human 
experience, but does not prove that they may not occur to-morrows.’
102  Hence, it was 
necessary to employ another mode of generalization which eliminated this defect. As 
for this, Mill wrote: 
There is a higher kind of empirical law than this, namely, when a phenomenon 
which is observed presents within the limits of observation a series of gradations, in 
which a regularity, or something like a mathematical law, is perceptible: from which, 
therefore, something may be rationally presumed as to those terms of the series 
which are beyond the limits of observation.
103 
This was ‘approximate generalization’, expressed in the form, ‘Most A are B’, not 
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‘Every A is B’. Mill stated that ‘the degree of probability of the inference [by 
approximate generalization] in an average case, will depend on the proportion between 
the number of instances existing in nature which accord with the generalization, and the 
number of those which conflict with it’.
104 
Crucially, there were two kinds of empirical law that Mill had in mind. He 
distinguished between higher and lower empirical laws. In his view, a lower empirical 
law was too specific to be deduced from the ultimate psychological laws of human 
nature, and, therefore, it had to be deduced from other higher empirical laws which 
could be deduced from the ultimate laws. In other words, the lower empirical law 
should be seen as a derivative law of the higher empirical laws, not of the highest, 
ultimate laws. Of the two kinds of empirical law, it was only the higher empirical laws 
that could become what Mill called the ‘axiomata media’ or the ‘middle principle’, 
because axiomata media had to be deduced directly from the ultimate laws.
105  He 
insisted: 
The lowest generalizations, until explained by and resolved into the middle 
principles of which they are the consequences, have only the imperfect accuracy of 
empirical laws; while the most general laws are too general, and include too few 
circumstances, to give sufficient indication of what happens in individual cases, 
where the circumstances are almost always immensely numerous. In the importance, 
therefore, which Bacon assigns, in every science, to the middle principles, it is 
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impossible not to agree with him.
106 
He conceived axiomata media as a set of laws which were not only sufficiently 
generalized to be deduced from the highest, ultimate laws, but which also were 
sufficiently particular to be connected with the lowest empirical laws. 
The logical process of converting a lower empirical law into a derivative law was a 
process in which, first, a lower empirical law was explained by deducing it from higher 
empirical laws; and second, the higher empirical law was explained by the highest, 
ultimate laws. In this process, the lower and highest laws were expected to be indirectly 
connected through the medium of the higher empirical laws. Mill never thought that the 
highest, ultimate psychological laws of human nature could directly explain each 
empirical law of social phenomena. Ascertaining a scientific law of social phenomena 
meant establishing an indirect connection between the lower empirical law of social 
phenomena and the ultimate laws of human nature, by means of axiomata media. 
Given the argument thus far, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, the 
ethological law of the formation of character was a derivative law of the psychological 
laws of human nature; therefore, making the ethological law scientific meant explaining 
it in terms of psychological laws, in other words, establishing a direct link between 
psychological and ethological laws. This logical process would employ either the first 
mode of explanation, in which the law of an effect of combined causes was resolved 
into the separate laws of causes, together with the fact of their collocation, or the third 
mode, in which two or more laws were resolved into one. Mill’s claim that ethological 
laws were derived from psychological laws does not mean that he thought that 
ethological laws could be reduced only to psychological laws. As seen above, a 
derivative law was not a law which was derived only from other causal laws, but a law 
which was derived from a combination of causal laws and their collocation, itself 
irreducible into any causal laws. In other words, a derivative law did not depend only on 
the causal laws of which it was the consequence.
107 
Second, the explanation of lower empirical laws of social phenomena in terms of the 
ultimate psychological laws was conducted by the second mode of explanation. In other 
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words, the ultimate psychological laws and the lower empirical laws of social 
phenomena were indirectly, not directly, connected by means of ethological laws, laws 
which were derivative laws of psychological laws, and from which the lower derivative 
laws could be deduced. Hence, as far as the lower empirical laws of social phenomena 
were concerned, what Mill had in mind as a logical operation was deduction from 
ethological laws as axiomata media, and not from the ultimate psychological laws. Mill 
never insisted that the lower empirical laws of social phenomena could, or should, be 
reduced to the psychological laws of human nature.
108  Accordingly, to connect 
empirical laws of social phenomena with the ultimate psychological laws by means of 
ethological laws did not involve the operation of reduction.
109   
To sum up, the connection between the psychological laws of human nature and 
social phenomena was indirect; there can hardly be found in his thought the logical 
operation which Popper defined as psychological reductionism. Hence, Popper’s 
criticism of Mill appears misconceived, and his misinterpretation is caused by his 
ignorance of Mill’s projected science of ethology. 
 
5. Concluding Note 
In the following chapters, I examine the indispensable constituent sciences of his 
system: first, the science of history; second, that of the formation of character, or 
ethology; and third, that of political economy. The chapters devoted to the science of 
history and that of the formation of character show that these sciences were, in spite of 
his failure to give a complete account of them, more significant than scholars have 
assumed. As far as the science of political economy, which has attracted much attention, 
is concerned, I show its place in his system of the science of society, rather than 
examine Mill’s economic doctrines. 
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Chapter 6. Historical Knowledge and the Theory of Social Change 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to examine Mill’s interest in historical knowledge, his ideas about 
its nature and role, and his aspiration to form a science of history which dealt with the 
laws of social change. Political theorists, who tend to put great weight on such works as 
On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, have paid little attention 
to Mill’s view of history. However, if his formulation of a system of moral science, 
presented in Book VI of A System of Logic, is taken into consideration, it becomes clear 
that history occupied a more significant place in his thought than scholars have tended 
to assume. 
In this chapter, I consider, first, Mill’s view of historical knowledge before the early 
1830s. During this period, his attitude towards history was wavering. Next, I examine 
Mill’s view of the role of historical knowledge in the 1830s. Through the 1830s, his 
interest in history as a source of empirical knowledge was growing. He gradually 
realized the significance of empirical knowledge in general, and that derived from 
history and travels in particular. He was convinced that this was not only useful but also 
necessary in order to avoid making a fatal mistake in politics, namely seeing particular 
experience as universal. This idea was closely associated with his reaction against 
Bentham, whose argument, to Mill’s mind, was ahistorical. Finally, I discuss Mill’s 
views on history in the mid-1840s. What characterized his thought at this stage was a 
strong concern with the laws which were governing historical change in society. In the 
mid-1840s, Mill presented some crucial ideas about history in review articles on the 
works of French historians, such as Guizot and Michelet. Importantly, Mill was not so 
much interested in the particular events of history as in theoretical views about history; 
what he was concerned with were the principles of explanation, or the laws of historical 
development, not historical events themselves. The reason why Mill was interested in 
history was not because of an interest in the past in itself, but because he hoped that a 
historical perspective would increase his understanding of the present and the future. 
As Georgios Varouxakis writes, Mill ‘saw France as a laboratory of mankind in the 
realm of new ideas and movements in the same way as his compatriots (and most 
Continental observers) saw Britain as a laboratory in terms of industrial and economic   - 109 - 
development’.
1  In the 1830s and early 1840s, Mill often referred to the modern French 
school of history, Comte and Guizot among others; he thought that these thinkers had 
contributed to innovation in historical study by employing original and distinctive 
approaches to the great questions of the study of politics. To Mill’s mind, what 
distinguished their approach from the old ones were, first, their vision of history as a 
progressive development, and second, their analysis of what they called the ‘state of 
society’ as an explanation for changes in the form of government. It is, however, 
disputable whether these were as original as Mill claimed. Duncan Forbes notes that 
‘J. S. Mill’s “discoveries” and “new” insights in historical understanding are often 
things which were well known enough to eighteenth-century thinkers.’
2  The thinkers 
Forbes has in mind are the Scottish philosophical historians in particular. Even though 
in the 1830s Mill paid little attention to the affinities between his views and those of the 
philosophical historians of eighteenth-century Scotland, his growing interest in history 
in the early 1840s led him to become aware of them. In October 1845 Mill wrote to 
Napier that, ‘there is, as you say, a considerable similarity between some of his [i.e. 
Millar’s] historical speculations and Guizot’s’.
3  Crucially, this awareness led Mill to 
recognize the significance of his father’s historical work, History of British India. 
Although he continued to regard James Mill’s method of reasoning in politics as 
inadequate,
4  in the mid-1840s he came to see James Mill as ‘the last survivor of that 
great school’ and as ‘the philosophical historian of India’.
5 
 
2. J. S. Mill and Historical Knowledge (i) the Late 1820s and Early 1830s 
In his Autobiography, Mill recalled that history was his ‘strongest predilection’ in 
boyhood.
6  According to his Autobiography, he read many historical works during his 
early education under the supervision of James Mill;
7  those works included, for 
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example, histories by William Mitford, Adam Ferguson, William Robertson, David 
Hume, Edward Gibbon, and John Millar, as well as Herodotus. At this period, Mill even 
attempted to write histories of Rome and Holland.
8  As far as this period is concerned, 
an episode which is worth noting here is that, when he was reading Mitford’s History of 
Greece, James Mill warned him against ‘the Tory prejudices of this writer, and his 
perversions of facts for the glorification of despots and discredit of popular 
institutions’.
9 
Apart from reading history in his early years under the guidance of James Mill, 
Mill’s attitude towards history can be roughly divided into three periods: first, the late 
1820s and early 1830s; second, the 1830s; and third, the 1840s. The changes in his 
attitude towards history reflected, to a large degree, the development of his political 
thought. 
In the 1820s Mill’s enthusiasm for France often took the form of an aspiration to 
write her history. He intended to write a ‘French political history from Louis 14th 
downwards’, as well as a history of the French Revolution, with which he was deeply 
impressed. He eagerly gathered materials for this, even though he had abandoned the 
project by the mid-1830s.
10  A feature which characterized his historical interest in the 
late 1820s was his intention to rebut biased, ignorant, and conservative interpretations 
of history. A good example of this was his ‘defence of the early French revolutionists 
against the Tory misrepresentations of Sir Walter Scott in his Life of Napoleon’, which 
appeared in the radical organ the Westminster Review in April 1828,
11  a year which 
marked the final phase of what he called his ‘Youthful Propagandism’.
12   
In History of British India, James Mill stated that the information travellers and 
historians provided tended to be fragmentary or biased, and therefore was not fully 
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credible.
13  This view of empirical knowledge seemed to be shared by Mill in the 1820s. 
For example, in a speech entitled ‘The Use of History’, which he delivered probably in 
the first half of 1827 to the London Debating Society, Mill stated: 
it appears self-evident, that the knowledge which is necessary to the statesman is 
knowledge of men: that the experience which he stands in need of, is experience of 
men: that he who knows mankind best, if he have integrity of purpose, is the best 
qualified to be a statesman, and that the volume which should be his guide is not the 
book of history but the book of human nature.
14 
Mill did not, however, entirely deny the role of empirical knowledge; what he was 
critical of was a particular way of using it: 
there is a right way of consulting experience, and there is a wrong way – And the 
question now is, which is the right way, and which is the wrong. Our opponents 
hold that the oracles of experience are written legibly in the page of history – we say 
that they are not, or, if they are, that like other oracles they are so ambiguous that 
they might be read to eternity and never understood.
15 
This was because, first, it was meaningless to compare one phenomenon with an other, 
due to the fact that all the circumstances in which they were produced were never the 
same, and second, the impossibility of experiment made it impossible to distinguish the 
true causes of an effect from the circumstances which happened to surround it.
16 
During this period, though believing that the study of social phenomena should be 
deductively grounded on the science of human nature, Mill had not yet worked out how 
to use empirical knowledge in deduction. Much inspired by Macaulay’s critique of 
James Mill and the subsequent controversy between Macaulay and the Westminster 
Reviewers, Mill came to think that the deductive reasoning of James Mill, despite his 
claim that theory should reflect all experience,
17  failed to involve the process of 
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modification based on experience within the procedures of logic.   
In the early 1830s, Mill came to hold the view that he called the mechanical 
composition of causes, and to recognize an important role for empirical knowledge in 
deductive reasoning. This new idea about methodology reflected his view of the role of 
history. According to his own recollection, in the early 1830s, he came to recognize the 
role of history in the study of politics: ‘any general theory or philosophy of politics 
supposes a previous theory of human progress, and … this is the same thing with a 
philosophy of history.’
18   
Apart from his interest in historical facts and narratives during his childhood, the 
theoretical view of history by which he was first inspired was the philosophy of history 
set out by Saint Simon, which he encountered in the late 1820s, namely ‘the natural 
order of human progress; and especially … [the] division of all history into organic 
periods and critical periods’.
19  Relying on this perspective, Mill stated that society was 
either in its natural state or in its transitional state. The natural state was a state in which 
‘worldly power, and moral influence, are habitually and undisputedly exercised by the 
fittest persons whom the existing state of society affords’, while the transitional state 
was a state in which ‘worldly power, and the greatest existing capacity for worldly 
affairs, are no longer united but severed’.
20  Mill saw the age in which he lived as ‘an 
age of transition’, and stated that an important characteristic of this age was social 
instability which was caused by the fact that the uninstructed multitude had lost their 
faith in the instructed.
21 
 
3. J. S. Mill and Historical Knowledge (ii) the 1830s 
In the 1830s, Mill was interested in history from two different points of view: one 
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was ‘scientific’; the other, ‘moral or biographic’.
22  As a scientific inquiry, to Mill’s 
mind, history ‘exhibits the general laws of the moral universe acting in circumstances of 
complexity, and enables us to trace the connexion between great effects and their 
causes’. As a moral or biographic inquiry, ‘it represents to us the characters and lives of 
human beings, and calls on us, according to their deservings or to their fortunes, for our 
sympathy, our admiration, or our censure’.
23  Mill now referred favourably to the moral 
function of history, which he had at one time dismissed.
24   
In order to combine scientific and moral interests, or, to use his terminology, ‘logic’ 
and ‘poetry’, Mill emphasized in particular the role of imagination. While he had once 
thought that scientific accuracy was by no means compatible with poetic imagination, 
he now came to think that these could be made compatible within the study of history. 
As far as his attitude towards history at this period is concerned, an important article is 
‘Carlyle’s French Revolution’, published in the London and Westminster Review of July 
1837, in which Mill praised the poetical aspect of Carlyle’s work, even though he 
criticized Carlyle for undervaluing ‘general principles’.
25  Mill stated that, thanks to his 
imagination, Carlyle’s epic poetical narrative of history dealt successfully with 
historical figures as ‘real beings, who once were alive, beings of his own flesh and 
blood, not mere shadows and dim abstractions’, though it tended to ‘set too low a value 
on what constitutions and forms of government can do’.
26 
In 1836 Mill stated that history was ‘the record of all the great things which have 
been achieved by mankind’. Students could learn from history as such ‘a certain 
largeness of conception’; ‘the great principles by which the progress of man and the 
condition of society are governed’; and ‘the infinite varieties of human-nature’. In 
addition, it could correct ‘anything cramped or one-sided in his own standard of it [i.e. 
human nature]’ by showing ‘the astonishing pliability of our nature’.
27 
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At this period, Mill had attained a relativist perspective on politics, a perspective 
that, in his own terms, recognized that ‘all questions of political restitutions are relative, 
not absolute, and that different stages of human progress not only will have, but ought to 
have different institutions’.
28  There were two kinds of empirical knowledge to which 
Mill attached a high value in order to redeem a lack of imagination, an ability which 
was crucial for relativism. These were history and travel, or, in his own words, 
‘Intelligent investigation into past ages, and intelligent study of foreign countries’. He 
explained how these could be useful in the study of politics: 
We would not exaggerate the value of either of these sources of knowledge. They 
are useful in aid of a more searching and accurate experience, not in lieu of it. No 
one learns any thing very valuable either from history or from travelling, who does 
not come prepared with much that history and travelling can never teach. … Even to 
the philosopher, the value both of history and of travelling is not so much positive as 
negative; they teach little, but they are a protection against much error.
29 
In Mill’s view, due to a lack of imagination, man was generally apt to regard his own 
experience as universal, even when it might be confined to his own society. In order not 
to commit such a mistake, Mill placed emphasis on empirical knowledge. According to 
Mill, ‘The correction of narrowness is the main benefit derived from the study of 
various ages and nations: of narrowness, not only in our conceptions of what is, but in 
our standard of what ought to be.’
30  Such an attitude towards empirical knowledge 
apparently reflected the discontent that Mill held towards Benthamite politics, for Mill 
thought that it failed to take the actual diversity of man and society into consideration, 
due to an undue reliance on the universality of the laws of human nature.
31 
                                                 
28  JSM, Autobiography, CW, i, 171. 
29  JSM, ‘America’, CW, xviii, 93. 
30  Ibid.   
31  In ‘Bentham’ in 1838, Mill criticized Bentham for lacking imagination: ‘the faculty by which one mind 
understands a mind different from itself, and throws itself into the feelings of that other mind, was denied 
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feelings which, if it were indeed real, it would bring along with it. This is the power by which one human 
being enters into the mind and circumstances of another.’ (JSM, ‘Bentham’, CW, x, 91-2.) Interestingly, 
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It was in ‘Definition of Political Economy’, published in 1836, that Mill raised and 
attempted to resolve the methodological question of how to make better use of empirical 
knowledge in politics. He gave empirical knowledge a crucial role, especially in 
verifying the conclusions of deductive reasoning from the laws of human nature. His 
view of history in this essay was similar to that expressed in ‘State of Society in 
America’; he claimed that history was not completely reliable at all the stages of 
reasoning. According to Mill:   
Knowledge of what is called history, so commonly regarded as the sole fountain of 
political experience, is useful only in the third degree. History, by itself, if we knew 
it ten times better than we do, could, for the reasons already given, prove little or 
nothing: but the study of it is a corrective to the narrow and exclusive views which 
are apt to be engendered by observation on a more limited scale. Those who never 
look backwards, seldom look far forwards: their notions of human affairs, and of 
human nature itself, are circumscribed within the conditions of their own country 
and their own times. But the uses of history, and the spirit in which it ought to be 
studied, are subjects which have never yet had justice done them, and which involve 
considerations more multifarious than can be pertinently introduced in this place.
32 
A further investigation into proper scientific method in the late 1830s and early 
1840s brought about a vital change in his views on historical knowledge, which were 
reflected in the historical argument contained within the Logic. Crucially, the passage 
quoted above, together with some other passages regarding history, was deleted when 
the essay was republished as part of Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political 
Economy in 1844. As J. H. Burns points out, this modification reflected a change in 
Mill’s attitude towards history, which was a consequence of his deepened understanding 
of Comte’s position.
33  Comte’s impact on Mill can be seen in the Logic, where Mill 
identified the laws of the development of society with the subject-matter of his 
projected science of society. Among the methods of the study of social phenomena 
                                                                                                                                      
Mill later ascribed British misrule in India to ‘the inability of ordinary minds to imagine a state of social 
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formulated in the Logic, it was in the inverse deductive method, which was also 
suggestively termed the ‘Historical Method’, that historical knowledge was expected to 
play an important role. The first logical stage of the inverse deductive method was to 
establish a link between the higher and the lower empirical laws by showing that the 
lower could be derived from the higher. In this process, historical knowledge was of 
vital importance. 
 
4. J. S. Mill and Historical Knowledge (iii) the 1840s 
i 
Some of Mill’s central ideas on history which he had formed by the mid-1840s can 
be found in a series of essays which appeared in the Edinburgh Review, and which 
considered the contemporary works of French historians, such as ‘Michelet’s History of 
France’ (January 1844) and ‘Guizot’s Essays and Lectures on History’ (October 1845). 
In ‘Michelet’s History of France’, Mill depicted the development, not the mere 
classification, of historical study. The first stage, which was, in Mill’s opinion, 
represented by the works of Pierre Henri Larcher,
34  was characterized by a type of 
study which was ‘to transport present feeling and notions back into the past, and refer 
all ages and forms of human life to the standard of that in which the writer himself 
lives’.
35  Historians of this kind could not understand anything different from that which 
they saw, and thereby tended to severely criticize the past. The second stage of 
historical study, in contrast, aimed to ‘regard former ages not with the eye of a modern, 
but, as far as possible, with that of a contemporary’.
36  Historians of this type sought to 
see the past as a whole, not as a mere collection of fragmentary facts of which the whole 
consisted. In order to do so, what was required was an ability to imagine what was 
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unknown to the present, an ability that poets usually possessed. Mill thought that 
Carlyle represented this stage of historical study.
37  Additionally, there was a higher and 
‘scientific’ stage. The aim of the third and highest stage of historical study was, 
according to Mill, ‘not simply to compose histories, but to construct a science of 
history’, by regarding history as ‘a progressive chain of causes and effects’ and pointing 
out the laws of causation.
38  Mill stated: 
In this view, the whole of the events which have befallen the human race, and the 
states through which it has passed, are regarded as a series of phenomena, produced 
by causes, and susceptible of explanation. All history is conceived as a progressive 
chain of causes and effects: or (by an apter metaphor) as a gradually unfolding web, 
in which every fresh part that comes to view, is a prolongation of the part previously 
unrolled, whether we can trace the separate threads from the one into the other, or 
not. … To find on what principles, derived from the nature of man and the system of 
the universe, each state of society and of the human mind produced that which came 
after it: and whether there can be traced any order of production sufficiently definite, 
to show, what future states of society may be expected to emanate from the 
circumstances which exist at present – is the aim of historical philosophy in its third 
stage.
39 
Mill’s formulation of the development of historical inquiry is interesting in several 
ways. First, this formulation can be seen as a variant of Comte’s so-called ‘three-stage 
theory’, which Mill endorsed as the general theory of the development of mankind. It 
depicted the development of human speculation as passing through three successive 
stages: first, the ‘theological’; second, the ‘metaphysical’; and third, the ‘positive’ stage. 
Second, it seemed, whether deliberately or not, to correspond approximately to the 
development of Mill’s own attitude towards history. In the first stage, as I have shown 
above, he was eager to rebut the Tory interpretations of history from the point of view 
of radical politics. The second stage, the mid- and late 1830s, saw Mill emphasizing the 
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role of imagination in the study of social phenomena, and from this perspective he was 
highly appreciative of the works of Carlyle, which he now thought represented the 
second stage of historical study. The third stage consisted in his historical discourses in 
the first half of the 1840s, specifically on contemporary French historians. At this point, 
Mill was largely concerned with the philosophy of history.
40 
In Mill’s opinion, it was the works of contemporary French historians, such as 
Michelet, Thierry, and Guizot, that needed to be examined in order to understand the 
development of historical study from the second to the third stage: ‘M. Guizot does not 
… remain in what we have called the second region of historical inquiry: he makes 
frequent and long incursions into the third.’
41  Mill went on to say that Guizot was ‘the 
Kepler, and something more, of his particular subject [i.e. history]’, a subject which had 
not yet had its Newton.
42  He praised Guizot particularly for his ‘talent for the 
explanation and generalization of historical facts’. Given his high praise for Guizot’s 
historical works, it is not surprising that Mill devoted a great deal of effort to the 
detailed examination of Guizot’s works, resulting in an essay which dealt exclusively 
with his works, ‘Guizot’s Essays and Lectures on History’. 
Before examining Mill’s review of Guizot’s historical works, it is necessary to 
comment briefly on his comparative neglect of German historical scholarship. Given 
Mill’s favourable view of the philosophy of history which was developed by those 
whom he called the ‘Germano-Coleridgian school’,
43  it may seem odd that Mill relied 
exclusively on French scholarship, and his detailed studies, though he was interested in 
it, was not extended to German scholarship which was likewise flourishing at this 
time.
44  In part, this was a consequence of Mill’s political radicalism and reaction 
against intuitionism, which, to Mill’s mind, provided the philosophical foundation for 
conservatism, and on which German history was based. Furthermore, Stefan Collini 
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points out another probable reason for Mill’s neglect: Mill had formed his basic ideas 
before ‘the fashion of looking to Germany for cultural nourishment had become at all 
widespread’.
45 
 
ii 
In ‘Michelet’s History of France’, Mill, relying on Guizot, argued that any social 
phenomenon was usually the result, not of a single cause, but of the combination of 
causes operating together, and that there were mutual interactions between men, 
institutions, and circumstances in the course of history. According to Mill, Guizot 
does not exaggerate the influence of some one cause or agency, sacrificing all others 
to it. He neither writes as if human affairs were absolutely moulded by the wisdom 
and virtue or the vices and follies of rulers; nor as if the general circumstances of 
society did all, and accident or eminent individuals could do nothing. He neither 
attributes everything to political institutions, nor everything to the ideas and 
convictions in men’s minds; but shows how they both co-operate, and react upon 
one another.
46 
Mill then insisted that the antagonism between, rather than the coexistence of, various 
principles and forces in society after the downfall of the Roman Empire enabled some 
European nations to progress. He wrote: ‘we ascribe chiefly to this cause [i.e. social 
diversity] the spirit of improvement, which has never ceased to exist, and still makes 
progress, in the European nations’.
47  Additionally, Mill asserted, with Charlemagne as 
his example, that the talented individual could contribute to the progress of society 
within the limits of causal laws operating at the time. He wrote: 
A great ruler cannot shape the world after his own pattern; he is condemned to work 
in the direction of existing and spontaneous tendencies, and has only the discretion 
of singling out the most beneficial of these. Yet the difference is great between a 
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skilful pilot and none at all, though a pilot cannot steer save in obedience to wind 
and tide. Improvements of the very first order, and for which society is completely 
prepared, which lie in the natural course and tendency of human events, and are the 
next stage through which mankind will pass, may be retarded indefinitely for want 
of a great man, to throw the weight of his individual will and faculties into the 
trembling scale.
48 
Despite his belief in the prevalence of a pre-determined course of history, Mill thought 
that the science of history could be used not only for predicting the future course of 
society, but also for amending the historical tendencies which the science revealed. 
Great men could not only prepare people for what was inevitable, but could also play an 
active role in accelerating, delaying, counteracting, and correcting these tendencies.
49 
Apart from these ideas, there was a further important argument which Mill put 
forward: how and why the transition from feudal to modern free society took place. 
Importantly, it was at this point that Mill was critical of Guizot. In spite of his high 
praise for Guizot’s achievement, Mill thought that Guizot had failed to ascertain the 
causal laws of historical change in general, and the causal laws of change from feudal to 
modern society in particular. Mill wrote:   
[Guizot’s] subject is not history at large, but modern European history; the 
formation and progress of the existing nations of Europe. Embracing, therefore, only 
a part of the succession of historical events, he is precluded from attempting to 
determine the law or laws which preside over the entire evolution. If there be such 
laws; if the series of states through which human nature and society are appointed to 
pass, have been determined more or less precisely by the original constitution of 
mankind, and by the circumstances of the planet on which we live: the order of their 
succession cannot be determined by modern or by European experience alone: it 
must be ascertained by a conjunct analysis, so far as possible, of the whole of 
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history, and the whole of human nature.
50 
According to Mill, what Guizot sought was ‘not the ultimate, but the proximate causes 
of the facts of modern history’. Mill went on to state that Guizot’s subject was not 
history at large, but only modern European history, and, therefore, what Guizot had 
achieved was only to point out ‘in what manner each successive condition of modern 
Europe grew out of that which next preceded it; and how modern society altogether, and 
the modern mind, shaped themselves from the elements which had been transmitted to 
them from the ancient world’.
51  Mill thus concluded that Guizot had failed to 
understand the ultimate cause of social change.
52   
Mill’s discontent with Guizot was clearly expressed in another section of ‘Guizot’s 
Essays and Lectures on History’, where he examined Guizot’s explanation of why 
European feudalism had declined.
53  Mill stated that Guizot never succeeded in giving 
scientific explanations, namely in ascertaining the causal laws which governed the 
decline of feudalism, even though he did refer to all the vital phenomena which 
contributed to the decline. To Mill’s mind, Guizot’s claim that feudalism did not 
‘contain in itself the elements of durability’ meant that he attributed the decline of 
feudalism to its inherent defects. Such an argument, however, was merely ‘an easy 
solution which accounts for the destruction of institutions from their own defects’.
54 
Mill found a clue to the explanation of the decline of feudalism in Guizot’s own 
analysis of its origin. Guizot insisted that the reason why feudalism established itself 
was not because feudalism was a good form of society, but because society could not be 
better. What Mill saw as inspirational was Guizot’s understanding of feudalism as ‘a 
product of this [limited] condition of the human mind, and the only form of polity 
which it admitted of’. This tied in with Mill’s view that the achievement of desirable or 
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acceptable political and social institutions depended on the condition of human mind.
55 
Thus, feudalism had contributed to the improvement of man when it was established.     
In other words, at a particular period in European history, ‘a great progress in 
civilization had been accomplished, under the dominion and auspices of the feudal 
system’.
56  Accordingly, the progress of civilization which resulted from feudalism 
became, in turn, the cause of the decline of the system. Mill stated: 
the fall of the system [i.e. feudalism] was not really owing to its vices, but to its 
good qualities – to the improvement which had been found possible under it, and by 
which mankind had become desirous of obtaining, and capable of realizing, a better 
form of society than it afforded.
57 
Mill concluded that various phenomena which were once thought to have been the 
cause of the decline of feudalism were not the true causes; the higher cause of these 
phenomena was the fact that people had improved their intellectual and mental abilities 
under feudalism, and this was the ultimate cause of its fall. According to Mill:   
the feudal system, with all its deficiencies, was sufficiently a government, contained 
within itself a sufficient mixture of authority and liberty, afforded sufficient 
protection to industry, and encouragement and scope to the development of the 
human faculties, to enable the natural causes of social improvement to resume their 
course.
58 
For Mill, the ultimate cause of the decline of feudalism was the improvement of human 
ability which had been accomplished under it.
59 
 
iii 
The reason why Mill could criticize Guizot’s position with conviction was that Mill 
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had been much inspired by another French writer, Auguste Comte, so far as the question 
relating to the ultimate cause of social development was concerned. In the Logic, Mill 
had paid attention to ‘the state of the speculative faculties of mankind’ as the ultimate 
factor of social change.
60 
Before examining his attitude towards Comte, it is helpful to mention briefly Mill’s 
situation around 1840. Intellectualism – seeing human intellectual elements as decisive 
in historical change – was not unique to the French thinkers to whom Mill had been 
attracted. British thinkers, such as Dugald Stewart and James Mill, with whose views 
Mill was familiar, had also developed a similar argument. Further to this, Mill himself 
had been emphasizing the importance of intellectual factors from a very early period. 
His sympathy for the French mind in general, its intellectualistic tendency in particular, 
was not the cause of his intellectualism, but a symptom of it. In addition, Mill’s 
intellectualism, particularly at this stage, no doubt reflected the fact that in the late 
1830s he became disillusioned with the contemporary political climate.   
In the reformed parliament after the passing of the Reform Act of 1832, the 
Philosophic Radicals had a vision of a new political realignment, and Mill published 
many articles in support of it.
61  The state of the parliamentary radicals in the late 1830s, 
particularly the decline in their numbers at the general election of 1837, discouraged 
him from continuing to commit a great deal of effort to the radical cause in actual 
politics. Specifically, the failure of the campaign for the reorganization of the Reform 
Party, which was triggered by the resignation of Lord Durham as Governor General in 
Canada in October 1838, who Mill thought might be prepared to lead reformers in a 
challenge to the Whig government as well as to their Tory opponents, discouraged 
Mill’s political journalism, and Mill subsequently abandoned his editorship and 
proprietorship of the Westminster Review in the middle of 1840. Mill thereafter devoted 
his energies towards bringing about change, not in actual politics in the short term, but 
in thought in the long term. In July 1841 Mill wrote to Macvey Napier, the editor of the 
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Edinburgh Review: ‘We are entering upon times in which the progress of liberal 
opinions will again, as formerly, depend upon what is said & written, & no longer upon 
what is done, by their avowed friends.’
62 
 
iv 
In Mill’s opinion, an intellectual factor, ‘the state of the speculative faculties of 
mankind’, actually influenced both on social change, the subject-matter of social 
dynamics, and on social stability, the subject-matter of social statics. This factor was 
decisive for the development of society, in that 
its influence is the main determining cause of the social progress; all the other 
dispositions of our nature which contribute to that progress, being dependent on it 
for the means of accomplishing their share of the work. … the progress of industry 
must follow, and depend on, the progress of knowledge.
63 
This was also the decisive factor in social stability: 
as the strongest propensities of human nature … evidently tend in themselves to 
disunite mankind, not to unite them, – to make them rivals, not confederates; social 
existence is only possible by a disciplining of those more powerful propensities, 
which consists in subordinating them to a common system of opinions. The degree 
of this subordination is the measure of the completeness of the social union, and the 
nature of the common opinions determines its kind. But in order that mankind 
should conform their actions to any set of opinions, these opinions must exist, must 
be believed by them. And thus, the state of the speculative faculties, the character of 
the propositions assented to by the intellect, essentially determines the moral and 
political state of the community ….
64 
Mill thought that such notions were not only deducible from the laws of human 
nature but also verifiable by empirical laws. In other words, the laws of social change 
could be derived from the law of ‘the order of progression in the intellectual convictions 
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of mankind’ as axiomata media. Mill continued: 
From this accumulated evidence, we are justified in concluding, that the order of 
human progression in all respects will be a corollary deducible from the order of 
human progression in the intellectual convictions of mankind, that is, from the laws 
of the successive transformations of religion and science.
65 
As far as ‘the order of progression in the intellectual convictions of mankind’ was 
concerned, Mill believed that Comte had provided a promising starting point. This was 
the three-stage theory, according to which the development of the human mind went 
through three successive stages: first, the ‘theological’ stage, where all events were 
explained in terms of supernatural agencies, God’s will in particular; second, 
‘metaphysical’, where phenomena were explained in terms of abstract ideas; and third, 
‘positive’, in which there was no absolute explanation, but useful generalizations 
obtained by observation.
66  Mill regarded this formulation as plausible. He stated: 
Speculation he [i.e. Comte] conceives to have, on every subject of human inquiry, 
three successive stages; in the first of which it tends to explain the phenomena by 
supernatural agencies, in the second by metaphysical abstractions, and in the third or 
final state confines itself to ascertaining their laws of succession and similitude. This 
generalization appears to me to have that high degree of scientific evidence, which 
is derived from the concurrence of the indications of history with the probabilities 
derived from the constitution of the human mind.
67 
Hence, Mill was convinced that it was possible, on the one hand, to connect ‘the 
correlative condition of all other social phenomena’ with ‘each of the three states of 
human intellect which it distinguishes, and with each successive modification of those 
three states’,
68  in other words, to regard every law of social phenomena as derivative 
from the law of the three stages; and on the other hand, to scientifically establish the law 
of the three stages by deducing it from the ultimate laws of human nature. In short, Mill 
thought it was possible to explain the laws of the historical change of society by linking 
indirectly every social phenomenon and the laws of human nature by means of 
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intellectual factors in the guise of axiomata media.
69 
 
5. Concluding Note 
As far as theory and methodology were concerned, Mill was firmly convinced that 
he had succeeded in settling the question of how the law of social change could be 
linked with the psychological laws of human nature. However, given his view of human 
nature, Mill had to face a crucial difficulty in explaining the relationship of empirical 
laws, which showed that society had advanced, to the ultimate laws of human nature.
70 
In addition, he came to realize that progressive change was an exceptional phenomenon 
in world history, in that only a few European nations had accomplished it. Furthermore, 
he feared that advanced European nations would lapse into what he termed ‘Chinese 
stationariness’. He could not, therefore, help concluding that it was difficult to explain 
European experience by direct derivation from the ultimate laws of human nature.
71  It 
was the science of the formation of character, which Mill termed ‘ethology’, that 
bridged the gap between these laws. Not only that, ethology was expected to play a 
significant role in a practical point of view: to show how the course of history could 
take a more attractive direction in the future than science suggested. The next chapter is 
devoted to an examination of the significance of ethology in Mill’s thought. 
                                                 
69  Comte insisted that social change also had three successive stages corresponding to the three stages of 
the development of human mind: from the military, through the legal, to the industrial. Mill paid little 
attention to it. In Mill’s opinion, this formula, though reasonable, should be seen as a derivative law of the 
ultimate law of the development of human mind. See ibid., 924-5. 
70  He later stated: ‘The natural tendency of men and their works was to degenerate … we ought not to 
forget, that there is an incessant and ever-flowing current of human affairs towards the worse, consisting 
of all the follies, all the vices, all the negligences, indolences, and supinenesses of mankind ….’ (JSM, 
CRG, CW, xix, 388.) 
71  See Feuer (1976) 90; Alexander (1976) 138ff. In ‘Grote’s History of Greece [2]’ (October 1853), Mill 
wrote: ‘That the former [i.e. stationary] condition is far more congenial to ordinary human nature than the 
latter [i.e. progressive], experience unfortunately places beyond doubt.’ (JSM, ‘Grote’s History of Greece 
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Chapter 7. Ethology 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter inquires into J. S. Mill’s aspiration to form a science of the formation 
of character, a science which he named ‘ethology’ after a Greek-origin word, ‘ethos’. In 
spite of their interest in Mill’s notion of human cultivation, recent studies do not give 
sufficient consideration to ethology, on which he grounded the practice of human 
cultivation.
1  This is due to the fact that Mill failed fully to develop ethology. Even 
when referring to ethology, recent scholarship is mainly concerned with how his later 
works reflected his interest in the formation of character, and not with the ideas which 
Mill actually developed earlier in his careers.
2 
In the first section, I present a brief account of two views concerning the formation 
of character, namely Owenite environmentalism and phrenology, both of which were 
popular in early and mid-nineteenth-century Britain. Not only were these views well 
known to Mill and his contemporaries, but also they constituted Mill’s main target. In 
this sense, his project of ethology can be seen, in the intellectual context of early and 
mid-nineteenth-century Britain, as an attempt to offer an alternative to these theories of 
the formation of character. In the next section, I discuss Mill’s interest in the formation 
of character in the 1830s which eventually led him to conceive a science of the 
formation of character in A System of Logic. In so doing, I examine Mill’s 
disenchantment with Bentham in light of his interest in the formation of character. Next, 
his ethology project itself will be examined, relying mainly on Book VI of the Logic and 
his correspondence with Auguste Comte. This section aims to show that the ethology 
project occupied a central place in his system of social science. In the third section, I 
point out the practical implications of the project, taking into consideration his notion of 
approximate generalization and his formulation of the relationship between science and 
art. 
 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Semmel (1984); Habibi (2001). 
2  E.g. Carlisle (1991); Ball (2000). Janise Carlisle fails to understand Mill’s methodological argument, 
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2. Theories of the Formation of Character in Early Nineteenth-Century Britain 
i 
In this section, I first examine phrenology, in particular Gall’s version of the 
doctrine. Recent studies have shown that phrenologists had a huge interest in 
educational practices that would mould the human character, but many early 
nineteenth-century thinkers, including Mill, thought that phrenology was a form of 
physiological determinism. This was because it claimed, in theory at least, that the 
moral and intellectual faculties were innate. Apart from the fact that phrenology had 
gained huge popularity in Britain, the immediate reason why Mill was so concerned 
about phrenology in the early 1840s was that Comte was eager to persuade him that the 
science of human nature should be physiology in general, and phrenology in particular. 
In order to rebut Comte’s claim, he needed thoroughly to read Gall’s work, which 
Comte had highly praised. 
Second, I deal with Owenism, which has been characterized as a form of 
environmental determinism, in that it insisted that man’s character was exclusively the 
result of the influence of the circumstances which surrounded him. One of the important 
advocates of Owenism was James Mill; J. S. Mill’s early education was heavily 
influenced by the Owenite perspective, together with associationist psychology.
3  His 
interest in the formation of character originated with his criticism of the Owenite notion 
of the formation of character in the late 1820s.
4 
As I shall demonstrate below, Mill criticized both Owenism and phrenology. To his 
mind, both theories were guilty of committing ‘fatalism’, an extreme and false version 
of determinism. He was convinced that his ethology would be constructed on better 
philosophical ground, namely determinism properly conceived. 
 
 
                                                 
3  For the affinities between the arguments of Owen and the utilitarians, James Mill among others, see 
Ball (2000) 30-1. 
4  Mill stated that the abstract conclusions of the science of political economy should be affected ‘by 
ethological considerations’. (JSM, Logic, CW, viii, 904-7.) However, it does not mean that his project of 
ethology originated with his recognition that the doctrines of political economy should be modified in 
their practical application according to the specific conditions in which these doctrines operated.   - 129 - 
ii 
Phrenology was a physiological science of human nature and character which 
studied the relationship between man’s character and the morphology of the skull. It had 
been widely diffused in early nineteenth-century Europe, including Britain; it was 
advanced in the 1790s by the Viennese physician Franz Joseph Gall.
5 Based on careful 
observation and extensive experimental measurement, he offered several premises on 
which phrenology was grounded. First, moral and intellectual abilities and aptitudes 
were innate. In this sense, whatever practical implications phrenologists insisted on, 
phrenology was, from a theoretical point of view, deterministic. Second, the exercise or 
manifestation of abilities and aptitudes depended on the organ of the mind. In other 
words, the brain was the organ on which all propensities, sentiments, and facultieswere 
dependent. Significantly, in opposition to Cartesian mind-body dualism, Gall claimed 
that the mind was not independent from the body, but part of the organization of the 
body as a whole. Third, the brain was composed of many particular cerebral organs, 
which Gall called ‘faculties’, and each of these faculties corresponded to each particular 
character trait. Gall thought that mental faculties could be anatomically reified within 
the brain. Fourth, the form of the head or cranium represented the form of the brain, and, 
accordingly, reflected the relative development of the organ of the brain. In other words, 
he thought it possible to diagnose internal mental faculties in terms of external 
craniological observations. Hence, it was physiology, not philosophy, that could provide 
the clue to understanding the human mind. 
Gall’s phrenology was grounded on cerebral anatomy; he showed how mental 
faculties were physically embodied within the brain. Based on his interpretation of the 
relationship between the brain and the mind, he attacked the view that man was capable 
of indefinite improvement, and denied that the drastic change of human character was 
possible. He stated: ‘Just so invariable is the organization of the human race; 
consequently, [man’s] moral and intellectual character can experience no essential 
                                                 
5  Gall never called his theory ‘phrenology’. The earliest known use of the term ‘phrenology’ in English 
was by the American physician Benjamin Rush in 1805, though he used it as equivalent to psychology. 
The more specific usage became popular in Britain, when T. I. M. Forster called the doctrines of Gall and 
Spurzheim ‘phrenology’ in 1815, and Spurzheim adopted the term. See Noel and Carlson (1970); Wyhe 
(2004) 17.   - 130 - 
change.’
6  He claimed that ‘man cannot, in any manner, arrest the development of his 
organs, nor consequently, relax the energy of their functions and cause himself to be 
urged either more or less imperiously to do good or evil’.
7 
Given that all faculties and qualities were innate, the next question was ‘whether the 
faculties and qualities inherent in our organization, are capable of a constantly and 
indefinitely progressive course of improvement’.
8  According to Gall, ‘the generality of 
men have been the slaves of ignorance, error, prejudice, and superstition’, and ‘Bad 
propensities and moral evil are, therefore, inherent in human nature.’
9  Hence, in his 
opinion, education was of no use in developing either good or evil inclinations: ‘In vain 
will you endeavour, by any education, to change the pigeon into an eagle, and the eagle 
into a pigeon.’
10 
While Gall’s contribution to the development of phrenology as a science was 
immense, it was not his version of the doctrine, but that put forward by his followers, 
Johann Gaspar Spurzheim and George Combe among others, that was diffused in 
Britain. Spurzheim was Gall’s most important collaborator, and he successfully 
disseminated phrenology in Britain. He first came into contact with Gall around 1800, 
attending his lectures while an anatomy student at the University of Vienna. He soon 
became Gall’s assistant, and then partner. Due to a ban on lectures on phrenology in 
Vienna, Gall and Spurzheim moved to Paris, and collaborated on a treatise on 
phrenology, Anatomy and Physiology of the Nervous System, the first volume of which 
appeared in 1810.
11  While collaborating, they gradually realized that they disagreed 
with each other on various issues. They separated, both intellectually and socially, in 
1812. After their separation, while Gall remained in Paris, Spurzheim moved to Britain, 
and presented his own version of phrenology, which was a reconstruction of Gall’s 
position. 
                                                 
6  Gall (1835) vi, 278. 
7  Ibid., i, 218. 
8  Ibid., vi, 279. 
9  Ibid., i, 216. 
10  Ibid., i, 212. 
11  Gall and Spurzheim (1810-19). The second, revised edition was published in the 1820s as Gall 
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Spurzheim, unlike Gall, was eager to explore the practical implications of the 
doctrine, in other words to show how human character could be reformed in terms of 
education based on phrenology. Gall complained that Spurzheim ‘too frequently 
deviated from the pure path of observation and had thrown himself into 
ideal-metaphysical and even theological reveries’.
12  Spurzheim expressed a more 
optimistic view of the possibility of human progress than Gall.
13  This becomes clear 
when I compare Spurzheim’s interpretation of the nature of the faculties with that of 
Gall. Spurzheim added new organs and gave favourable explanations about each organ. 
Gall believed that man was both good and evil; his interpretation of the nature of organs 
included both positive and negative elements. On the contrary, Spurzheim depicted each 
faculty as good by nature, and consequently presented an image of the ideal human 
character. Spurzheim argued that evil should not be seen as an inherent characteristic of 
human nature, but the result of circumstances which disturbed the proper operation of 
the innate faculties. Thus, Spurzheim and his most notable follower, George Combe, 
believed that the human character could be improved by changing the surrounding 
circumstances. Their attempt to fuse physiology and the practice of moral education was 
attractive to elements within both the middle and working classes in Britain.
14   
The remarkable flourishing of phrenology in early nineteenth-century Britain 
became the subject of much scholarly attention throughout Britain, especially in 
Edinburgh. What is now called the ‘Edinburgh Phrenology Debate’ commenced with 
Thomas Brown’s attack on Gall which appeared as early as 1803, and was followed by 
a number of other criticisms, including John Gordon’s severe critique of Spurzheim in 
1815 and Francis Jeffrey’s scathing article on Combe’s work in 1826.
15  All those 
articles were published in the Edinburgh Review. Mill, therefore, probably read them,
16 
                                                 
12  Quoted in Temkin (1947) 309. 
13  Wyhe (2004) 33-42. 
14  See Cooter (1984) esp. 101-33. 
15  Brown (1803); Gordon (1815); Jeffrey (1826: Phrenology); Jeffrey (1826: Note). Besides these 
criticisms, one of the most important attacks on phrenology was undertaken in the late 1820s and early 
1830s by William Hamilton. For the so-called Edinburgh Phrenology Debate, see Cantor (1975a); Shapin 
(1975); Cantor (1975b); Shapin (1979).   
16  In his Autobiography, Mill stated that James Mill ‘made [him] read through all the volumes of the 
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and would have been by no means ignorant of Spurzheim’s and Combe’s version of 
phrenology, even though he might not have read their works. As far as Gall’s views 
were concerned, there is circumstantial evidence to show that Mill knew about them 
from his early years, even though his reading of Gall’s work in the early 1840s was of 
more crucial significance. During his stay in France in 1820-1, Mill attended Joseph 
Diez Gergonne’s lectures at the University of Montpellier, which dealt with Gall’s 
phrenology.
17  Mill’s knowledge of phrenology seems to have been primarily based on 
Gall’s version, rather than that of his followers which gained popularity in Britain. This 
might partly explain why Mill did not take any notice of the educational implications of 
phrenology.   
 
iii 
In A New View of Society, which first appeared in 1813, Robert Owen discussed the 
formation of human character. His central idea was, in simple terms, that man’s 
character was formed by the environment which surrounded him. He famously stated: 
Any general character, from the best to the worst, from the most ignorant to the most 
enlightened, may be given to any community, even to the world at large, by the 
application of proper means; which means are to a great extent at the command and 
under the control of those who have influence in the affairs of men.
18   
From this environmentalist point of view, he insisted that man could influence the 
formation of another’s character by environmental planning, including education; and in 
turn, he denied that man could form his own character. Crucially, his claim implied that 
man was no longer required to take any responsibility for his own character and actions 
which reflected his character. For, if man’s character was entirely formed by the 
circumstances surrounding him, he could not be involved in the formation of his own 
character. According to Owen, the greatest of all errors was ‘the notion, that individuals 
form their own characters’.
19  He went on to claim: ‘Man therefore never was, nor can 
                                                                                                                                      
[Edinburgh] Review, or as much of each as seemed of any importance’ in 1823. (JSM, Autobiography, 
CW, i, 93-5.) 
17  Mill (1960) 110ff. 
18  Owen (1972) 19. 
19  Ibid 133.   - 133 - 
he ever become a free agent or a responsible being.’
20  This was a crucial implication of 
his environmentalism which Mill later severely attacked. 
James Mill approved Owen’s doctrine on the formation of character. Along with 
Francis Place, he is said to have helped Owen edit A New View of Society; it is said that 
James Mill gave it ‘the clarity that is missing from most of [Owen’s] later works’.
21  In 
addition, James Mill wrote a favourable review of Owen’s New View when it was 
published. In his review, James Mill endorsed the view that ‘human beings are the 
creatures of the circumstances in which they are placed; and that not merely opinions 
and faculties, but dispositions and habits, and almost everything which constitutes 
character, are altogether the offspring of the impressions which, from sources over 
which he had no control, are made upon the individual’.
22  The practical implication 
which Owen, and then James Mill, put forward was that ‘the character of every man is 
bad to the most enormous pitch of depravity, or good to the highest degree of excellence, 
exactly as it has been operated upon by circumstances’.
23  What was meant by 
‘circumstances’ included, for example, government and the legal system, as well as 
education. As far as education was concerned, James Mill claimed: ‘The first operation 
which naturally presents itself to every mind to be undertaken for the improvement of 
character, is the education of the young.’
24  From this viewpoint, he showed enthusiasm 
for a number of educational projects, such as the Lancasterian School and the 
Chrestomatic School.   
J. S. Mill’s reaction against Owen’s view was closely associated with his own 
experience, as the Owenite doctrine constituted the philosophical foundation of James 
Mill’s educational theory and practice.
25  Apart from his enthusiasm for several projects 
                                                 
20  Owen (1826-7) 59. 
21  Donnachie (2000) 116-7. 
22  James Mill (1813: Character) 96. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Ibid., 108. 
25  In his Autobiography, J. S. Mill commented on James Mill’s educational theory and practice: ‘In 
psychology, [James Mill’s] fundamental doctrine was the formation of all human character by 
circumstances, through the universal Principle of Association, and the consequent unlimited possibility of 
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of public education, one of the most important educational practices undertaken by 
James Mill was J. S. Mill’s early education, keeping the latter away from any society 
which James Mill thought would have a negative influence.   
Whatever he acquired in his early education, by the early 1830s, namely soon after 
recovering from his ‘Mental Crisis’, J. S. Mill came to see that his education by James 
Mill, grounded on Owenite environmental determinism, was deficient. He recalled that 
he became ‘a dry, hard logical machine’ or ‘a mere reasoning machine’, as a result of his 
education.
26  In addition, to Mill’s mind, his education failed to form ‘a character whose 
instinct and habit are openness’, and made him a passive man.
27  J. S. Mill thus 
concluded that James Mill denied the possibility of moulding man’s character by his 
own will and endeavours, and his paternalism had been apt to make J. S. Mill passive 
and dependent. This was to deny any sense of independence. Reflection on the 
experience of his own education was one of the factors which prompted Mill to develop 
a science of the formation of character. 
 
3. The Project of the Science of the Formation of Character 
i 
Even before coining the term ‘ethology’ and sketching its outline in the Logic in 
1843, Mill had often expressed his interest in the formation of character. This was 
closely connected with his disenchantment with what he saw as the Benthamite view of 
man, as well as with his reaction against Owenite doctrine. His criticism of the 
Benthamite view was grounded on the assumption that Bentham never saw man as ‘a 
being capable of pursuing spiritual perfection as an end; of desiring, for its own sake, 
the conformity of his own character to his standard of excellence, without hope of good 
or fear of evil from other sources than his own inward consciousness’.
28  His reaction 
against Bentham was not only from a theoretical perspective. He also believed that 
Bentham’s position had a practical or moral defect in that it tended to discourage man 
from desiring the cultivation of his own character, and, therefore, offered no guide for 
                                                 
26  Ibid., 110, 111. The phrase, ‘a dry, hard logical machine’, in the early draft was replaced with ‘a mere 
reasoning machine’ in the final draft. 
27  JSM, Autobiography, rejected leaves, ibid., 612. 
28  JSM, ‘Bentham’, CW, x, 95.   - 135 - 
doing so.
29  For Mill, it was crucial to believe in the possibility that man could alter his 
own character, and, moreover, to ground this belief on a solid scientific foundation. 
Significantly, as John Robson points out, the term ‘character’, including ‘national 
character’, occupied a prominent place in Mill’s criticism of what he saw as Bentham’s 
universalism.
30  In ‘Remarks on Bentham’s Philosophy’, which appeared in the year 
following Bentham’s death in 1832, Mill criticized Bentham for lacking ‘[the deep] 
insight into the formation of character, and knowledge of the internal workings of 
human nature’,
31  and for not considering political institutions as ‘the great instrument 
of forming the national character’, focusing almost exclusively on the question of the 
machinery of institutions.
32  A more detailed critique is found in ‘Bentham’ of 1838, 
where he argued that Bentham’s view of man was very limited due to his lack of 
imagination.
33  To his mind, Bentham recognized ‘no such wish as that of 
self-culture’.
34  In Bentham’s system, Mill stated, it was impossible to find any 
discussion of ‘self-education; the training, by the human being himself, of his affections 
and will’.
35  Mill thought that Bentham’s view was so limited that he could not only not 
understand the individual, and even more so society, which consisted of many 
individuals. To his mind, though an understanding of the national character of a people 
was necessary in order to inquire into the society to which they belonged, Bentham gave 
                                                 
29  Mill stated that ‘[Bentham’s system of ethics] recognises no such wish as that of self-culture, we may 
even say no such power, as existing in human nature; and if it did recognise, could furnish little assistance 
to that great duty of man, because it overlooks the existence of about half of the whole number of mental 
feelings which human beings are capable of, including all those of which the direct objects are states of 
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namely a theory of national education or the formation of national character. (JSM, ‘Coleridge’, CW, x, 
141.) 
30  Robson (1998) 353. 
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‘no account of national character and the causes which form and maintain it’.
36  Mill 
stated:   
That which alone causes any material interests to exist, which alone enables any 
body of human beings to exist as a society, is national character. … A philosophy of 
laws and institutions, not founded on a philosophy of national character, is an 
absurdity. But what could Bentham’s opinion be worth on national character?
37 
Furthermore, in the mid-1830s, Mill claimed: ‘Each nation, and the same nation in 
every different age, exhibits a portion of mankind, under a set of circumstances, 
different from what have been in operation anywhere else.’
38  In his view, the 
requirement of improvement, both of the people and of the society where they lived, 
varied according to the condition of that society. The practice of improvement required 
a knowledge of the nature and condition of each society. Subsequently, the standard and 
immediate ends of improvement were provided not by the universal principle of utility, 
but by secondary principles. Even though he endorsed Bentham’s notion of the principle 
of utility as the first and ultimate principle, Mill regarded the concept of utility or the 
greatest happiness as ‘much too complex and indefinite an end to be sought except 
through the medium of various secondary ends, concerning which there may be, and 
often is, agreement among persons who differ in their ultimate standard’.
39 
Even though Mill’s disenchantment with Bentham at this period was strong, it 
should be noted that his critique of what he regarded as Benthamite utilitarian theory 
did not lead him to abandon, or even doubt, utilitarian theory in itself. In his opinion, 
the deficiency in Bentham’s version of utilitarian theory was caused not by any innate 
deficiency in the theory, but by the fact that Bentham’s view of man and society was 
extremely narrow. Mill never regarded his interest in the formation of character as 
incompatible with utilitarian theory; rather, what he attempted was to incorporate the 
theory of the formation of character into utilitarian theory. He believed that such an 
attempt would not undermine utilitarian theory, but would help to make it more 
philosophically elaborate and practically reliable than Bentham’s conception of it. 
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According to Mill, Bentham and James Mill had stated that the morality of an action 
depended wholly on its consequences, independently of motive; he criticized their 
exclusion of motive from the judgement of the goodness of an action in terms of the 
principle of utility. In ‘Sedgwick’s Discourse’ (April 1835), Mill stated: 
In estimating the consequences of actions, in order to obtain a measure of their 
morality, there are always two sets of considerations involved: the consequences to 
the outward interests of the parties concerned (including the agent himself); and the 
consequences to the characters of the same persons, and to their outward interests as 
far as dependent on their characters. 
He went on to state that, while in the first consideration there was generally not much 
difficulty, the latter required a complex examination. For, ‘In all these cases there will 
naturally be as much difference in the moral judgments of different persons, as there is 
in their views of human nature, and of the formation of character’, and, therefore, ‘Clear 
and comprehensive views of education and human culture must therefore precede, and 
form the basis of, a philosophy of morals.’
40  Having said that, he claimed that the 
utilitarian theory could take both sorts of consequences into consideration: 
It is not true that utility estimates actions by this sort of consequences; it estimates 
them by all their consequences. If he [i.e. Sedgwick] means that the principle of 
utility regards only (to use a scholastic distinction) the objective consequences of 
actions, and omits the subjective; attends to the effects on our outward condition, 
and that of other people, too much – to those on our internal sources of happiness or 
unhappiness, too little; this criticism is, as we have already remarked, in some 
degree applicable to Paley; but to charge this blunder upon the principle of utility, 
would be to say, that if you judge of a thing by all its consequences, you will judge 
only by some.
41 
Thus, he claimed that it was not only necessary, but feasible to consider both the 
external and internal elements of an action in estimating its utility. 
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ii 
As I have shown, in Mill’s opinion, the science of human nature was psychology, 
which investigated the universal, ultimate laws of human nature.
42  In other words, the 
subject-matter of psychology were the laws of succession and coexistence of mental 
states whose cause was other mental states. Psychology, he claimed, was an empirical 
science in that all knowledge of human nature should be ascertained in terms of 
experience, namely external observation and introspection. Psychological laws were 
formed by generalization from such experience, and no further rationalization was 
required. These laws always operated in conjunction with the circumstances in which 
man was placed. A diversity of circumstances, therefore, resulted in a diversity in 
humans. The way in which empirical human nature, namely character in the ordinary 
sense of the term, was formed, or the way in which universal psychological laws were 
affected by the circumstances in which they operated, was the subject-matter of 
ethology. As a derivative science of psychology, ethology was conceived by Mill as the 
means of clarifying how human character was formed in particular circumstances in 
accordance with the ultimate laws of psychology. According to Mill: 
Men do not all feel and act alike in the same circumstances; but it is possible to 
determine what makes one man, in a given position, feel or act in one way, another 
in another; how any given mode of feeling and conduct, compatible with the general 
laws (physical and mental) of human nature, has been, or may be, formed. In other 
words, mankind have not one universal character, but there exist universal laws of 
the Formation of Character.
43 
One of the theoretical roles of ethology was to act as what Mill called the ‘axiomata 
media’ between the ultimate laws of human nature and the laws of social phenomena.
44 
As I have shown, Mill insisted that no empirical laws of social phenomena could 
become scientific without being deduced from the psychological laws of human nature. 
In his opinion, ‘The actions and feelings of human beings in the social state, are, no 
doubt, entirely governed by psychological and ethological laws’,
45  but the length and 
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complexity of ‘a series of actions and reactions between Circumstances and Man’ made 
it impossible to connect directly the laws of social phenomena with the ultimate 
psychological laws.
46  Therefore, the connection would be indirect by means of 
ethology as axiomata media. 
The psychology which Mill had in mind was associationist psychology. He took 
much of his associationist theory from James Mill, especially from his An Analysis of 
Phenomena of the Human Mind, first published in 1829.
47  According to James Mill, 
When the idea of the Pleasure is associated with an action of our own as its cause;         
that is, contemplated as the consequent of a certain action of ours, and incapable of 
otherwise existing; or when the cause of a Pleasure is contemplated as the 
consequent of an action of ours, and not capable of otherwise existing; a peculiar 
state of mind is generated which, as it is a tendency to action, is properly 
denominated MOTIVE.
48 
Having shown what a motive consisted of, he went on to insist that the morality of an 
action did not depend on a motive of any kind. In his Fragment on Mackintosh, 
published in 1835, James Mill rebutted James Mackintosh who stated that Bentham 
claimed that the principle of utility ‘ought … to be the chief motive of human 
conduct’:
49 
In fact he [i.e. Bentham] never said, that the principle of morality was a motive at all. 
He knew better the meaning of the word. His doctrine of motives was, that neither 
morality nor immorality belongs to motives, but to a different part of the mental 
process.
50 
What Bentham stated was, in his view, that ‘the morality of an act does not depend upon 
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the motive’.
51 
J. S. Mill thought that motives did not always arise in association with pleasure and 
pain, and that they might include ‘a habit of willing’ or ‘purpose’ which did not relate to 
pleasure and pain. On this point, he criticized Bentham because he never imagined that 
‘any human being ever did an act merely because it is right, or abstained from it merely 
because it is wrong’ without considering the outward interest derived from it.
52  In the 
Logic, Mill stated: 
A habit of willing is commonly called a purpose; and among the causes of our 
volitions, and of the actions which flow from them, must be reckoned not only 
likings and aversions, but also purposes. It is only when our purposes have become 
independent of the feelings of pain or pleasure from which they originally took their 
rise, that we are said to have a confirmed character. “A character,” says Novalis, “is 
a completely fashioned will:” and the will, once so fashioned, may be steady and 
constant, when the passive susceptibilities of pleasure and pain are greatly 
weakened, or materially changed.
53 
Mill criticized Bentham and James Mill for excluding motive from the evaluation of the 
utility of an action, and then claimed that the utility of an action had to be estimated in 
terms both of the motive and of its external results.
54 
   
iii 
Mill’s ‘General Science of Society’ consisted of two branches: ‘Social Dynamics’ 
and ‘Social Statics’, the terminology and content of which he learnt from Comte. Mill 
claimed that every study of social phenomena, including the General Science of Society, 
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should be founded on psychology as the science of human nature. He agreed basically 
with Comte as far as Social Dynamics was concerned, but disagreed about Social Statics, 
and about the question of what sort of knowledge should form the science of human 
nature on which all the sciences of society, including Social Dynamics and Social 
Statics, should be grounded. While Comte was convinced that it was physiological 
knowledge in general, and phrenology in particular, that should be regarded as the 
science of human nature, Mill thought that phrenology was inappropriate as the science 
of human nature. In Comte’s phrenology-based system, Mill found a fatal defect, 
namely a determinist tendency, which he also found in Owen’s system. 
Comte denied any role for psychology in his system of social science. For him, 
psychology was an attempt to discover ‘the laws of individual life’ from which the laws 
of social life could be derived. Such an attempt, however, was impossible. To his mind, 
‘the knowledge of the law of individual life can never enable us to make deductions of 
successive social phenomena; for each stage is deducible only from the one 
immediately preceding’. As the character of man was formed, to some extent, by the 
social environment surrounding him, the laws of his pre-social nature were biological. 
He identified ‘the preponderance of the affective over the intellectual faculties’, and the 
inferiority ‘in strength and steadiness’ of social affection compared to self-regarding 
affection, as laws of this kind.
55  Crucially, these laws were the very ones that Mill 
regarded as psychological when he discussed, in ‘Definition of Political Economy’ 
(1836), the laws of human nature applied to isolated individuals and the laws regarding 
‘the feelings called forth in a relation with others’.
56 
In the Logic, Mill stated: ‘All states of mind are immediately caused either by other 
states of mind, or by states of body. When a state of mind is produced by a state of mind, 
I call the law concerned in the case, a law of Mind. When a state of mind is produced 
directly by a state of body, the law is a law of Body, and belongs to physical science.’
57 
Physiologists, according to Mill, usually thought that all states of mind were produced 
by states of the brain as a bodily organ. Mill thought that Comte shared this view with 
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the physiologists in claiming that uniformities of succession among states of mind were 
derived from uniformities among bodily states. In this sense, no laws of mind in Mill’s 
sense could exist; and consequently, mental science became a mere subsidiary study of 
physiology. Accordingly, Comte stated that psychology was not a science, but remained 
‘in the chimerical nature of its objects and pretension, almost on a par with astrology’.
58 
On the contrary, Mill thought that there existed uniformities of succession among 
mental states. One of Mill’s statements about the difficulty of regarding physiology as 
the science of human nature can be found in Chapter XI of Book III of the Logic, where 
he pointed out that there were cases, especially of physiological phenomena, which 
involved ‘much difficulty in laying down with due certainty the inductive foundation 
necessary to support the deductive method’.
59  To his mind, it was almost impossible to 
‘separate the different agencies which collectively compose an organized body, without 
destroying the very phenomena which it is our object to investigate’. Hence, he claimed: 
‘it is possible to study the laws of man’s mind and actions apart from other men, much 
less imperfectly than we can study the laws of one organ or tissue of the human body 
apart from the other organs or tissues’.
60  This was why he thought psychology was 
more developed and, therefore, more reliable than physiology.
61 
Comte thought that the explanation of social phenomena could not logically be 
derived from non-sociological premises, even though he admitted that knowledge of 
human nature might be of use in the verification of the conclusion of reasoning, and not 
in the reasoning itself. In the meantime, however, he insisted that the science of human 
nature was not psychology, but phrenology. While thinking that psychology could not 
exist as an independent science, he saw that phrenology had been well developed. While 
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Comte appreciated Gall’s phrenological ideas and regarded phrenology as the scientific 
foundation of social science, Mill often expressed a negative attitude towards Comte’s 
view in their correspondence, which commenced soon after Mill’s reading of the fourth 
volume of Comte’s Course on Positive Philosophy, published in 1839, which 
concentrated mainly on Social Statics. Mill, in a letter to Comte of 18 December 1841, 
wrote that ‘I believe in the possibility of a positive psychology’. He went on to write 
that the psychology in question, 
would certainly be neither that of Condillac, nor of Cousin, nor even of the Scottish 
school. I believe it to be fully contained in the analysis of our intellectual and 
affective faculties which, as part of your system, serves as proof of phrenological 
physiology, with the primary purpose of separating truly primordial faculties from 
those that are merely necessary consequences of the former produced by their 
combination or interaction.
62 
Here, Mill claimed that psychology would be useful even in Comte’s phrenology-based 
system, subsidiary even though it was. Then, on 9 June 1842, he told Comte that he had 
read again Gall’s On the Functions of the Brain and of Each of its Parts (1822-5), and 
confessed that he had never been persuaded by Gall’s argument.
63  To Mill’s mind, 
Gall’s phrenology was so unscientific and premature that it could not be regarded as the 
science of human nature on which all social sciences should be founded. Not only that, 
Gall’s argument was crucially defective in that it ignored the alterability of character. He 
had never accepted phrenological ideas, and went on to claim that the theory of 
education was   
so neglected today that most thinkers do not even know how far general conditions, 
together with the degree of general nervous sensitivity can, according to the laws of 
physiology and of the mind, not only modify [man’s] character, but sometimes even 
determine its types. Differences in individual or national character, which can be 
sufficiently well explained by circumstances with which we are most familiar, are 
commonly resolved by the simple expedient of an unknown difference in physical 
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organization, or even, among metaphysicians, by basic differences in psychic 
constitution.
64 
Mill thought that phrenology was deterministic, in that it presupposed the innate fixed 
character or ability of man, and in turn denied the possibility of altering human 
character. Comte’s system of social science was, therefore, fundamentally defective, as 
he grounded it on an improper knowledge of human nature. On 30 October 1843, when 
the Logic had already been published, Mill again criticized Comte for relying on 
phrenology, and suggested ethology, which he had outlined in the Logic, as the proper 
alternative: 
The foundations of social dynamics are, to my view, fully established today. But not 
so for social statics, where history does not hold first place and can only be adduced 
more or less as an accessory (though I am not denying the importance of its 
secondary role). Transforming static sociology to a truly positive state consequently 
requires, if we compare it to social dynamics, a far greater perfection in the science 
of individual man. It requires above all a very advanced state of the secondary 
science I have called ethology, that is, the theory of how external circumstances, 
either individual or social, influence the formation of moral and intellectual 
character.
65 
To Mill’s mind, the three-stage theory was scientifically established. Hence, Social 
Dynamics could rely on historical knowledge as far as it was consistent with the 
three-stage theory. In contrast, in Social Statics, the fundamental theory had not yet been 
ascertained. In this science, it was initially necessary to ascertain the fundamental 
theory which could be explained by the laws of human nature. Hence, in Social Statics, 
it was necessary to rely more on a knowledge of human nature than in Social 
Dynamics.
66  Mill claimed that psychology and its derivative science, ethology, and not 
phrenology, could provide such a knowledge of human nature.
67 
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Crucially, Comte thought that it was the deterministic character of phrenology that 
made it possible to predict accurately the future course of history by means of social 
science. For Comte, to consider the alterability of human character meant to introduce 
random, unscientific factors into scientific inquiry. As Robert Brown points out, 
‘Comte’s elimination of psychology as an independent science from his system of 
sociology was founded on programmatic considerations rather than on the scientific 
evidence available to him.’
68  Furthermore, from a practical point of view, Comte 
thought that the notion of free will could not be endorsed, as this might imply that the 
course of history predicted by social science might fail to come into reality. Comte’s 
theory, from Mill’s perspective, put the cart before the horse, in that it rejected any 
knowledge of human nature which seemed incompatible with his system of social 
science. 
Moreover, Comte, unlike Mill, believed that the natural course of history predicted 
by Social Dynamics should be seen as desirable, and did not, therefore, require any 
modification. In Comte’s view, once science had shown the course of history, man did 
not need to, or was not able to, change its direction. On the contrary, Mill believed that 
it was necessary, as well as possible, to make the future course of affairs more attractive 
than science predicted, and that this was where man exercised his freedom. He was 
convinced that ethology could give a scientific foundation to man’s practice of shaping 
a more attractive future through his own capabilities.
69 
Another reason why Mill regarded ethology as of huge importance was that his 
attitude towards human nature was not entirely favourable, though he admitted that 
society, especially European society, had been advancing. In the Logic, he stated: 
The words Progress and Progressiveness are not here to be understood as 
synonymous with improvement and tendency to improvement. It is conceivable that 
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the laws of human nature might determine, and even necessitate, a certain series of 
changes in man and society, which might not in every case, or which might not on 
the whole, be improvements. It is my belief indeed that the general tendency is, and 
will continue to be, saving occasional exceptions one of improvement; a tendency 
towards a better and happier state. But this is not a question of the method of the 
social science but an ultimate result of the science itself.
70 
In his view, it was not always possible to derive an attractive vision for social change 
directly from the laws of human nature. In this respect, his project of ethology can be 
seen as a product of his concern both to place empirical laws regarding improvement of 
society on a scientific basis, and to understand how society could be improved in the 
future. 
 
4. The Practical Dimension of Ethology 
i 
In order to understand the practical significance of science in general, and ethology 
in particular, it is helpful to look at Mill’s formulation of the relationship between 
science and art. In the very final chapter of the Logic, entitled ‘Of the Logic of Practice, 
or Art; Including Morality and Policy’, Mill stated that science and art, though closely 
related, should be distinguished. He stated: 
The art proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines the end, and hands it over to 
the science. The science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or effect to be 
studied, and having investigated its causes and conditions, sends it back to art with a 
theorem of the combinations of circumstances by which it could be produced. Art 
then examines these combinations of circumstances, and according as any of them 
are or are not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not. The only one of 
the premises, therefore, which Art supplies, is the original major premise, which 
asserts that the attainment of the given end is desirable. Science then lends to Art the 
proposition (obtained by a series of inductions or of deductions) that the 
performance of certain actions will attain the end. From these premises Art 
concludes that the performance of these actions is desirable, and finding it also 
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practicable, converts the theorem into a rule or precept.
71 
According to Mill, art defined the ends; each art was coupled with its corresponding 
science which clarified the possible courses of action, from which art chose the policies 
which were thought best to promote the ends in the given circumstances. Crucially, in 
his system, both the defining of the ends – teleology – and the selecting of the means to 
promote those ends were not the role of science, but of art. The fundamental principle of 
teleology was the promotion of happiness.
72  Education in the widest sense of the term, 
including the formation of character, was one of the most important arts, and its 
corresponding science was ethology. Mill stated: ‘The character itself should be, to the 
individual, a paramount end, simply because the existence of this ideal nobleness of 
character, or of a near approach to it, in any abundance, would go further than all things 
else towards making human life happy.’
73  In relation to education, Stefan Collini points 
out that ‘Mill's conception of society is an exceptionally and pervasively educative one’, 
and that Mill regarded their effect on the shaping of character as ‘the ultimate test of all 
institutions and policies’.
74 
 
ii 
As previously stated, Mill’s notion of the formation of character was essentially that 
of environmental determinism, in spite of his criticism of Owenite environmental 
determinism. In criticizing Owenite determinism, which he called ‘fatalism’, in favour 
of environmental determinism properly understood, Mill emphasized the importance of 
an individual’s possessing a desire to form his own character, whatever the cause of this 
desire. Accepting the view that man’s character was formed by the circumstances in 
which he was placed, Mill insisted that man’s desire to form his own character was in 
itself a constituent circumstance, and consequently he went on to state: ‘If they could 
place us under the influence of certain circumstances, we, in like manner, can place 
ourselves under the influence of other circumstances. We are exactly as capable of 
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making our own character, if we will, as others are of making it for us.’
75  The reason 
why Mill laid great stress on the possibility of man’s having such a desire was that he 
thought fatalism was not only theoretically wrong in misunderstanding the term 
‘necessity’, but also practically harmful in that, by insisting that ‘we have no power of 
altering our character’, it had a depressing effect.
76  According to Mill, ‘this feeling, of 
our being able to modify our own character if we wish, is itself the feeling of moral 
freedom which we are conscious of.’
77  He went on to answer the question of who could 
feel morally free. Both a person ‘who feels that his habits or his temptations are not his 
masters, but he theirs’, and one ‘who believed that he could resist them’ could feel 
morally free.
78  However, it was necessary that ‘we must feel that our wish, if not strong 
enough to alter our character, is strong enough to conquer our character when the two 
are brought into conflict in any particular case of conduct’.
79  Thus, Mill emphasized the 
significance of feeling morally free, and regarded it as desirable that a person should 
have such a feeling. 
Mill claimed that the most vital antecedent that brought about such a desire was 
neither the operation of institutions nor of education, but ‘experience of the painful 
consequences of the character we previously had’.
80  As he never attempted to 
investigate further the nature of such antecedent experience, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that his speculation was insufficient as a philosophical argument. However, as 
G. W. Smith points out, of vital importance was that Mill’s notion of the formation of 
character was essentially environmental determinism, which implied that, first, the 
desire for self-reform could not ultimately be self-induced, and second, ‘the external (i.e. 
social) circumstances which either stimulate or inhibit its occurrence take on crucial 
significance for the individual’s actual engagement in the process of 
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self-development’.
81  Ethology was designed to offer scientific knowledge concerning 
the relationship between human character and external circumstances. In other words, 
ethology should be seen as the scientific foundation of the practice, or art, of education. 
Thus, ethology was strongly connected with Mill’s concern for the improvement of 
mankind. In regard to the practical significance of ethology, Mill wrote: 
we must remember that a degree of knowledge far short of the power of actual 
prediction, is often of great practical value. … It is enough that we know that certain 
means have a tendency to produce a given effect, and that others have a tendency to 
frustrate it. When the circumstances of an individual or of a nation are in any 
considerable degree under our control, we may, by our knowledge of tendencies, be 
enabled to shape those circumstances in a manner much more favourable to the ends 
we desire, than the shape which they would of themselves assume. This is the limit 
of our power; but within this limit the power is a most important one.
82 
As far as methodology was concerned, as I have shown, the direct deductive method 
was the only mode of reasoning that was applicable to ethology.
83  Like all other 
sciences that employed this method, ethology could provide hypothetical conclusions. 
In other words, what ethology discussed were not facts but tendencies, because a 
science of this kind did not consider factors which might counteract the factor in 
question.
84  Nevertheless, the reason why Mill laid emphasis on the significance of the 
knowledge of tendencies was that man could avail himself of such knowledge in order 
to ‘shape those circumstances in a manner much more favourable to the ends we 
desire’.
85 
This notion of the formation of character of the individual could be extended to the 
collective character of the people belonging to a certain nation, in other words, national 
character. To Mill’s mind, ‘Ethology is the science which corresponds to the art of 
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education; in the widest sense of the term, including the formation of national as well as 
individual character.’
86  While ethology was the science that discussed the character of 
the individual, political ethology was the applied science that was designed to discuss 
national character. Accordingly, political ethology was to the art of national education 
what ethology was to the art of personal education. Mill intended political ethology to 
show how national character could be formed in a given state of society, or how a 
certain factor that constituted a state of society affected the collective character of the 
people belonging to that society. It should be emphasized that his interest lay not only in 
a descriptive explanation of the differences of national character in various nations, but 
also in a prescriptive discussion as to the means by which a desirable national character 
could be formed and what political and social institutions could contribute to the 
formation of such a desirable national character. Mill believed that once the causes 
forming national character were ascertained, it would be possible to form a favourable 
national character by introducing into society institutions which would have a good 
influences on the current national character, and by removing, or reforming, those which 
had negative effects. Given the notion of ‘the necessary correlation between the form of 
government existing in any society and the contemporaneous state of civilization’, Mill 
insisted that the scientific knowledge of the formation of national character which 
political ethology could provide could help to create a virtuous cycle which would 
improve both individuals and social arrangements. He thought that social arrangements, 
including government, if in a suitable form for a given society, could contribute to the 
cultivation of the national character of those belonging to that society, and, in turn, those 
cultivated individuals would themselves come to desire even better arrangements. This 
cycle of mutual influence would result in the creation of a free people with free 
institutions.
87  Mill’s project of political ethology had a practical purpose.
88 
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iii 
Mill published several important works in the 1850s and 1860s, including On 
Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, without having fully 
developed an ethology which would have been the immediate scientific foundation for 
the political and social arguments advocated in those works. This does not mean, 
however, that he either abandoned the project of ethology or came to think that he could 
remove ethology from his system of moral science.
89  Rather, this was because, first, 
Mill was convinced that the empirical laws of the formation of character, even though 
still remaining unscientific at that time, would become scientific before long; and 
second, and more importantly, he believed that empirical laws in themselves were, 
though not reliable as scientific knowledge, useful in practice or art. This becomes clear 
when his notion of ‘approximate generalization’ is examined. According to Chapter 
XXIII of Book III of the Logic, ‘approximate generalization’ was a logical operation 
that derived a conclusion in the form, ‘most A are B’ or ‘A is often B’, not ‘every A is 
B’.
90  Mill stated: ‘the degree of probability of the inference [in terms of approximate 
generalization] in an average case, will depend on the proportion between the number of 
instances existing in nature which accord with the generalization, and the number of 
those which conflict with it’.
91  Mill insisted that ethological laws should not be 
regarded as scientific, but as approximate generalizations. These remained unscientific 
unless they were explained by higher laws.
92  Nevertheless, to his mind, approximate 
generalization was sufficient for practical purposes. He claimed that while ‘so little use 
can be made, in science, of approximate generalizations, except as a stage on the road to 
something better [i.e. universal truths]’, they were often useful for practical guidance.
93   
In Mill’s view, there were two cases in which approximate generalization might be 
particularly useful even for scientific purposes, in other words cases where approximate 
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generalization was ‘capable of being transformed into complete generalizations exactly 
equivalent’.
94  The first case was that in which the ‘reason for stopping at the 
approximation is not the impossibility, but only the inconvenience, of going further’;
95 
second, that in which ‘the proposition, Most A are B, is not the ultimatum of our 
scientific progress, though the knowledge we possess beyond it cannot conveniently be 
brought to bear upon the particular instance’.
96  This case was generally found in the 
moral sciences. Approximate generalization was, to Mill’s mind, of especial use, among 
the moral sciences, in ‘the science of politics, or of human society’, which dealt with 
‘the properties not of individuals, but of multitudes’. According to Mill, it could be seen, 
from a scientific point of view, that ‘what is true approximately of all individuals is true 
absolutely of all masses’, and, therefore, practical politicians ‘must in general both 
reason and act as if what is true of most persons were true of all’.
97  These notions 
explain why Mill could develop arguments in his later works based on provisional 
ethological knowledge, that is knowledge which had not yet become scientific, and 
therefore represented merely a kind of approximate generalization. 
 
5. Concluding Note 
On 3 April 1844, Mill told Comte: ‘Since my meditations on ethology will not be 
ripe for some time, I may meanwhile undertake a project that, for me, would only be the 
task of a few months, that is to say – a special treatise on political economy ….’
98 
Knowledge of the science of political economy, whose subject-matter was ‘the nature of 
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Wealth, and the laws of its production and distribution’,
99  was of importance in that it 
contributed to the development of the necessary conditions for the intellectual and 
moral improvement of mankind. Mill believed that the progress of man’s intellectual 
and moral abilities could be achieved only where wealth had been widely diffused in 
society, and thereby the material needs of most of the people had been to a certain 
degree met, and where the level of production facilitated the emergence of a class able 
to devote its time and effort to intellectual activity. In the next chapter, I examine Mill’s 
political economy. 
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Chapter 8. Political Economy 
 
1. Introduction 
My interest in this chapter lies in J. S. Mill’s notion of the nature of political 
economy, and his formulation of its relationship with such neighbouring sciences as the 
‘General Science of Society’ and political ethology. Mill began studying political 
economy in 1819 when he was thirteen years old. According to his own recollection, 
My father [i.e. James Mill] … commenced instructing me in the science by a sort of 
lectures, which he delivered to me in our walks. He expounded each day a portion of 
the subject, and I gave him next day a written account of it, which he made me 
rewrite over and over again until it was clear, precise, and tolerably complete. In this 
manner I went through the whole extent of the science …. After this I read Ricardo, 
giving an account daily of what I read, and discussing, in the best manner I could, 
the collateral points which offered themselves in our progress.
1 
Mill’s writings on political economy spanned the period from 1822 until 1872 when the 
seventh edition, and the last in his lifetime, of Principles of Political Economy was 
published; topics ranged from pure economic theory to a comparative study of 
capitalism and socialism. Political economy constituted one of what he called the 
‘Special Sociological Enquiries’. This implied two things. The first was that political 
economy could be an independent science. Comte denied the viability of political 
economy as an independent science, claiming that social phenomena should be 
investigated in the totality of their elements. In other words, Comte claimed that no 
study that inquired into any portion of those elements was possible, except in constant 
connection with parallel studies that simultaneously investigated all co-existing portions 
of what were complex social phenomena. All independent study of a particular element 
of social life would necessarily result in failure. To Comte, therefore, despite 
recognizing that wealth constituted one of the important elements in determining the 
condition of and change in society, an independent science of political economy, that 
inquired exclusively into the phenomena relating to the pursuit of wealth, was 
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impossible.
2  In his Logic, Mill argued against such a notion. In Mill’s view, despite the 
existence of a ‘universal consensus of the social phenomena, whereby nothing which 
takes place in any part of the operations of society is without its share of influence on 
every other part’, it was possible to see that ‘different species of social facts are in the 
main dependent, immediately and in the first resort, on different kinds of causes; and 
therefore not only may with advantage, but must, be studied apart’.
3 
The second implication was that the conclusions of political economy were subject 
to the conclusions of the General Science of Society. As the independent science of 
political economy was concerned with man as an economic being, its conclusions were 
necessarily hypothetical, in that it ignored other aspects of man, such as the intellectual, 
the moral, and the political. Political economy was designed to deal with the desire for 
wealth as if it were the sole end.
4  Therefore, the conclusions of political economy, 
which presupposed a certain condition of society, were subject to the conclusions of the 
General Science of Society whose subject-matter was the nature and condition of 
society itself. In this sense, political economy was an abstract science and its 
conclusions were hypothetical. 
In order to understand these implications of Mill’s notion of political economy, it is 
useful to note that Ricardian political economy had become the target of criticism by the 
early 1830s when Mill first conceived of writing an essay on the method and scope of 
political economy. The first part of this chapter deals with this criticism of Ricardian 
political economy. 
As far as methodology was concerned, Mill attempted to combine inductive and 
deductive approaches, though following David Ricardo, he continued to hold the view 
that political economy was a deductive science. The second part of this chapter aims to 
examine Mill’s notion of political economy as a science.   
Mill was happy to adopt Ricardo’s interpretation of the method and province of 
political economy, as well as some of his economic doctrines. Nevertheless, he regarded 
his own political economy as ‘a newer & better’ version, distinguished in several ways 
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from the old political economy.
5  To his mind, the elements that made his argument 
‘newer & better’ were as follows: first, he did not give the highest priority to economic 
growth; and second, he thought that the current capitalist system was merely 
provisional.
6  In the third and last part of this chapter, I examine these ‘newer & better’ 
aspects of his political economy.   
 
2. Ricardian Political Economy and its Critics 
i 
At the outset of his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Ricardo stated 
that the object of political economy was to determine the laws which regulated the 
distribution of wealth among landowners, capitalists, and labourers in the form of rent, 
profit, and wages respectively.
7  He employed a deductive or geometrical manner of 
reasoning. He stated that political economy should be ‘a strict science like the 
mathematics’.
8  The reason why he claimed that the deductive approach should be used 
in political economy was that he thought that, ‘There are so many combinations, – so 
many operating causes in Political Economy, that there is great danger in appealing to 
experience in favor of a particular doctrine, unless we are sure that all the causes of 
variation are seen and their effects duly estimated.’
9   
In Ricardo’s view, the deductive science of political economy consisted of the 
following steps. The first was to determine certain axioms about human nature. These 
axioms were discovered either by introspection or by casual, not necessarily 
comprehensive, observation of a few examples, and were regarded as grounded on 
‘universal’ experience. The second was to deduce laws regarding the production and 
distribution of wealth from these axioms. In so doing, unrealistic, simplified, and 
idealized assumptions were presupposed as the conditions in which these laws 
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operated.
10  Ricardo claimed that political economy was an abstract science in that it 
took into consideration only one of the causes of human action, namely the desire to 
maximize material advantages, even if there were other causes that were actually 
operating. This idea reflected his distinction between what he called the ‘questions of 
fact’ and those ‘of science’. While, on the one hand, the question of fact concerned the 
actual cause of an action, the question of science, on the other hand, concerned the 
interest rationally served by an action. Political economy treated only the question of 
science.
11  The object of Ricardo’s political economy was to determine how abstract 
economic causal laws operated under ideal conditions. Consequently, he eliminated 
political and moral considerations from political economy.
12 
Apart from close personal links between Ricardo and the Philosophic Radicals, it 
has often been claimed that Ricardian political economy accorded well with the 
activism of Philosophic Radicalism.
13  Ricardo’s theories, such as those of capital 
accumulation, of diminishing return, and of rent, had anti-landlord implications, in that 
they set the interests of the landed class against those of all other classes in society. For 
example, in An Essay on the Influence of a Low Price of Corn on the Profit of Stock in 
1815, Ricardo claimed that the Corn Laws brought about an increase in the price of 
food, which caused a rise of money wage costs, while depressing real wages.
14  He 
concluded that the Corn Laws benefited only the landowners, while hampering the 
interests of all other classes. This argument against the Corn Laws appealed to the 
Philosophic Radicals, who levelled their criticisms at aristocratic landlords. 
Even though Ricardian political economy was closely associated with Philosophic 
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Radicalism, the Philosophic Radicals were not the sole group who became its 
propagators and enthusiasts. For example, John Ramsay McCulloch, a Whig and 
Edinburgh Reviewer, published in 1818 a favourable review of Ricardo’s Principles, 
thanks to which the sales of the Principles began to take off.
15  As a leading political 
economist, McCulloch contributed more than seventy articles to the Edinburgh Review 
in the next two decades. In addition, he also wrote an article on political economy for 
the famous Supplement to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Editions of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica.
16  John Maynard Keynes pointed out the extent to which Ricardo influenced 
intellectuals and politicians in early nineteenth-century Britain: 
Ricardo conquered England as completely as the Holy Inquisition conquered Spain. 
Not only was his theory accepted by the city, by statesmen and by the academic 
world. But controversy ceased; the other point of view completely disappeared; it 
ceased to be discussed.
17 
 
ii 
In the early 1830s, however, when Mill first conceived of an essay on the method of 
political economy, Ricardian political economy had become the target of criticism.
18 
Besides Malthus’s enduring and comprehensive critique, Samuel Bailey’s severe attack 
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on Ricardo’s theory of value had appeared as early as 1825.
19  One of the most energetic 
opponents of Ricardian political economy in the late 1820s and the 1830s was a group 
now known as the ‘Cambridge Inductivists’,
 which included, among others, William 
Whewell, Richard Jones, Charles Babbage, and, to a lesser extent, Malthus.
20  They 
shared a strong opposition to the Ricardian deductive approach, and instead advocated 
an inductive approach. 
Despite their close friendship, there were fierce disputes between Ricardo and 
Malthus on various economic topics, such as the bullion system, the Corn Laws, and 
gluts. In addition, they disagreed on the scope and method of political economy. 
Malthus criticized Ricardo both for his narrow view of the scope of political economy 
and for his extreme reliance on deduction. While Ricardo claimed that political 
economy should deal with man’s behaviour as if he always acted according only to 
economic interest, Malthus insisted that all the causes of man’s economic action in 
practice had to be taken into account. In order to understand the actual causes of man’s 
behaviour, generalization – induction from extensive observations of actual phenomena 
– was needed. He pointed out the disadvantages of Ricardo’s extremely deductive 
approach as follows: ‘The principal cause of error, and of the differences which prevail 
at present among the scientific writers on political economy, appears to me to be a 
precipitate attempt to simplify and generalize.’
21   
It should be noted, however, that Malthus, unlike other Cambridge inductivists, did 
not deny the necessity of deduction itself. Significantly, he wrote to Whewell in 1831 
that Jones erred by being extremely inductive, while Ricardo erred by being extremely 
deductive: ‘My apprehension at present is that the tide is setting too strong against him 
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[i.e. Ricardo]; and I even think that Mr. Jones is carried a little out of the right course by 
it.’
22  As J. A. Schumpeter and Mark Blaug point out, Malthus agreed with Ricardo on 
the use of theorizing or generalization which employed deduction in political 
economy.
23  Crucial differences in their views, however, related to the manner of 
deduction. First, while Ricardo’s interest lay in how a single cause would operate 
ceteris paribus, Malthus took into account the simultaneous operation of plural causes. 
Malthus stated: ‘In political economy the desire to simplify has occasioned an 
unwillingness to acknowledge the operation of more causes than one in the production 
of particular effects.’
24  Second, unlike Ricardo, Malthus emphasized the importance of 
verifying conclusions drawn from deductive reasoning by referring to empirical data. In 
his view: ‘The tendency to premature generalization occasions also, in some of the 
principal writers on political economy, an unwillingness to bring their theories to the 
test of experience.’
25  He claimed that theory should be abandoned if it were 
inconsistent with ‘general experience’.
26  To his mind, a reference to experience was 
useful not only in rejecting mistaken theory, but also in enhancing the value of theory to 
practice.
27  Subsequently, Malthus was convinced that considerations other than 
economic ones, such as political and moral, should have an important place within 
political economy. To his mind, ‘the science of political economy bears a nearer 
resemblance to the science of morals and politics than to that of mathematics’.
28  Thus, 
the dispute between Malthus and Ricardo to a great extent reflected the differences in 
their views on the proper object and province of political economy. Donald Winch 
depicts the Ricardo-Malthus controversy as a conflict between ‘wealth’ and ‘happiness’, 
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in other words, ‘a conflict between the concerns of political economy strictly delimited, 
and those of a more general science of morals and politics’.
29     
In the mid-1810s, as the Napoleonic Wars ended, the English agricultural market 
was disrupted as a joint consequence of economic dislocation and bumper harvests. The 
landed class demanded further tariff protection, thereby provoking public debate over 
the Corn Laws. Malthus argued for agricultural protectionism from political, moral, and 
economic perspectives, and not from the standpoint of economic laws alone. In two 
pamphlets, published on 3 and 10 February 1815 respectively, Malthus argued in favour 
of retaining high tariffs to protect the prosperity of farmers and the rural population on 
the grounds that national security and progress depended on their prosperity.
30  He did 
not deny that free trade was desirable in abstract theory, but in the actual condition of 
Britain in the 1810s, it might produce unfavourable effects on ‘national quiet and 
happiness’.
31  In his pamphlet, An Essay on the Influence of a Low Price of Corn, 
published around 24 February 1815, Ricardo argued against Malthus, relying on his 
theories of population and rent. Ricardo thought that England’s prosperity depended on 
her commerce and industry, which was being stifled by the protectionist Corn Laws, 
and stated: ‘If then the prosperity of the commercial classes, will most certainly lead to 
accumulation of capital, and the encouragement of productive industry; these can by no 
means be so surely obtained as by a fall in the price of corn.’
32  He tended to identify 
economic growth with the improvement of society, and gave a high priority to capital 
accumulation. He advocated the abolition of the Corn Laws, which caused food prices 
to increase.   
After Ricardo’s death in 1823, his followers, such as McCulloch and Torrens, as 
well as James Mill, disseminated his economic doctrines. Meanwhile, the inductivist 
criticism of Ricardian political economy was carried on by the Cambridge Inductivists, 
who were, according to Lawrence Goldman, the only group that ‘attacked the very 
method of political economy – its reliance on deduction from “self-evident truths” of 
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human behaviour and its restriction to the existing economic state of Britain’.
33  For 
example, in On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures in 1832, Babbage 
claimed the need for greater information in political economy, and accused political 
economists of ‘too small a use of facts, and too large an employment of theory’.
34 
Whewell, too, argued that political economy should be concerned with economic laws 
‘as they actually operated in different countries and different forms of society’, and 
‘with actual facts and daily observations’. Furthermore, all propositions should be 
verified by reference to ‘particular cases of human affairs’. He was convinced that, 
‘Political economy in short must be a science of induction and not of deduction. It must 
obtain its principles by reasoning upwards from facts, before it can apply them by 
reasoning downwards from axioms.’ He then claimed that political economy ‘cannot 
form a science of the nature of geometry and arithmetic, which deduce all their 
conclusions from a few definitions and conventions’.
35   
Richard Jones’s An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth, which first appeared in 
1831, was directed against Ricardo’s work. Whewell later recalled the state of political 
economy at the time when Jones was preparing his Essay: 
By the labors of various writers, culminating in the treatise of Mr. Ricardo, Political 
Economy had become in a great measure a deductive science: that is, certain 
definitions were adopted, as of universal application to all countries upon the face of 
the globe and all classes of society; and from these definitions, and a few 
corresponding axioms, was deduced a whole system of propositions, which were 
regarded as of demonstrated validity.
36 
Jones stated that ‘Mr. Ricardo was a man of talent, and he produced a system very 
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ingeniously combined, of purely hypothetical truths; which, however, a single 
comprehensive glance at the world as it actually exists, is sufficient to shew to be utterly 
inconsistent with the past and present condition of mankind’.
37  Jones, as well as 
Whewell, identified both the deductive or geometric mode of reasoning and the 
universalistic view that economic laws were valid in any place and time as the 
characteristics of Ricardian political economy. In this regard, they agreed with Malthus. 
In Jones’s view, Ricardo committed a number of errors because he underused the 
inductive method. Ricardo’s theory of rent was, according to Jones, based on an account 
of the landlord-tenant relationship that was valid for only a tiny proportion of cases in 
the world. Jones exemplified types of relationship other than ‘farmers’ rent’ (by which 
he meant the sort of relationship assumed by Ricardo), such as ‘serf’, ‘metayer’, ‘ryot’, 
‘cottier’, and ‘peasant’, to which Ricardo’s theory could not be applied. Ricardo’s 
argument, therefore, was based on the observation of only one of the classes found in 
the world, and was absurd and meaningless; it could not be applied to ‘one hundredth 
part of the cultivated surface of the habitable globe’.
38 
Jones criticized Ricardo not only for his extreme reliance on a deductive approach 
that restricted the applicability of his system to the existing economic order, but also for 
his narrow view of the domain of political economy. Ricardo claimed that science 
should not be confused with practice or art, and that the science of political economy 
should eliminate moral and political factors. Contrary to Ricardo, and along with 
Malthus, Jones thought that, in order to examine actual economic problems, factors 
other than the economic should be taken into consideration. That is, political economy 
should embrace political, social, and moral, as well as economic, concerns. He argued: 
‘There is a close connection between the economical and social organization of nations 
and their powers of production.’
39   
In antagonism with Ricardian political economy, Jones and Whewell aspired not 
only to redefine the province of political economy, but also to replace it with a new 
study, ‘Beyond political economy, strictly so called’.
40  This new science employed the 
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inductive approach, grounded on empirical materials derived from all areas of social 
existence: 
If we wish to make ourselves acquainted with the economy and arrangements by 
which the different nations of the earth produce or distribute their revenues, I really 
know but of one way to attain our object, and that is to look and see. We must get 
comprehensive views of facts, that we may arrive at principles which are truly 
comprehensive.
41   
Their new inductive science was a science of statistics which aimed to ‘consider the 
results which they [i.e. various elements in society] produce, with the view to determine 
those principles upon which the well-being of society depends’. In their view, this 
science of statistics was distinguished from political economy in a significant way:   
The Science of Statistics differs from Political Economy, because, although it has 
the same end in view, it does not discuss causes, nor reason upon probable effects; it 
seeks only to collect, arrange, and compare, that class of facts which alone can form 
the basis of correct conclusions with respect to social and political government.
42   
Grounded on observing the existing social order, and not limited to the economic, this 
inductive science of society would reveal ‘the shifting political and social influences 
which accompany the march of nations from rudeness and feebleness to power and 
civilization’.
43  This aspiration of Jones, Whewell, and their fellow inductivists was the 
driving force behind what is known as the ‘statistical movement’, which contributed to 
the creation of the ‘Statistical Section’ of the British Association for the Advancement 
of Science (1833) and the foundation of the Statistical Society of London (1834).
44 
There were some interesting terminological affinities between J. S. Mill and the 
Cambridge inductivists. First, in 1833, Jones made the following statement, which bore 
a strong resemblance to Mill’s favourable comment on history and travel as source of 
knowledge:   
Supposing, however, that we determine to know as much as we can of the world as 
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it has been, and of the world as it is, before we lay down general laws as to the 
economical habits and fortunes of mankind or of classes of men: there are open to us 
two sources of knowledge, history and statistics, the story of the past, and a detail of 
the present condition of the nations of the earth.
45   
Second, as Goldman points out, there is a significant coincidence between them in their 
employment of the term ‘social economy’ to mean a comprehensive study of society.
46 
While Whewell referred to the new inductive, statistical science of society, as 
represented in particular by Jones’s work, as ‘social economy’, Mill stated that the term 
‘social economy’ would be the most appropriate for a comprehensive science of society 
that embraced ‘every part of man’s nature, in so far as influencing the conduct or 
condition of man in society’.
47  Having said that, this does not mean that either 
influenced the other as far as their terminology was concerned. Rather, they 
independently came to use this term, and there was a common source. They would both 
have found the term in use among French thinkers, the Saint-Simonians in particular.
48 
Given the intellectual climate in Britain in the early 1830, in which Mill came to 
doubt the validity of orthodox political economy, along with what he saw as Benthamite 
politics, it may seem odd that Mill did not refer to Jones and his arguments in his essay 
‘Definition of Political Economy’, which was written in the early 1830s. In spite of his 
neglect of the argument of the inductivists in his published articles, there is no doubt 
that Mill absorbed some of their criticisms. These are the reasons behind looking at the 
inductivists’ critiques of Ricardian political economy before going on to discuss Mill’s 
notions of political economy. Yet the intention is not to suggest that the criticisms of 
Ricardian political economy converted Mill into an anti-Ricardian. He remained a 
Ricardian political economist at heart in that he accepted Ricardo’s view that political 
economy was a deductive science with a narrow scope.
49  The following sections 
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examine Mill’s views on the method and scope of political economy. 
 
3. J. S. Mill on the Definition and Method of Political Economy 
i 
Having taken ‘a complete course in political economy’ directed by James Mill in 
1819, Mill published his first piece in the field of political economy, entitled 
‘Exchangeable Value’, in December 1822 in the Traveller.
50  One of the most important 
essays in political economy in his early years was ‘Definition of Political Economy’, in 
which he presented his view of the relationship between the science and art of political 
economy. In this essay, he stated that ‘Science takes cognizance of a phenomenon, and 
endeavours to discover its law; art proposes to itself an end, and looks out for means to 
effect it’.
51  On this basis, he opposed the view that, ‘Political Economy is a science 
which teaches, or professes to teach, in what manner a nation may be made rich’, a view 
which he thought was represented by Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. Such a 
consideration should be part of the art, rather than of the science. 
Rules, therefore, for making a nation increase in wealth, are not a science, but they 
are the results of science. Political Economy does not instruct how to make a nation 
rich; but whoever would be qualified to judge of the means of making a nation rich, 
must first be a political economist.
52 
Another definition of political economy – ‘The science of the laws which regulate the 
production, distribution, and consumption of wealth’ – was insufficient, even though it 
did not confound science and art.
53  The law of the production of wealth might be 
related both to such physical sciences as chemistry and geology, and to psychological 
science. The former were not the subject-matter of political economy. Furthermore, he 
found problems even in such definitions of political economy as, ‘The science which 
treats of the production and distribution of wealth, so far as they depend upon the laws 
of human nature’, and ‘The science relating the moral or psychological laws of the 
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production and distribution of wealth’.
54  To his mind, political economy was not 
concerned with all the laws of the production and distribution of wealth, but only with a 
certain portion of them, namely those laws operating in what he termed the ‘social state’. 
Accordingly, he concluded that political economy dealt with man ‘solely as a being who 
desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of 
means for obtaining that end’, and only with ‘such of the phenomena of the social state 
as take place in consequence of the pursuit of wealth’.
55  He concluded, therefore, that 
the complete definition of political economy should be:   
The science which traces the laws of such of the phenomena of society as arise from 
the combined operations of mankind for the production of wealth, in so far as those 
phenomena are not modified by the pursuit of any other object.
56 
Having defined political economy as a science, Mill developed his methodology. As 
early as 1828 he had written a review of Richard Whatley’s Elements of Logic, in which 
he agreed with Whatley that the method of political economy should be deductive and 
syllogistic.
57  In the early 1830s, however, he came to abandon his earlier view that 
syllogism was of much use in moral science, including political economy, though he 
maintained his belief in the use of a deductive method in moral science.
58  In ‘Definition 
of Political Economy’, he insisted that conclusions from such hypotheses ‘might be 
totally without foundation in fact’. In this sense, a science which employed the 
deductive method was an abstract science, and its conclusions were hypothetical. 
Significantly, this did not mean that a deductive science was either imperfect or useless. 
In his opinion,   
Geometry presupposes an arbitrary definition of a line, “that which has length but 
not breadth.” Just in the same manner does Political Economy presuppose an 
arbitrary definition of man, as a being who invariably does that by which he may 
obtain the greatest amount of necessaries, conveniences, and luxuries, with the 
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smallest quantity of labour and physical self-denial with which they can be obtained 
in the existing state of knowledge.
59 
In ‘Definition of Political Economy’, Mill also examined the role of verification in 
political economy. Verification had no place in scientific processes, but did have a place 
in the application of science; verification was a process in which a conclusion which 
had been reached from assumed premises was compared with what actually happened; 
it was not a process intended to verify premises in themselves by reference to empirical 
facts. This was because what actually happened was motivated by many motives other 
than economic ones, while reasoning in political economy was based only on 
hypothetical economic motives.
60 
 
ii 
More detailed argument on the definition and method of political economy can be 
found in the Logic. Oscar Kubitz regards the sections on political economy in the Logic 
as a complete development of the argument in ‘Definition of Political Economy’. He 
bases his conclusion on the following facts. First, in the Logic, Mill quoted many 
passages from ‘Definition of Political Economy’; and second, he republished 
‘Definition of Political Economy’ with only minor changes, as part of Essays on Some 
Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, in 1844, the year following the publication 
of the Logic.
61  However, there were crucial differences between ‘Definition of Political 
Economy’ and the Logic. First, in the latter, unlike in ‘Definition of Political Economy’, 
he proposed the existence of more than one deductive method; he conceived two kinds 
of deductive method – the geometrical method and the physical method. Second, he 
introduced the operation of à posteriori verification into the deductive method.
62 
In Mill’s opinion, ‘the chemical or experimental method’ was identified with the 
method of Coleridge and Macaulay amongst others,
63  while ‘the abstract or geometrical 
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method’ was attributed to Hobbes and the Bentham school.
64  On the one hand, the 
chemical or experimental method was unsuitable in the social sciences because of the 
impossibility of experiment in these sciences. Moreover, even in chemistry, the 
deductive, namely the non-experimental, method was actually used.
65  On the other 
hand, the geometrical method was insufficient in the social sciences in that it did not 
take into account the existence of counteracting causes. According to Mill, ‘The 
phenomena of society do not depend, in essentials, on any one agency or law of human 
nature, with only inconsiderable modifications from others.’
66  He thought that Hobbes 
and the Benthamites were correct in thinking that the social sciences should be 
deductive, but they were incorrect in building their theory on too narrow a notion of 
acting causes in society. 
Having denied the suitability of both methods in the social sciences, Mill instead 
presented ‘the concrete deductive or physical method’ as the sole suitable method.
67 
This method consisted of three logical steps: induction, deduction, and verification. The 
first, inductive step used the experimental method in order to discover the laws of 
human action which jointly produced a certain sort of behaviour in a specific case. In 
the second, deductive step, the effect of the combination of causes which had been 
discovered in the first step was deductively ascertained. In the third and final step, the 
ascertained effect was verified. In the Logic, contrary to ‘Definition of Political 
Economy’, Mill incorporated verification into the scientific process. 
Mill regarded political economy as a science which dealt with ‘one large class of 
social phenomena, in which the immediately determining causes are principally those 
which act through the desire of wealth; and in which the psychological law mainly 
concerned is the familiar one, that a greater gain is preferred to a smaller’. He went on 
to state: 
By reasoning from that one law of human nature, and from the principal outward 
circumstances … which operate upon the human mind through that law, we may be 
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enabled to explain and predict this portion of the phenomena of society, so far as 
they depend on that class of circumstances only; overlooking the influence of any 
other of the circumstances of society; and therefore neither tracing back the 
circumstances which we do take into account, to their possible origin in some other 
facts in the social state, nor making allowance for the manner in which any of those 
other circumstances may interfere with, and counteract or modify, the effect of the 
former.
68 
Whatever man’s actual motivations were, political economists were to assume that the 
preference for a greater gain to a smaller one was the sole motivation for his economic 
actions. Reasoning in political economy, therefore, should be based on this general 
hypothesis. As a result, its conclusions would inevitably be hypothetical, for, ‘They are 
grounded on some supposititious set of circumstances, and declare how some given 
cause will operate in those circumstances, supposing that no others are combined with 
them’.
69  In this sense, political economy should be seen as a hypothetical science. 
 
4. Beyond the Science of Political Economy 
i 
Given the distinction between science and art, Mill wrote: ‘If … Political Economy 
be a science, it cannot be a collection of practical rules; though, unless it be altogether a 
useless science, practical rules must be capable of being founded upon it.’
70  Crucially, 
science was, to his mind, a necessary condition for the practice of the art. He stated: 
No one who has to think of mankind, however perfect his scientific acquirements, 
can dispense with a practical knowledge of the actual modes in which the affairs of 
the world are carried on, and an extensive personal experience of the actual ideas, 
feelings, and intellectual and moral tendencies of his own country and of his own 
age. The true practical statesman is he who combines this experience with a 
profound knowledge of abstract political philosophy.
71 
Mill’s Principles of Political Economy was first published in April 1848. On 22 
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February 1848, just before its publication, Mill wrote to John Austin: ‘I doubt if there 
will be a single opinion (on pure political economy) in the book, which may not be 
exhibited as a corollary from his [i.e. Ricardo’s] doctrines’.
72  As far as the scope and 
method of political economy was concerned, Mill basically endorsed Ricardo’s view 
that the science of political economy should be deductive and strictly distinguished 
from the art. Nevertheless, in the Principles, whose sub-title was ‘With some of their 
Applications to Social Philosophy’, he did not confine himself to the science of political 
economy, but was concerned as well with the art. As Neil de Marchi states, Mill ‘sought 
to combine the offices of theorist and practical man’, intending to ‘provide an 
up-to-date statement of the abstract science of political economy’.
73  In the Principles, 
his interest was in the application of the pure principles of political economy, combined 
with other laws, to practical questions of the time, as well as in the pure economic 
principles themselves.   
Mill claimed that the conclusions of political economy should be examined in light 
of a more comprehensive science of society which, unlike political economy, took into 
consideration all the available laws relating to man’s actual behaviour. Having once 
criticized Adam Smith for confounding ‘the essentially distinct, though closely 
connected, ideas of science and art’,
74  he now saw Smith’s Wealth of Nations as ‘great 
and beautiful’
75  in its ‘teaching the applications along with the principles’.
76 
Furthermore, in writing his book on political economy, he took Smith’s work as a 
model, and expressed his aspiration to replace it with his own.
77  In the Preface to his 
Principles, Mill wrote that, ‘The most characteristic quality’ of Wealth of Nations was 
‘that it invariably associates the principles with their applications’. He continued: 
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This of itself implies a much wider range of ideas and of topics, than are included in 
Political Economy, considered as a branch of abstract speculation. For practical 
purposes, Political Economy is inseparably intertwined with many other branches of 
social philosophy. Except on matters of mere detail, there are perhaps no practical 
questions, even among those which approach nearest to the character of purely 
economical questions, which admit of being decided on economical premises 
alone.
78 
 
ii 
In discussing the economic problems of his time, J. S. Mill aspired to combine the 
limited scope of the science of political economy with the expansive moral vision that 
suffused his conception of the art. In his attempt to apply the principles of political 
economy to actual problems, he was concerned not only with the economic, but 
crucially also with the intellectual and moral state of mankind. For Mill, the ultimate 
end was the improvement of mankind, not the improvement of their economic condition 
in itself. In January 1850 he wrote that, ‘At present I expect very little from any plans 
which aim at improving even the economical state of the people by purely economical 
or political means’, and even went on to say: 
We have come, I think, to a period, when progress, even of a political kind, is 
coming to a halt, by reason of the low intellectual & moral state of all classes: of the 
rich as much as of the poorer classes. Great improvements in Education … are the 
only thing to which I should look for permanent good.
79 
In the Principles, Mill devoted a great deal of effort to discussing the possibility of 
the moral transformation of the people, in the belief that such a transformation would 
make it possible to transform the social system. It should be recalled that as early as 
1834 Mill had criticized the political economists for regarding the existing class society 
as invariable.
80  Even though in the mid-1830s Mill gave no clear indication as to the 
way in which existing social arrangements might be transformed, he now came to hold a 
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firm view on this subject. He came to see intellectual and moral development as the 
efficient cause.
81  In discussing the national characters of England and of the United 
States, for example, Mill insisted:   
it is not the desire of wealth that needs to be taught, but the use of wealth, and 
appreciation of the objects of desire which wealth cannot purchase, or for attaining 
which it is not required. Every real improvement in the character of the English or 
Americans … must necessarily moderate the all-engrossing torment of their 
industrialism; must diminish … the aggregate productiveness of their labour.
82 
Such a view was reflected in Mill’s argument as to what sort of society would be 
desirable. He shed new light on the problem of the so-called ‘stationary state’, the 
ultimate consequence of economic growth, where there would be no further increase in 
capital and wealth. In an opulent country with no further unused fertile land, such as 
Britain, profits were, according to the Ricardian argument, falling to their customary 
minimum rate, thereby such a country was ‘on the very verge of the stationary state’, 
even though the arrival of the stationary state was continually postponed by certain 
factors that prevented the fatal falling of profits to their minimum rate, such as 
technological advance and cheap capital imports.
83  The orthodox political economists 
generally believed that the arrival of the stationary state, though the inevitable 
consequence of economic growth, was undesirable, and therefore required both that 
those laws that tended to anticipate the arrival of the state be repealed and that policies 
that would contribute to postpone its arrival as long as possible be introduced.
84  Mill’s 
notion of the stationary state was at variance with that of the orthodox political 
economists of the day. Mill did not fear the arrival of the stationary state; rather he saw 
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it as a desirable condition. He criticized such political economists as Smith, Malthus, 
and McCulloch for tending to identify all that was economically desirable with the 
progressive state. He criticized them for their view that ‘prosperity does not mean a 
large production and a good distribution of wealth, but a rapid increase of it’, and 
consequently, that society would thus cease to progress when it reached the stationary 
state.
85  In Mill’s view, enduring economic growth was not necessarily good. He 
thought that, unless accompanied by favourable changes in human character and social 
arrangements, especially in the distribution of wealth, economic growth would merely 
result in a larger population and larger capital stocks, together with environmental 
degradation. Mill depicted a society that was growing economically in the following 
way:   
There is a greater aggregate production, a greater produce divided among the 
labourers, and a larger gross profit; but the wages being shared among a larger 
population, and the profits spread over a larger capital, no labourer is better off, nor 
does any capitalist derive from the same amount of capital a larger income.
86   
In such a condition, only the landlord class benefited, and did so at the expense of the 
interest of the other classes of society.
87 
Unlike the mainstream of English political economy, Mill claimed that society could 
progress in the stationary state. Here, the term ‘progress’ did not mean economic growth, 
but the moral and intellectual cultivation of the people and the improvement of the 
social and political arrangements for the distribution, not the production, of wealth.
88 
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Mill stated:   
a stationary condition of capital and population implies no stationary state of human 
improvement. There would be as much scope as ever for all kinds of mental culture, 
and moral and social progress; as much room for improving the Art of Living, and 
much more likelihood of its being improved, when minds ceased to be engrossed by 
the art of getting on.
89 
For Mill, the stationary state was a desirable state of society where a stable population 
could be maintained at a reasonable level of material comfort and their energies would 
no longer be devoted exclusively to the ‘struggle for riches’, but instead to moral and 
mental cultivation, as well as to a better and more equitable distribution of wealth.
90  In 
the stationary state, he envisioned that the current three-class structure, as well as the 
economic institutions that were closely associated with it, might be forced to change, 
and subsequently two groups would emerge: ‘a well-paid and affluent body of 
labourers’ and ‘a much larger body of persons than at present, not only exempt from the 
coarser toils, but with sufficient leisure, both physical and mental’. This condition of 
society, Mill asserted, was ‘the most desirable condition of society’.
91 
In Book IV, Chapter VII of the Principles, entitled ‘On the Probable Futurity of the 
Labouring Classes’, Mill compared what he called the ‘theory of dependence and 
protection’ with that ‘of self-dependence’. The former claimed that the poor should be 
regulated on their behalf by the higher classes which were expected to ‘think for them, 
and to take the responsibility of their lot’.
92  According to this theory, the rich were to 
the poor what adults were to children. Mill criticized this theory on the following 
grounds. First, such an ideal class of the rich had almost never existed. He stated: ‘All 
privileged and powerful classes, as such, have used their power in the interest of their 
own selfishness.’
93  Second, and more crucially, the working classes of such advanced 
                                                 
89  JSM, PPE, CW, iii, 756. 
90  Ibid., 754. It should be noted that Mill thought that increased production was an important object for 
less-advanced countries, for a certain degree of material opulence constituted a precondition for mental 
and intellectual improvement. (ibid., 755.) 
91  Ibid., 755. 
92  Ibid., 759. 
93  Ibid., 760.   - 176 - 
countries as Britain no longer accepted ‘the patriarchal or paternal system of 
government’.
94  Having taken their interests into their own hands, they had realized that 
their interests were opposite to, not identical with, those of the rich. Thanks to the 
diffusion of wealth and the subsequent diffusion of knowledge through society, they 
were well enough cultivated not to be treated like children, and thereby should be 
regarded as partakers ‘in all discussions on matters of general interest’.
95   
In contrast, the theory of self-dependence would suit the labouring classes of 
civilized nations who had been far enough disciplined to improve their condition on 
their own. This view was associated with his view that local self-government was 
essential for the education and welfare of the people. As an indispensable school for 
democracy, it would permit the people to acquire invaluable experience of working 
towards common ends, and introduce them to the skills and ethics of collaboration.
96 
As a result of the increasing political power and importance of the labouring class, 
Mill pointed out, they had not only stepped up their demands for a new mode of 
distribution of the produce of their labours to their advantage, but had also come to be 
discontented with ‘the condition of labouring for wages as their ultimate state’.
97 
Importantly, his vision for the stationary state and the future of the labouring classes 
was based on the premise that current social and political arrangements, as well as the 
current moral and intellectual state of people, were provisional and needed to be 
improved. He thought that, ‘Mankind are capable of a far greater amount of public spirit 
than the present age is accustomed to suppose possible. History bears witness to the 
success with which large bodies of human beings may be trained to feel the public 
interest their own.’
98  He thought that associations, which aimed not ‘for the mere 
private benefit of the individual members, but for the promotion of the co-operative 
cause’, would contribute to the improvement of condition of the people.
99  According to 
Mill, ‘association … of interests, is the school’ in which the ‘excellences’ of ‘public 
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spirit, generous sentiments, or true justice and equality’ could be nurtured.
100  His 
theory of self-dependence did not imply that man should be isolated. Rather, 
improvement should aim not ‘to place human beings in a condition in which they will 
be able to do without one another, but to enable them to work with or for one another in 
relations not involving dependence’.
101  The first form of association which had been 
practised was that of labourers with capitalists, in which everyone who contributed to 
the work in any form had a partner’s interest in it according to the value of his 
contribution.
102  If mankind continued to improve, Mill expected that this association 
would be taken over by the association of labourers among themselves, which would be 
‘on terms of equality, collectively owning the capital with which they carry on their 
operations, and working under managers elected and removable by themselves’.
103  He 
admitted that such social systems as socialism and communism would not succeed in 
the present condition of society where man’s actions were to a great degree dominated 
by the wealth-maximization motive, but believed that they might be established in the 
future when human character had been greatly improved. 
 
5. Concluding Note 
Mill admitted that the Principles ‘was far more rapidly executed than the Logic’. He 
took only about two years to write it; he commenced writing in the autumn of 1845 and 
it was ‘ready for the press before the end of 1847’.
104  Indeed, he might have completed 
it even more rapidly had famine not struck Ireland in 1846, and sparked the controversy 
over the Irish land question. In order to take part in the debate, Mill suspended work on 
the Principles, and contributed a series of articles on the Irish land problem, which 
appeared in the Morning Chronicle between October 1846 and January 1847. Mill’s 
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Morning Chronicle series can be seen as a test case of what he was about to attempt in 
the Principles. In other words, it was an attempt to apply his political, social, and 
economic theories, combined with an expansive moral vision, to an urgent practical 
question of the time. In the next chapter, I examine Mill’s contribution to the debate on 
the Irish land question at the time of the Great Famine in Ireland, a project to which he 
deployed many of the ideas that he had developed over the previous twenty years. 
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Chapter 9. J. S. Mill and the Politics of the Irish Land Question 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses J. S. Mill’s involvement with the Irish land question at the 
time of the Great Famine of 1846, which was caused by the failure of the potato crop. 
By the term ‘Irish land question’, I loosely indicate the issue of the structure and 
relationships of landownership, landholding, and the use of the soil in Ireland, an issue 
which became a matter of political controversy in early nineteenth-century Britain.
1 
The Irish land question was itself an aspect of a larger issue, ‘the Irish question’. On the 
eve of the Great Famine, Benjamin Disraeli spoke as follows in the House of Commons:   
you have a starving population, an absentee aristocracy, and an alien church, and in 
addition, the weakest executive in the world. That was the Irish question. … The 
connexion with England thus became the cause of the present state of Ireland. If the 
connexion with England prevented a revolution, and a revolution were the only 
remedy, England logically was in the odious position of being the cause of all the 
misery in Ireland. … That was the Irish question in its integrity.
2 
The land question was regarded as a central aspect of the political and constitutional, as 
well as economic, relationship between Britain and Ireland. Accordingly, a solution to 
the Irish land question would first be necessary in order to solve the Irish question as a 
whole. 
Suspending his work on Principles of Political Economy, Mill exclusively devoted 
his time and effort to a series of articles on the problems of the Irish land system, which 
was published in a liberal periodical, the Morning Chronicle, during the Irish famine of 
1846. Philip Bull states that Mill was one of the first thinkers who ‘placed the question 
of Irish agricultural land tenure in a wider context embodying not only Irish cultural and 
social factors and English legal assumptions but also the general principles of political 
economy as then understood’.
3  As the topics Mill discussed were economic, and Mill 
drew on his knowledge of political economy, Mill’s involvement with the Irish land 
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question in the mid-1840s has been examined mainly from the perspective of his 
economics.
4  Nevertheless, given Mill’s aspiration to create a new science of society in 
the 1830s and 1840s, his Morning Chronicle series is better understood from the point 
of view of his science of society, in which political ethology was hugely important, and 
not from the point of view of political economy alone.
5 
In the first section of this chapter, I examine how early nineteenth-century 
intellectuals thought about the nature of the Irish question and how they saw ‘Irish 
national character’. In this context, ‘Irish national character’ referred to the traits of the 
Irish peasantry from a social point of view, even though the fact that the great mass of 
them were Roman Catholic in religion made the situation complex. Political economists 
especially had a huge interest in the Irish question, and their ‘scientific’ perspective was 
vital in their analysis of its economic aspects. A remedy for the Irish distress that most 
political economists put forward was the capitalization of Irish agriculture through the 
introduction of English capital, a policy proposal which Mill later criticized. 
In the second section, I present an account of Mill’s views on the Irish condition and 
his proposed solution for the Irish land question. He examined the question not only 
from an economic point of view, but also from an ethological point of view; he stressed 
how artificial social systems, including the land system, could contribute to the 
formation of national character. This section shows that both his diagnosis of the Irish 
distress and his proposed remedy for it were firmly grounded on the theoretical views of 
man and society, which, as I have shown in previous chapters, had been gradually 
developed in the 1830s and early 1840s. 
 
2. The Irish Question and Irish National Character 
i 
The experience of colonization and plantation cast a long shadow over modern Irish 
history. Even though the penal laws against Catholics, which were enacted between 
1667 and 1705, had gradually been abandoned in the later eighteenth and early 
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nineteenth centuries, the repeal of these laws did not reverse the near-monopoly of land 
ownership and political power in the hands of the Protestant elite. By the terms of the 
Act of Union of 1800, the British government and parliament took on direct 
responsibility for the condition of Ireland, but they had little interest in its improvement. 
Rather, economic and social divergence between England and Ireland increased after 
the Union. Britain’s misgovernment made Ireland more vulnerable to social disaster. 
Eventually, however, the state of Ireland became a source of serious concern to the 
British government from the points of view of political control and military security. 
Alongside this growing concern, an awareness of the deteriorating socio-economic 
condition of Ireland, such as agricultural and industrial stagnation and overpopulation, 
leading to social instability, came to be increasingly felt by British politicians and 
intellectuals.
6 
In discussions of Irish national character, one of the fundamental questions was 
whether the Irish national character was due to the history of oppression and 
demoralization by England, or to heredity. The clash between those who advocated 
environmentalism and those who advocated biological determinism came to a head on 
this issue. Early nineteenth-century environmentalist arguments on national character 
originated in the tradition of philosophical history which flourished in late 
eighteenth-century Scotland. The posthumous, third edition of John Millar’s An 
Historical View of the English Government was published in 1803.
7  This work 
contained a section on ‘The Government of Ireland’ which was characterized by 
historical environmentalism. Millar argued against the view held by many of his 
contemporaries that the ‘average’ Irish character was inconsistent with the requirements 
of economic and social development, and that the Irish were inherently ‘disgraced by a 
greater portion of barbarity and ferocity, than the rude inhabitants of other countries’. 
The manners of the Irish ‘exhibit that striking resemblance of lines and features, which 
may be remarked in the inhabitants of every country before the advancement of arts and 
civilization’. Irish national character was to a large extent a product of the ‘acts of 
injustice’ which had been perpetrated by successive English governments. Significantly, 
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Millar laid little emphasis on the religious factor in discussing Irish national character. 
Many contributors to the Edinburgh Review followed Millar in emphasizing the 
importance of government in the shaping of national character. Francis Jeffrey, for 
example, in a review of Millar’s Historical View, expounded Millar’s approach to 
national character; thereafter James Mill adopted Millar’s view on Irish national 
character.
8  The reviewers often claimed that the dark side of the Irish national character 
was to a great extent due to oppression by the English. Hence, the backwardness of 
Ireland was not to be ascribed to inherited national character. James Mackintosh, for 
example, stated that English oppression took away ‘skill and industry, hope and pride’ 
from the Irish Catholics.
9  It is worth emphasizing that, even though they were 
conscious of the significance of the Catholic question,
10  most of the Edinburgh 
Reviewers, like Millar, saw the Irish question as essentially a social and economic, and 
not a religious one. The repeal of the remaining discriminatory laws against Catholics in 
1829, though it did little for the improvement of the social and economic condition of 
the Irish people, reinforced this trend. Opposing a religious or fatalist view, a 
‘scientific’ attitude, grounded in political economy, helped intellectuals look to the 
nature of the problem and suggest remedies. 
 
ii 
In order to understand Irish economic history, historians have examined a number of 
causal factors: geographical, political, social, institutional, ethnic, demographic, and so 
on.
11  One of the most influential explanations for Irish economic backwardness places 
the responsibility on the Irish land tenure system. In fact, the land question has been a 
contentious issue since the early nineteenth century. In this view, Irish economic 
distress is attributed to the insecurity of tenure of the tenants, which led to 
under-investment, and in turn to low incomes in agriculture. The so-called ‘land tenure 
hypothesis’ was put forward by travellers, administrators, agricultural reformers, as well 
as political economists, in the first half of the nineteenth century. This hypothesis had a 
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crucial influence on British policies towards Ireland during and after the Great 
Famine.
12 
Among early nineteenth-century British intellectuals, especially political economists, 
there was a consensus that the miserable state of Ireland was to a great degree caused by 
its unproductive agriculture, even though there were disagreements on the remedies for 
it. As early as 1808 and 1809, Thomas Robert Malthus examined the rapidly increasing 
population in Ireland.
13  He thought that overpopulation in Ireland was due to the Irish 
reliance on potatoes as the food staple, and then identified British misrule as the cause 
of the Irish reliance on potatoes. He claimed the problem would be solved by ‘the 
abolition of the Catholic code, and the improvement of government’.
14  He regarded 
overpopulation in Ireland as the cause of the high rents which burdened the Irish 
tenantry, and he saw the Irish land system as an evil in so far as it allowed the number 
of poor people to multiply to dangerous levels.
15  Nevertheless, he thought that 
economic development and the subsequent improvement of social conditions could be 
achieved ‘through the retention of that system [of landed property], and the adjustment 
of Irish agriculture to the capitalist type of mixed farming’.
16  Accordingly, he argued 
that the consolidation of holdings and the subsequent conversion of the cottier into a 
wage-labourer, which would deter improvident marriages and thereby rapid population 
growth, would be necessary. In addition, he feared that Ireland could not support its 
current population on the land, and looked for the development of manufacturing 
industry and the subsequent redeployment of population. By the mid-1810s, most of 
Malthus’s ideas had been widely accepted by political economists in Britain.
17   
Grounded on Malthus’s principle of population, as well as on Ricardo’s arguments 
on capital accumulation and rent, most British political economists claimed that the 
widespread subdivision of land was not desirable. John Ramsay McCulloch contributed 
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an essay on the ‘Cottage System’ to the third volume of the Supplement to the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Editions of the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1819, where he doubted 
that ‘the letting of small farms and patches of ground’ would encourage the 
improvement of the condition of the people.
18  Such a use of land, to his mind, 
contradicted the laws of political economy. Subdivision of land was harmful in so far as 
it disturbed the accumulation of capital and the division of labour, while it created a 
surplus and indolent population. He employed the examples of Ireland and France to 
support his claim, and referred to political economists such as Arthur Young and 
Edward Wakefield, as well as Ricardo, as authorities who shared his view.
19 
In the 1820s, a modest revival in corn production in Ireland led political economists 
to hope for an increase in agricultural productivity at a rate greater than that of the 
growth of population. However, they thought at the same time that this improvement 
would be unsustainable without structural change. Accordingly, they gave a high 
priority to capital investment in land. A re-organization of landholding which swept 
away the cottier system was vital, since only large-scale capitalist farming was efficient. 
The notion of the ‘Anglicization’ of Irish agriculture in terms of the introduction of 
English capital was central to the vision of most political economists of the day. The 
crucial element of Anglicization lay in the introduction into Ireland of a tripartite 
division of labour between landlords, capitalist farmers, and wage-labourers. 
Most British political economists thought that it was the landlords’ duty to reform 
their estates, adopting their traditional paternalist role, but modified by capitalist 
motives. Hence, they criticized the landlords for not acting more decisively to 
encourage improvement along the lines of a modern, capitalist economy. They were 
clear in their view about the nature of the problem: they believed that there was a cycle 
in which excessive population on the land consumed a disproportionate proportion of its 
produce. The consequence of this was that wealth could not increase, nor capital 
accumulate, in order to afford other means of employment. This in turn further bound 
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the population to the land. They thought that the problem in Ireland was the want of 
employment, which produced subsequent starvation and discontent. According to an 
English traveller, Henry David Inglis, ‘Men who are unable to turn to any business but 
agriculture, will agree to pay any rent, so long as want of employment prevails to so 
enormous an extent.’
20  The solution which the political economists advanced was that 
landlords should take responsibility for turning their own estates into more efficient 
agricultural units: farms should be made more compact and capital invested to secure 
more profitable farming conditions. What was needed to improve the condition of 
Ireland was, in their view, the will of landlords to improve. The absentee landlord often 
became the target of their criticism, not because absenteeism was thought to be 
incompatible with economic efficiency, but because it meant the abrogation of the 
paternalist role that political economists expected the landlord to take.
21   
 
iii 
During his visit to London in 1835, Camillo Cavour, a leading political figure in 
mid-nineteenth-century Italy, witnessed Nassau Senior, Alexis de Tocqueville, and 
Gustav de Beaumont discussing landed property: 
I found Mr. Senior walking in the garden with M. Tocqueville and M. Beaumont, 
discussing the great subject of the division of property. An extraordinary thing was 
that the radical Englishman was in favour of large ownership and the legitimist 
Frenchman of small ownership. Mr. Senior thinks that the small proprietor has 
neither security nor comfort, and that it is much better for him to be in the employ of 
a large proprietor and have nothing to fear from bad luck or bad seasons. M. 
Tocqueville refuted his argument very well both on moral and material grounds.
22 
In general terms, Tocqueville emphasized the importance of landed property in the 
formation of social and political habits. In Democracy in America, he examined the way 
in which the distribution of landed property affected the condition of society. He 
thought that the laws of inheritance had an ‘unbelievable influence on the social state of 
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peoples’; power was diffused where the law required landed property to be divided into 
equal shares, and this wide distribution of property provided the foundation for 
democracy.
23  In an essay which he contributed, at Mill’s request, to the London and 
Westminster Review, he wrote that there was ‘nothing … more favourable to the reign 
of democracy than the division of the land into small independent properties’.
24 
Tocqueville and Beaumont travelled through Ireland in July and August 1835. 
Beaumont visited Ireland again in the summer of 1837 to gather material for a work on 
Ireland. While Tocqueville did not publish any work on Ireland, Beaumont published 
Ireland, Social, Political, and Religious in 1839, in which he gave an analysis of Irish 
society on the eve of the Great Famine.
25  Even though Beaumont was an Anglophile 
and attempted to defend British policies in Ireland, he could not help concluding that the 
misery of Ireland was due largely to oppression by British governments. He began his 
book by stating: ‘The dominion of the English in Ireland from the invasion of that 
country in 1169 to the close of the last century, has been nothing but a tyranny.’
26  In a 
devastating critique of British policy in Ireland, he questioned why a government with 
such enlightened institutions tolerated such oppression, referring to the desperation of 
the Catholics, the abusive land system, and the misery of famine. Beaumont observed 
that Ireland’s English conquerors appropriated lands and bestowed on themselves feudal 
privileges, which prevented the development of an indigenous aristocracy and middle 
class by depriving the Irish of any commercial or territorial foundation on which these 
two classes could rise. The consequence was that an Irish municipal society could not 
form. To his mind, since their earliest history, the Irish people had never been able to 
achieve the circumstances in which commerce, liberty, and community identity could 
develop and thereby form a powerful union among themselves. In examining Ireland’s 
sorry history and current miserable condition, he paid attention to the land system in 
Ireland, and subsequently suggested the introduction of peasant proprietorship as a 
means of improving the condition of Irish society as well as her agriculture. He 
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observed that the Irish economy was divided between wealthy landowners who 
expatriated profits and capital to England on the one hand, and impoverished tenant 
farmers, most of whom were forced to survive in rueful conditions, on the other. 
Significantly, Beaumont’s interest in the Irish land system was not from an economic, 
but rather from a political point of view. He was concerned with the question of the 
relationship between land-holding, locality, liberty, and identity. He argued that wealth 
could be derived from small and medium holdings when a free economy was allowed to 
develop. These holdings would be the domain of a middle class, and it was out of this 
class that a conscious awareness of freedom and independence would emerge.   
Continental authors, including Beaumont, provided Mill with a different perspective, 
both complementary and critical, from those of British authors. Contrary to the 
mainstream view of British political economists, J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi, a 
Genevan political economist and economic historian, pointed out the advantages of 
peasant proprietorship as it existed on the Continent.
27  A Prussian historian, Frederick 
von Raumer, pointed to Prussia where small farming had had a hugely favourable effect, 
and proposed the introduction of the same system into Ireland.
28  Along with 
Continental thinkers, British travellers who personally observed and thus were familiar 
with the Continental situation brought a further perspective to the British debate. One 
such traveller whose work Mill admired was Samuel Laing.
29  In his Notes of a 
Traveller, published in 1842, Laing criticized the conventional view held by most 
British political economists that a wide subdivision of land was not desirable for the 
development of society. He accused British political economists, such as Arthur Young 
and McCulloch, of having a ‘narrow local view and prejudice’.
30  Based on his own 
observations in various Continental countries, Laing concluded that the subdivision of 
land and peasant proprietorship could check overpopulation, for under such a system, 
the peasant wisely delayed marriage until he had inherited or purchased sufficient land 
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to support his family. In addition, he insisted that small farmers were so industrious that 
their holdings were in a garden-like state of cultivation.
31  He stated that France was 
improving the condition of her people under ‘this very system of subdivision of 
property’, while the condition of the English labouring class was worsening with the 
progress of capitalization.
32   
The works illustrating the advantages of peasant proprietorship which attracted 
Mill’s interest included the following: Henry David Inglis’s Switzerland, the South of 
France and the Pyrenees (1831); William Howitt’s Rural and Domestic Life of 
Germany (1842); and George Poulett Scrope’s How is Ireland to be governed? (first 
edition in 1834; second, 1846). The latter proposed the reclamation of waste land, 
which Mill would also support in his Morning Chronicle series.
33  Moreover, in the 
mid-1840s, William Thomas Thornton, Mill’s colleague at East India House, published 
two works, Over-Population and its Remedy, in 1845, and A Plea for Peasant 
Proprietors, with the Outlines of a Plan for their Establishment in Ireland, in 1848. In 
these works, which were similar in substance, Thornton argued strongly for the 
subdivision of the land, and proposed the reclamation of waste land by Irish peasants, 
severely criticizing the views of McCulloch regarding the effect of a wider distribution 
of landed property on the increase of population. 
As far as Thornton’s works were concerned, Alexander Bain stated in his biography 
of Mill as follows: ‘I believe that it was his friend W. J. [sic] Thornton that first 
awakened him to the question of Peasant Properties. Thornton’s “Plea” was published 
before the Political Economy came out, and Mill read the proof sheets as it went 
through the press.’
34  In one of his Morning Chronicle articles, Mill acknowledged that 
he had been influenced by Thornton’s work.
35  As Bruce Kinzer, who has recently 
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examined in detail whether and how Thornton influenced Mill on the land question, 
points out, what Mill had in mind, as far as the Morning Chronicle series was concerned, 
was not A Plea, but Over-Population.
36  Thornton’s Plea had not been written when 
Mill was writing the Morning Chronicle articles, though Thornton had finished writing 
Over-Population by December 1845 and presented a copy of it to Mill early in 1846. 
Having said that, this does not mean that Thornton’s Over-Population played a crucial 
role in Mill’s conversion to an advocacy of peasant proprietorship. Rather, it reinforced 
Mill’s conviction. His receptiveness to peasant proprietorship had been shaped by his 
close examination of the works on Continental systems of land tenure by both 
Continental and British thinkers. All the works mentioned above helped Mill recognize 
the advantages of peasant proprietorship.
37 
 
3. J. S. Mill and the Irish Land Question 
i 
J. S. Mill’s involvement with the Irish question spanned more than forty years and 
embraced a variety of issues.
38  His involvement with the Irish land question at the time 
of the Great Famine in the mid-1840s was of particular importance. In 1845 he began 
writing Principles of Political Economy, but he temporarily put aside this project in the 
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autumn of 1846 in order to contribute to the emerging debate on the Irish land question. 
On the occasion of the Great Famine of 1846, Mill found a propitious, as well as an 
urgent, opportunity to present a programme based on the principles that he had been 
developing. He published a series of forty-three articles, entitled ‘The condition of 
Ireland’, in the Morning Chronicle from 5 October 1846 to 7 January 1847.
39  The 
arrival of the potato blight in Ireland had been reported in early September 1845. Even 
though the rest of Europe had suffered to some degree from the potato blight, Ireland’s 
reliance on the potato as a staple food made its effects more severe. The Great Famine 
revealed that the current system in Ireland was no longer sustainable, and opened up a 
new range of possibilities of reform. In other words, radical reform, which had long 
been desired by critics of the existing system, now seemed practicable given the 
urgency of the situation. Mill recalled in his Autobiography: 
the stern necessities of the time seemed to afford a chance of gaining attention for 
what appeared to me the only mode of combining relief to immediate destitution 
with permanent improvement of the social and economic condition of the Irish 
people.
40 
He thought that the most important institutional cause that had exacerbated the famine 
was the so-called ‘cottier-tenant system’ or ‘cottier system’, the system of land tenure 
that had been widely diffused in Ireland. According to Mill, ‘A cottier system may be 
defined, that in which the produce of the land is divided between two sharers – a 
landlord on one side, and labourers on the other; the competition of the labourers being 
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the regulating principle of the division.’
41  As Mill was well aware, this system did not 
inevitably lead to the impoverishment of the agricultural class. Nevertheless, it 
produced calamitous results in Ireland where there had been overpopulation and cottier 
tenants were in a very vulnerable position, being subject to English landlords. In 
mid-nineteenth-century Ireland, overpopulation resulted in the further segmentation of 
land and soaring rent, and farmers, growing potato as their own staple food, were forced 
to export corn to England, even during the Great Famine. 
Mill saw the cottier-tenant system as ‘the grand economical, as well as moral, evil 
of Ireland’.
42  Tolerated by a reckless and improvident landlord class, this system 
produced overpopulation and savage competition for subsistence. Furthermore, it 
produced a habitual disaffection from the law and destroyed all motivation to industry 
and enterprise. His proposed solution, as I shall illustrate below, was to replace this 
system with an alternative land system, namely peasant proprietorship, which he 
thought would contribute to the improvement of the moral, as well as economic, 
condition of the Irish people.   
Significantly, Mill was firmly convinced that his proposal, as put forward in the 
Morning Chronicle series, was by no means utopian. Policies to improve the Irish 
condition had been discussed by many of his contemporaries, but some of them were 
obviously impracticable. One of the most popular views, put forward especially by 
political economists, was that Ireland could prosper through the introduction of 
large-scale farming carried on by capitalist tenants, and the simultaneous conversion of 
the cottier population into hired labourers. This policy, however, would not have been 
successful unless accompanied by such measures as clearances, organized emigration, 
and the creation of alternative employment. Mill thought that this would be 
impracticable. In contrast, he was convinced that his plan was, though apparently 
radical, not only theoretically well-grounded, but also practicable in the context of 
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mid-1840s Ireland. 
 
ii 
In the Morning Chronicle series, Mill proposed ‘the formation of peasant properties 
on the waste lands of Ireland’ as a potential remedy for Irish distress.
43  In advocating 
the reclamation of waste land, he developed an argument against such alternative 
proposed remedies as the enactment of the new Poor Law, the capitalization of Irish 
agriculture by the introduction of English capital, the fixity of tenancy, and the 
emigration of the Irish people to the United States, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere. 
The Irish Poor Law, enacted in 1838, had introduced provision for the 
non-able-bodied poor in the workhouse and employment of the able-bodied poor in 
public works. At the time of the Great Famine, ‘A poor law, with extensive out-door 
relief to the able-bodied’ was being widely suggested.
44  While The Times, among 
others, argued in favour of it,
45  Mill criticized it in his Morning Chronicle series. His 
opposition to outdoor relief was based on several grounds. First, he thought that it 
would disturb the development of private industries, for the poor flocked to outdoor 
relief which provided easy money and work. Second, as the poor realized that they 
could get money whether or not they worked, they would be disinclined to work. Third, 
it would demoralize the peasant. It had harmful moral effects, in that it would ‘break 
down all the salutary barriers which the law erects to prevent the people from making 
what ought to be an extreme resource an habitual one’.
46   
In relation to the Poor Law scheme, Mill held an unfavourable opinion not only of 
outdoor relief, but also of public works, under the existing system. In November 1845, 
Peel’s government, faced with an unprecedented food shortage among the Irish 
peasantry, purchased ₤100,000 worth of corn from the United States and sold it at a low 
price. Peel also launched public works and repealed the Corn Laws.
47  These measures 
seemed sufficient, but in the summer of 1846, when the potato blight struck Ireland, 
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Russell’s government, which had come to power on 30 July 1846, failed to respond 
adequately. Influenced by a laissez-faire belief that the market would provide the food 
needed, Russell’s government halted government food supply and public works other 
than relief in the form of wages from public employment.
48  To Mill’s mind, public 
works were of little use in improving the condition of the Irish peasant. He stated: ‘The 
best which will have been done with any part of this money [i.e. public money] is to 
drain and otherwise improve land for the benefit of the landlords: the worst, to squander 
it in jobs, or in useless or superfluous “public works”’. Even at best, ‘it appears more 
probable that drainage by public money will be confined to lands already under culture, 
and will not increase the quantity, but only the productiveness, of the available soil; so 
that the competition for land remaining in unabated intensity, no one will gain but the 
landlord’.
49   
In Mill’s view, some intellectuals and politicians both in England and Ireland were 
correct to recognize that the evils were to a large extent caused by the cottier-tenant 
system, but wrong to claim that the transformation of Irish agriculture into large-scale 
farming in terms of the introduction of English capital was the solution. Mill thought 
that this proposal was so counter-productive and inhumane that it would make the 
situation worse. It would require a massive expropriation of land, and subsequently the 
peasantry would be cleared off it, with no alternative employment available. It would 
not, therefore, contribute to the improvement of the condition of the Irish peasantry.
50 
To his mind,   
The introduction of English farming is another word for the clearing system. It must 
begin by ejecting the peasantry of a tract of country from the land they occupy, and 
handing it over en bloc to a capitalist-farmer. The number of those whom he would 
require to retain as labourers would be far short of the number he displaced.
51 
Mill argued that ‘Improvement in the English sense, improvement by the more powerful 
instruments and processes of capitalist-farmers, though it raises a far greater net produce 
than the Irish system, yet from its very nature employs fewer hands.’ This was not 
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appropriate for Ireland, where the pressure of overpopulation was acute.
52 
Mill was sympathetic towards the Irish demand for tenant-right as a means of 
mitigating the cottier system, and so admitted the merits of fixity of tenure, which had 
been proposed by the Repeal Association founded in 1840. Mill thought that such a 
measure would be ‘a real and a through remedy’. It would be able to convert ‘an 
indolent and reckless into a laborious, provident, and careful people’.
53  Nevertheless, 
he did not give his full support to it, for he thought that it would involve ‘a violent 
disturbance of legal rights, amounting almost to a social revolution’.
54  In order to make 
such a radical change politically feasible, it would need a prior change in the British 
public mind. In addition, he did not believe that it would contribute to easing the 
pressure of overpopulation. Instead, he hoped for milder and more efficient measures, 
that would make such a revolutionary step unnecessary. 
As far as emigration was concerned, even though he appreciated the merits of 
colonization in general, Mill opposed the proposal of the mass emigration of the Irish 
people to North America and Australia on several grounds: it would be too costly; it 
would be of a compulsory nature; and it ignored the fact that the Irish people were not 
yet fit to be ‘missionaries of civilization’.
55  Furthermore, he thought that those 
advocating mass emigration looked away from the real root of the evil, namely the 
system of cottier tenancy. As long as the system of cottier tenancy existed, there was no 
guarantee that the remaining Irish would not be as miserable as ever. To Mill’s mind, 
advocates of mass emigration as a remedy for Irish distress averted their eyes from the 
nature of the problem.
56  In other words, they failed to understand that, in Mill’s words, 
‘the people are there, and the problem is not how to improve the country, but how it can 
be improved by and for its present inhabitants’.
57     
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iii 
Having rejected the other proposed remedies, Mill presented his own plan to 
improve the condition of the Irish peasants, the so-called plan of ‘waste land 
reclamation’. He was convinced that it could achieve both relief and reconstruction at 
the same time. The government would buy up waste land in Ireland, and reclaim it 
through a public works project. The land would then be distributed to Irish peasants, 
either through outright grants-in-deed, or through permanent tenures under quit-rent. 
Mill believed that, ‘Neither the economical nor the moral evils admit of any 
considerable alleviation while that baneful system [i.e. cottier tenancy] continues.’
58 
As I have shown above, in the early nineteenth century, many British political 
economists, including such authorities as Malthus, McCulloch, and Young, tended to 
see peasant proprietorship in a negative light. It was thought not to benefit from 
economies of scale and the division of labour.
59  In addition, it had been argued that in 
peasant society, property, including land, was usually divided equally among heirs on 
the death of the holder, which encouraged early marriage and abundant procreation, 
which then accelerated population pressure. The young Mill accepted these views. By 
the mid-1840s, however, he had revised his understanding of peasant proprietorship and 
became its ardent advocate, thanks largely to the wide-ranging study of land systems in 
a variety of nations.
60  A number of works which argued, with supporting examples, in 
favour of peasant proprietorship persuaded Mill to believe that peasant proprietorship 
could be economically successful in that it could achieve a significant degree of 
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agricultural efficiency, and at the same time guard against overpopulation.
61  Mill 
referred, for example, to France, where small farming was widely diffused, as follows: 
Every authentic statistical account of the condition of her industry and of her people 
has shown, and continues to show, that within that period [i.e. the last few decades] 
the state of her rural population, who are four-fifths of the whole, has improved in 
every particular; that they are better housed, better clothed, better and more 
abundantly fed; that their agriculture has improved in quality; that all the 
productions of the soil have multiplied beyond precedent; that the wealth of the 
country has advanced, and advances with increasing rapidity, and the population 
with increasing slowness.
62 
He contrasted the distressed state of Ireland in which cottier tenancy was widespread 
with various Continental nations where peasant proprietorship had produced good moral 
effects in improving the condition of people. 
Mill gave the highest priority to a scheme of waste land reclamation: ‘After the 
people are saved from present starvation, which must be presupposed in all plans, the 
formation of a peasant proprietary should, in our opinion, be the first object; all other 
things are of secondary importance.’
63  To his mind, ‘All other schemes for the 
improvement of Ireland are schemes for getting rid of the people.’
64  He insisted that the 
government should take the land that had remained unused and pay only the shillings 
that it was worth. Crucially, Mill was convinced that it would not be unjust to landlords 
if the government compulsorily bought out the unused land at a price which reflected 
the present value, not at a speculative price, ‘grounded on the improvements which are 
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only to be effected by means of the purchase’.
65  In a Morning Chronicle article, Mill 
criticized the landed aristocracy for their ‘defence of an imaginary idol called Rights of 
Property’.
66  He was at his most radical when rebutting the claims of the landed interest. 
Mill had been hostile towards the landed aristocracy since the 1820s. In the mid-1830s, 
for example, he stated that the landed interest successfully made others bear their 
burdens by enacting laws to force people to buy their produce at high prices and by 
exempting their land from taxation.
67   
Mill argued that, if schemes of land improvement were launched, based on the 
expenditure of public money, it should be on condition that the ‘tenants of the land so 
improved’ would be given ‘a permanent proprietary interest in the soil’.
68  Mill 
recognized the good economic effect of having property in land. In his opinion, 
‘Property in the soil has a sort of magic power of engendering industry, perseverance, 
forethought in an agricultural people’,
69  and that ‘the feeling of proprietorship’ was a 
‘never-failing source of local attachments’.
70  He thought that such a justification from 
the viewpoint of economic efficiency was well grounded on human experience. 
Nevertheless, he thought that an improvement in economic efficiency was not a 
sufficient justification for land reform, and that a further ethological justification was 
needed. He reiterated the point that the reform of the economic system should also 
contribute to the moral improvement of people; without such moral effects, the reform 
in the economic system would not be efficient, and it would end in failure. He stated: 
‘Without a change in the people, the most beneficent change in their mere outward 
circumstances would not last a generation. … You will never change the people but by 
changing the external motives which act on them, and shape their way of life from the 
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cradle to the grave.’
71 
As John Robson states, Mill thought that property was ‘Essential to achieving and 
maintaining civilization’.
72  Peasant proprietorship, which secured tenure, would make 
the Irish people ‘not just better farmers but better people’.
73  Mill emphasized ‘how high 
a rank among civilizing agents belongs to the wide diffusion of property in land’.
74 
From an ethological viewpoint, he found good moral effects in peasant proprietorship. 
In other words, he was convinced that the conversion of the Irish land system into 
peasant proprietorship would contribute to the improvement of Irish national character. 
This was the most important reason why he argued for peasant proprietorship. In 
advocating the introduction of peasant proprietorship into Ireland, his ultimate aim was 
the improvement of the moral state of the Irish people. Peasant proprietorship was, to 
his mind, ‘a measure of social reform and moral regeneration, a means of abolishing the 
worst of all forms of landed tenure, and raising up a class of peasantry to be an example 
and a guiding influence to the rest’.
75 
Mill’s proposals belonged to the environmentalist tradition of interpretation in 
relation to the formation of the Irish national character. He admitted that the current 
Irish national character was far from desirable, stating that, ‘The grand fundamental 
defects in the character and habits of the Irish peasants are want of industry and want of 
providence.’
76  However, his point was to claim that, ‘The faults of the Irish peasantry 
are the result of circumstances’,
77  and not due to heredity, and subsequently that Irish 
national character could be improved.
78  Once peasant proprietorship had been 
                                                 
71  JSM, ‘Ireland [20]’ (19 November 1846), ibid, 955. 
72  Robson (1998) 357. 
73  Ibid., 360. 
74  JSM, ‘Ireland [32]’ (15 December 1846), CW, xxiv, 997. See also JSM, ‘Ireland [25]’ (2 December 
1846), ibid., 974. 
75  JSM, ‘Ireland [32]’ (15 December 1846), ibid., 996. 
76  JSM, ‘Ireland [20]’ (19 November 1846), ibid., 955-6. 
77  JSM, ‘Ireland [34]’ (17 December 1846), ibid., 1004. 
78  Mill stated: ‘The curse of this system [i.e. cottier-tenant system] is, that it destroys, more utterly than 
any other system of nominally free labour, all motive either to industry or to prudence. … A cottier-tenant 
system is essentially an anarchical system. Habitual disaffection to the law is almost inherent in it.’ (JSM, 
‘Ireland [3]’ (10 October 1846), ibid., 891.)   - 199 - 
introduced, the Irish farmers would acquire such virtues as industry, conscience, and 
independence. Peasant proprietorship would, therefore, ‘be not merely a sovereign 
remedy for Irish listlessness and indolence, but would do much to correct the still 
deeper seated and more intractable malady of Irish improvidence’.
79   
 
iv 
It is difficult to assess the actual effect of Mill’s articles on the British politics of the 
day,
80  but it is possible to understand the significance of his political ethology from his 
involvement in Irish affairs in the mid-1840s. Mill’s diagnosis of the state of the Irish 
people in the mid-1840s was that, even though they did not yet possess the qualities 
necessary for self-rule, they had been sufficiently cultivated to the point where their 
consent to be governed by others was not only desirable but also necessary. In the 
ladder of civilization, according to Mill, Ireland was distinct not only from the advanced 
nations, such as Britain and America, but also from the lower nations like India. In the 
lower stage of civilization, where the people were not capable of understanding their 
true interest, their consent to be governed was not necessarily required, and, therefore, 
despotism was justified. In contrast, Ireland, unlike India, was not fit for despotism, 
which was legitimate only for governing the people of low development and slaves.
81 
Hence, what Ireland needed were circumstances in which its people would attain such a 
suitable character that they would be capable of fulfilling the duties required by 
self-government, a government which would lead to the further improvement of their 
character.   
Mill believed that economic reform would create the conditions by which the Irish 
farmers would raise themselves up to a position of moral independence, akin to the 
process which Mill envisaged for the working class in England, where commerce and 
industry had been sufficiently developed. He thought that the main superiority of the 
remedies he proposed was not that they contributed to the improvement of Irish 
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agriculture, but that ‘they would surround the peasant with a new moral atmosphere; 
they would bring a set of motives to operate upon him which he has never before 
experienced, tending in the strongest manner to correct everything in his national 
character which needs correction’.
82  As I have shown, Mill held an environmentalist 
view that Irish national character was a reflection of the backward social condition of 
Ireland, which was due in turn to English misgovernment. This view implied that Irish 
national character could be changed through institutional reform. For Mill, the ultimate 
purpose of land reform was not ‘the improvement of Irish agriculture’ but ‘of the 
condition of the Irish people’.
83 
 
4. Concluding Note 
As time went on, the Irish distress deepened. By the beginning of December 1846, 
around 300,000 able-bodied people in Ireland were receiving relief in the form of wages 
from public employment.
84  The British government, however, was forced to recognize 
the failure of the public works policy.
85  The worst consequence of this relief was the 
demoralization of the Irish, who would work only for government wages, which were 
higher than any other.   
Mill’s Morning Chronicle series was intended to build up public support for his 
scheme. Its target was ‘the spirit of routine’, which was ‘an obstacle to good, almost as 
strong and far more universal than selfishness’.
86  He criticized the views of what he 
regarded as obsolete English political economists and the public acceptance of them. In 
spite of his great efforts, however, his proposed measures were not implemented by the 
British government. Nevertheless, Mill contended that his objective had, to some degree, 
been met by the late December. In a letter to Bain of 28 December 1846, he wrote:   
I continue to carry on the Pol. Econ. [i.e. Principles of Political Economy] as well as 
I can with the articles in the Chronicle. These last I may a little slacken now, having 
in a great measure, as far as may be judged by appearances, carried my point, viz., to 
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have the waste lands reclaimed and parcelled out in small properties among the best 
of the peasantry.
87   
The final article of Mill’s Morning Chronicle series was published on 7 January 1847, 
by which time he had resumed his work on Principles of Political Economy. 
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Chapter 10. Conclusion 
 
Among early nineteenth-century British thinkers, there was a widely accepted view 
that contemporary society was a commercial, civilized society, in which the influence of 
an emerging commercial class was rapidly increasing. J. S. Mill shared this view. In the 
late 1830s, Mill attempted to give a systematic and comprehensive analysis of civilized 
society in terms of the concept of civilization, a concept which reflected to a great 
extent his understanding of American, as well as British, society. He regarded the rise of 
the commercial, middle class as of great importance in characterizing contemporary 
society. He saw the excessive exercise of power by the majority and a subsequent 
excessive degree of social uniformity, which tended to repress individuality – a central 
theme in his later works and particularly in On Liberty – as inevitable consequences of 
the rise of the middle class. 
From the mid-1830s onwards, Mill attempted to tackle questions regarding political 
institutions by considering them in light of their relationship to the state of society to 
which they belonged.
1  He claimed that what was a desirable form of government 
depended on the condition of society; in the Logic, he stated that ‘the necessary 
correlation between the form of governments existing in any society and the 
contemporaneous state of civilization’ was ‘a natural law’ which was ascertained by 
Social Statics.
2   
Representative democracy, for example, was the most suitable form of government 
for the nations which had reached an advanced stage of civilization, such as the United 
States and Britain, where commerce and industry had been sufficiently developed, 
wealth and knowledge had widely been diffused, and the ability of people to co-operate 
had been refined.
3  In this stage of society, the people were supposed to have been 
cultivated to the point where they could practice self-government. Compared to these 
advanced nations, Ireland remained at a lower stage of civilization. Though cultivated to 
the point where their consent to be governed by others was both desirable and necessary, 
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the Irish people had not attained the qualities necessary for self-government. Based on 
such a diagnosis of the Irish social condition, Mill claimed that what Ireland needed was 
the creation of circumstances in which people would attain a suitable character and 
would be capable of fulfilling the duties required by self-government. 
Along with deepening his understanding of contemporary society, Mill aspired to 
create a new science of society which would inquire into the nature, process of 
historical change, and prospects of commercial society. This aspiration culminated in 
the early 1840s and in particular in the publication of A System of Logic in 1843. In 
examining Mill’s political thought between the late 1820s and the mid-1840s, I have 
concentrated on his projected science of society, which received its most detailed 
formulation in the Logic. It was here that his system of science of society, constituted by 
the General Science of Society – itself consisting of Social Dynamics and Social Statics 
– and Special Sociological Enquiries – including political ethology and political 
economy – was systematically and methodologically elaborated. Among the 
indispensable constituent sciences of his system, I gave particular attention to his 
projected sciences of history and of the formation of character, despite his failure to 
give a complete account of these sciences. The implications of his interest in history and 
the formation of character were more significant than scholars have assumed.   
Stefan Collini states that ‘Mill’s failure to implement the programme of Book VI [of 
the Logic]’ was due particularly to ‘[his] inability to make any progress with the 
Ethology’. He goes on to point out: ‘In [ethology’s] absence, Mill’s science of politics 
wore a decidedly traditional look.’
4  Nevertheless, a more complete understanding of 
Mill’s projected science of society, in which ethology, as well as history, occupies a 
crucial place, can shed new light on Mill’s mature works written in the 1850s and 1860s, 
including On Liberty (1859) and Considerations on Representative Government (1861). 
Even though Mill never completed his projected system of the science of society as he 
conceived it in the Logic, some vital ideas developed in this project were incorporated 
into his mature theory. In his mature works, he often referred to both laws of ethology 
and of history as if they had already been scientifically ascertained. Methodologically, 
the reason he could do so was because he employed such laws as ‘approximate 
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generalizations’. 
From the 1840s onwards, Mill’s concerns about the possibility of the degeneration 
of European civilization, concerns which he grounded on the scientific laws of social 
change, became more acute. He thought that the repression of individuality and 
excessive social uniformity – inevitably brought about by civilization – might result in 
social stagnation. In On Liberty, Mill stated that liberty had a utility for the life of the 
individual because it was an unfailing source of personal development, and it also had a 
social utility in that society would benefit from whatever sustained a diverse and rich 
life for its members. Mill’s advocacy of the freedom of opinion was grounded not only 
on his belief that it was vital in its own right in order to promote the happiness of the 
individual, but also because it constituted one of the necessary conditions for the 
progress of society. Mill argued that the diversity of opinion could produce social 
antagonism, which he thought was a necessary condition for the progress of society. 
In Considerations on Representative Government, Mill also expressed his concern 
regarding social degeneration: 
there is an incessant and ever-flowing current of human affairs towards the worse, 
consisting of all the follies, all the vices, all the negligences, indolences, and 
supinenesses of mankind; which is only controlled, and kept from sweeping all 
before it, by the exertions which some persons constantly, and others by fits, put 
forth in the direction of good and worthy objects. … the general tendency of things 
towards deterioration …, once begun, would proceed with increasing rapidity, and 
become more and more difficult to check, until it reached a state often seen in 
history, and in which many large portions of mankind even now grovel ….
5 
Mill’s insight into history led him to conclude that the progress of man and society was 
not a fact of nature. Further, he came to realize that the general tendency of society was 
to degenerate, and not to progress. However, he also insisted that it might be possible to 
‘counteract’ the natural tendency to degenerate ‘for an indefinite length of time’ by 
‘good institutions virtuously administered’.
6  He was convinced that, within the limits of 
the inevitable laws of causality, a well-arranged political and social system – 
                                                 
5  JSM, CRG, CW, xix, 388. 
6  Ibid.   - 205 - 
representative government in this case – could contribute to the great improvement of 
human character and thereby of social condition.   
Mill did not, however, express unqualified approval of representative government. 
After his so-called Mental Crisis, he did not think that representative government was 
the best system for all societies. Its establishment would not be justified unless it 
contributed to the improvement of the people. For Mill,
 good government was not an 
end in itself, but an instrument to further the improvement of mankind. His case for 
representative government was that, if well arranged, it would facilitate the cultivation 
of national character in a certain state of society.
7   
To Mill’s mind, the belief in our ability to build an attractive society by our own 
effort, even though constrained by the limits of the inevitable laws of causality, was ‘the 
feeling of moral freedom’.
8  Mill intended his projected science of society to provide the 
philosophical foundation for moral freedom. 
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